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1 Introduction 
While the modern global economy is highly integrated and interconnected, international taxa-
tion remains characterized by different coexisting national tax systems.1 For multinational en-
terprises (MNE), this entails both risks of double taxation and opportunities for tax avoidance.2 
International policy has long been focused on tackling double taxation resulting from a lack of 
harmonization of the tax systems. However, media reports3 of very low effective tax burdens 
of prominent multinationals have pushed the issue of tax avoidance to the top of the interna-
tional policy agenda.4 Since 2012, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and the G20, as well as the European Commission have been working on 
measures to combat base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by multinationals.5 Both the scope 
of this development and the fast speed at which international consensus on relevant issues has 
been achieved are remarkable. 
In its BEPS action plan, the OECD identified 15 actions that comprehensively target common 
tax-planning strategies.6 The final BEPS reports on these actions include recommendations 
ranging from common approaches and best practices for domestic law, through reinforced in-
ternational standards, to agreed minimum standards.7 The latter comprise a new approach to 
defining substantial activity for the evaluation of harmful tax practices, compulsory sponta-
neous exchange of information on certain tax rulings,8 new regulations against treaty abuse,9 
the introduction of mandatory country-by-country reporting,10 and changes to dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms.11 In addition, the OECD transfer pricing guidelines and the OECD model 
treaty have been substantially revised.12 As part of its Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, the Euro-
pean Commission adopted an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive on 12 July, 2016. This required 
all European Union (EU) member states to introduce specific controlled foreign company 
                                                          
1 See also Deffaa (2011), p. 287; Devereux/Fuest (2010), p. 23. 
2 See Deffaa (2011), p. 289; Lang (2003). 
3 See e.g. Duhigg/Kocieniewski (2012); Griffith (2012); Jungbluth (2013); Meck (2013). 
4 The first time G20 leaders declared the fight against tax base erosion and profit shifting by multinational corpo-
rations to be an important aim was during the G20-summit in Los Cabos in June 2012. See G20 Leaders (2012), 
p. 9. 
5 For an overview of the final reports of the OECD BEPS project, see OECD (2015a). For an overview of the Anti-
Tax Avoidance Package of the European Commission, see European Commission (2016a). 
6 See OECD (2013). 
7 See OECD (2015b), p. 6. For an overview of the intermediate reports on the 15 BEPS action points, see Spen-
gel/Nusser (2015a). 
8 For details, see OECD (2015e). 
9 For details, see OECD (2015f). 
10 For details, see OECD (2015i). 
11 For details, see OECD (2015j). 
12 For details, see OECD (2015h); OECD (2015g). 
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(CFC) regulations, an earnings stripping rule, measures against hybrid mismatch arrangements, 
regulations for exit taxation, and a general anti-abuse rule.13 These reforms may promote the 
harmonization and coordination of international taxation. To what extent they will be effective 
in reducing so-called “aggressive tax planning”14 and how both countries and multinational 
corporations will respond to those new circumstances remains to be seen. 
This dissertation contributes to the ongoing discussion of BEPS in two ways. In the first part, 
it summarizes existing knowledge of and provides new insights into the tax-minimization po-
tential of profit shifting within multinationals. It gives an overview of anecdotal and empirical 
evidence related to BEPS and identifies key elements of the international tax system that make 
aggressive tax planning possible. Based on these findings, it identifies representative tax plan-
ning arrangements and analyses their impact on the cost of capital (CoC) and effective average 
tax rates (EATRs) of cross-border investments between EU member states and the United States 
(US) using the Devereux/Griffith model. The results complement anecdotal evidence on BEPS 
by illustrating the extent to which the effective tax burden can be reduced by typical tax-plan-
ning strategies, depending on the location of the parent and subsidiary and the existence of 
certain anti-avoidance measures. 
The aim of the second part of this dissertation is to provide arguments for and analyse the effects 
of different methods for extending the taxation of interest and royalties at source. Firstly, gen-
eral approaches for combating BEPS are discussed, and the advantages of extending source 
taxation of interest and royalties are emphasized. Secondly, an overview of the prevalence and 
forms of anti-avoidance regulations extending taxation of interest and royalties at source is 
provided, and the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of these rules is summarized. In ad-
dition, this dissertation itself empirically investigates whether companies substitute between 
different profit-shifting channels, as well as how this affects the effectiveness of existing regu-
lations for source-based taxation of intragroup payments. Finally, the dissertation presents al-
ternative measures for extending taxation of interest and royalties at source that prevent the 
double taxation of profits and are not being considered by either the OECD or the European 
Commission. The dissertation highlights the different objectives and effects of these measures. 
                                                          
13 See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164. 
14 There is no clear definition of “aggressive tax planning”, see Vella (2015), p. 4. On the meaning and definition 
of “aggressive tax planning” see also Dourado (2015a) and Steiner (2007), pp. 308-309. In the following, the term 
will be used for tax-planning strategies such as those explained in Chapter 2.1. These achieve low effective tax 
burdens using BEPS. 
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It also provides rough estimates of the tax revenue gains and losses resulting from two of these 
reform options in selected countries. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes anecdotal and empirical evi-
dence related to BEPS and identifies the key elements of the international tax system that enable 
aggressive tax planning.15 In Chapter 3, the impact of representative tax-planning strategies on 
forward-looking effective tax rates is studied.16 The first section of Chapter 4 discusses prob-
lems of BEPS and potential reform options.17 In the second section of Chapter 4, current country 
practices concerning anti-avoidance measures that extend source taxation of interest and royal-
ties are summarized. In addition, empirical evidence about their effectiveness is provided.18 
Alternative methods to strengthen the taxation of interest and royalties at source and their po-
tential tax-revenue consequences are discussed in the third section of Chapter 4.19 Chapter 5 
concludes the dissertation. 
This dissertation is based on several papers originally written as submissions for publications 
in taxation journals and includes a report commissioned by the European Commission. Table 1 
lists these papers, referring to the co-authors, the publication status and the contribution of the 
author of this dissertation.
                                                          
15 Chapter 2.1.1, providing anecdotal evidence on BEPS, is based on a paper published in the World Tax Journal 
and co-authored by Clemens Fuest, Christoph Spengel, Katharina Nicolay, and Jost H. Heckemeyer, see Fuest et 
al. (2013) pp. 309-312. 
16 The chapter is based on a study conducted on behalf of the European Commission, published as European 
Commission Taxation Paper No 64-2016. It is a joint work with Christoph Spengel, Jost H. Heckemeyer, Oliver 
Klar, and Frank Streif, see Spengel et al. (2016b). 
17 This chapter is based loosely on arguments presented in two papers co-authored by Clemens Fuest, Christoph 
Spengel, Katharina Nicolay, and Jost H. Heckemeyer published in Steuer und Wirtschaft and the World Tax Jour-
nal, see Fuest et al. (2015) and Fuest et al. (2013). 
18 Chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are extracts of a paper co-authored by Katharina Nicolay (née Finke), Clemens Fuest, 
and Christoph Spengel which has been published as ZEW Discussion Paper 14-073, see Finke et al. (2014). The 
content has been slightly modified. Chapter 4.2.3 is a joint work with Katharina Nicolay and Olena Pfeiffer, pub-
lished in a modified version as ZEW Discussion Paper 17-066, see Nicolay et al. (2017). 
19 This chapter is based on Sections 5 and 6 of a paper co-authored by Katharina Nicolay (née Finke), Clemens 
Fuest, and Christoph Spengel which has been published as ZEW Discussion Paper 14-073, see Finke et al. (2014). 
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Table 1: Co-authors, publication status, and contribution of the author 
  Paper  Co-Authors  Publication Status Own Key Contribution 
1  Profit Shifting and “Aggres-
sive” Tax Planning by Multi-
national Firms: Issues and 
Options for Reform 
 Clemens Fuest         
Jost H. Heckemeyer 
Katharina Nicolay 
Christoph Spengel 
 Published in         
World Tax Journal 
- Description of tax-planning strategies of prominent mul-
tinational corporations 
- Elaboration and description of policies to address profit 
shifting and “aggressive” tax planning 
2  Eindämmung internationaler 
Gewinnverlagerung: Wo 
steht die OECD und was 
sind die Alternativen? 
 Clemens Fuest         
Jost H. Heckemeyer 
Katharina Nicolay 
Christoph Spengel 
 Published in         
Steuer und Wirt-
schaft 
- Description of the OECD-BEPS actions and of general 
options for reform 
- Discussion of the German position on BEPS 
3  The impact of tax planning 
on forward-looking effective 
tax rates 
 Jost H. Heckemeyer 
Oliver Klar         
Christoph Spengel 
Frank Streif 
 Published as            
European Commis-
sion Taxation Paper 
No. 64-2016  
- Introduction and positioning of the study 
- Development and description of the tax-planning strate-
gies and collection and description of relevant tax para-
meters 
- Adaption of the basic formulas of the Devereux/Griffith 
model and implementation into the java code underlying 
the software TaxKit used to calculate effective tax rates 
- Evaluation and description of the baseline results 
- Evaluation and description of the CoC and EATR results 
for all tax planning alternatives 
- Collection and description of information on CFC rules in 
EU member states and the US and modelling and descrip-
tion of examples for the effect of anti-avoidance rules 
- Summary of results 
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4  Extending Taxation of Inter-
est and Royalty Income at 
Source – an Option to Limit 
Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting? 
 
 Clemens Fuest 
Katharina Nicolay 
Christoph Spengel 
 Published as          
ZEW Discussion 
Paper No. 14-073 
- Introduction and positioning of the study 
- Collection and description of information on interest de-
duction limitation rules and WHTs on interest and royal-
ties in EU, European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and 
G20 member states 
- Qualitative literature survey 
- Description and analysis of reform options 
- Data collection 
- Data evaluation and description of stylized facts on cross-
border royalties and license fee flows 
- Tax revenue estimation including development of study 
design, calculation of revenue effects and description of 
results 
  
5  On the interdependency of 
profit-shifting channels and 
the effectiveness of anti-
avoidance legislation 
 Katharina Nicolay 
Olena Pfeiffer 
 Published as     
ZEW Discussion 
Paper No. 17-066 
- Introduction and positioning of the study 
- Development of data collection concept 
- Collection of data on interest deduction limitation rules 
and transfer pricing regulations and elaboration of strict-
ness indicators 
- Development of the model and hypothesis 
- Description of the data, estimation approaches, and insti-
tutional background 
- Panel analysis 
- Difference-in-Difference analysis 
- Description of results 
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2 Anecdotal and empirical evidence on BEPS 
The lack of harmonization of international taxation and the substantial tax-rate differences be-
tween countries create numerous possibilities for multinational corporations to engage in tax 
planning. How high the resulting tax savings may be in individual cases has been revealed by 
media reports20 and academic publications21 about the tax planning arrangements of Google, 
Apple, and several other prominent multinational corporations. According to numbers pub-
lished in Tax Notes International, Google and Apple have been able to reduce their effective 
tax rate on non-US income to 3% and 1%, respectively in 2010 by shifting profits from high-
tax to zero-tax countries and stateless companies.22 In Chapter 2.1, some of the tax planning 
structures of well-known multinational corporations are outlined to identify the distinct ele-
ments of taxation that render such arrangements possible. In Chapter 2.2, an overview of em-
pirical studies on the extent and forms of multinational profit shifting is provided to illustrate 
the general significance of the issue beyond anecdotal evidence. Chapter 2.3 summarizes the 
findings of the previous two sections and defines three key elements of the international tax 
system that make aggressive tax planning possible. 
2.1 Tax-planning strategies of prominent multinational corporations  
The disclosed tax planning structures of prominent multinational corporations all feature simi-
lar and distinctive elements. Chapter 2.1.1 describes these elements in detail, based on the tax-
planning strategy that Google has been using. In Chapter 2.1.2, a short overview of alternative 
structures applied by several other multinational corporations is provided. 
2.1.1 “Double Irish Dutch sandwich”23 
The tax-planning technique that Google and others have been using to reduce tax liability on 
non-US income has become known as the “Double Irish Dutch sandwich”.24 As its name im-
plies, this technique involves two companies incorporated in Ireland (one intellectual property 
(IP)25-holding company and one operating company), and one conduit company incorporated 
                                                          
20 See e.g. Duhigg/Kocieniewski (2012); Meck (2013); Jungbluth (2013). 
21 See e.g. Kleinbard (2011a), pp. 707-714; Sandell (2012). 
22 See Sullivan (2012). 
23 This chapter is a slightly modified extract from Fuest et al. (2013), pp. 309-312. 
24 Google now seems to use a different structure. However, the “Double Irish Dutch sandwich” or single elements 
of it are also used by other multinationals, and the structure serves as a good example to illustrate important features 
of aggressive tax planning. For the statement on Google’s new strategy, see House of Commons - Committee of 
Public Accounts (2012). 
25 In line with the OECD definition, the term IP in the following denotes the rights to use industrial assets, such as 
patents, trademarks, trade names, designs, models and so on. Such commercial IP can be classified into trade IP 
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in the Netherlands.26 The IP holding company is a direct subsidiary of the U.S. parent company 
and the single owner of the Irish operating company and the Dutch conduit company. The IP 
holding company is managed and controlled in Bermuda and is therefore considered resident 
in this country for Irish tax purposes.27 The US, in contrast, treats the company as an Irish 
corporation because, according to US tax law, tax residency is based on jurisdiction of incor-
poration.  
Figure 1 summarizes the structure. In the following, the single steps and elements of the “Dou-
ble Irish Dutch sandwich” are explained in detail. 
Figure 1: „Double Irish Dutch sandwich” 
 
 
                                                          
and marketing IP. While trade IP (e.g. patents) is often created through costly and risky research and development 
(R&D) activities, marketing IP (e.g. trademarks) serves the commercial exploitation of a product or service, etc. 
See OECD (2010). 
26 For a detailed description of the structure, see Berrong (2010); Kleinbard (2011a); Sandell (2012); Pinkernell 
(2012); Brothers (2014). 
27 With the Finance Act 2014, Ireland changed its company residence rules. Since 2015, companies that are either 
incorporated in Ireland or managed from Ireland are considered to be subject to unlimited tax liability in Ireland. 
However, a transition period until 2020 applies for companies incorporated in Ireland before 2015. See Irish Tax 
and Customs (2017). 
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(1) Payment of low tax on the initial IP transfer 
To set up the structure, the U.S. parent company first transferred the rights to use its IP outside 
of the US to the IP holding company. According to the U.S. super-royalty rule, transferring the 
full-fledged intangible would have triggered taxation of the hidden reserves and future income 
generated by the intangible.28 Therefore, the IP holding company has likely made a buy-in pay-
ment and concluded a cost-sharing agreement on the future modification and enhancement of 
the IP with the U.S. parent company. Under a cost-sharing agreement, the IP holding company 
bears a certain share of the research and development (R&D) costs for the future development 
of the IP, and it is thus entitled to a respective share of worldwide profits.29 The R&D activities 
usually largely remain in the US.30 As the IP holding company owns the non-U.S. IP rights 
developed under the cost-sharing agreement no periodic license payments must be made to the 
U.S. parent company. Determining the arm’s length price for the buy-in payment is often very 
difficult as the intangible is only partially developed at the time of transfer and risk is associated 
with future earnings. Hence, multinationals have considerable leeway in determining the price 
and are usually able to avoid high exit taxes.31 
(2) Almost no taxation in the country of final consumption  
The Irish operating company exploits the IP and earns revenues. In Google’s case, the operating 
company provides advertising services and acts as the contractual partner of non-U.S. cus-
tomers. No substantial physical presence is created in the country of final consumption and the 
profits cannot be taxed there. Functions in the customers’ residence states (such as marketing 
activities) are usually assigned to low-risk group companies. These group service providers 
work on a cost-plus basis, which keeps the tax base in the country of final consumption low.  
 
 
 
                                                          
28 According to this rule, transfer prices determined at the time of transfer that are not commensurate with the 
income attributable to the intangible may be adjusted later on. For details on the rule, see Lessambo (2016), pp. 
315-316. 
29 For an overview of the U.S. rules for cost-sharing agreements, see Simone/Sansing (2016), pp. 6-11; Heriford 
et al. (2013). 
30 See Ting (2014), p. 42; Sapirie (2013), p. 1037. 
31 According to the U.S. cost-sharing regulations, buy-in payments can also be adjusted if the profit of a participant 
in the cost-sharing agreement turns out to be too high relative to payments. See also Keates et al. (2009). However, 
there are exceptions to this, and similar adjustment rules and their application seem to be avoidable. See Pinkernell 
(2013), p. 182 footnote 18. 
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(3) Setting high royalty payments reduces taxation at the level of the operating company  
The profits from customer sales earned by the operating company are subject to tax in Ireland. 
However, the tax base of the operating company is close to zero because it pays high tax-de-
ductible royalties for the use of the IP that is held by the IP holding company. As Ireland has 
only recently introduced transfer pricing rules and these rules do not apply to contracts and 
terms agreed before July 2010,32 most companies using the “Double Irish Dutch sandwich” are 
able to erode the tax base in Ireland by paying very high royalty payments. 
(4) Interposition of Dutch conduit company to avoid withholding taxes 
The royalties are not paid directly to the IP holding company but are passed through a conduit 
company in the Netherlands, which sublicenses the IP. The Dutch conduit company does not 
perform any economic activity. It is interposed because the IP holding company is a Bermuda 
resident for Irish tax purposes, and Ireland levies withholding tax (WHT) on royalty payments 
to Bermuda. By channeling the royalties through the Dutch conduit company, WHTs can be 
completely circumvented, as royalties paid from Ireland to the Netherlands are tax-free under 
the EU Interest and Royalties Directive.33 Moreover, the Netherlands does not impose WHT on 
any royalty payments, irrespective of the residence state of the receiving company. 
(5) IP holding company untaxed in Ireland and Bermuda 
The IP holding company is subject to tax in neither Ireland nor Bermuda, since Ireland consid-
ers the company a non-resident and Bermuda does not impose income tax on corporations. 
Hence, the profits earned in the EU leave it virtually untaxed. 
(6) U.S. CFC rules are circumvented 
The US also does not tax non-U.S. income as long as it is not redistributed as dividends or 
qualified as Subpart F income under U.S. CFC rules.34 To avoid the latter, the Irish operating 
company and the Dutch conduit company file a check-the-box election with the consequence 
that both Irish subsidiaries and the Dutch Conduit Company are treated as one single Irish cor-
poration and their incomes are combined for U.S. tax purposes. The royalty payments between 
the companies are thus disregarded. This also means that only revenues from transactions with 
                                                          
32 See Hogan/Galvin (2010), p. 222. 
33 Council Directive 2003/49/EC. 
34 For an overview of U.S. CFC rules, see Brauner/Herzfeld (2013) and Demleitner (2012). 
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customers (which typically do not constitute Subpart F income due to exceptions included in 
the Subpart F provisions) are considered from a U.S. perspective. 
2.1.2 Overview of other MNE tax planning arrangements 
The “Double Irish Dutch sandwich” is only one example of how multinational companies use 
profit shifting to minimize tax payments. In the following, an overview of comparable strategies 
applied by other multinational corporations is provided. 
Until recently,35 Apple, one of the world’s most valuable corporations, used a structure that was 
fairly similar to Google’s. The company also took advantage of the conflicting definition of tax 
residence according to Irish and U.S. tax law and transferred economic ownership of its IP 
rights for sales and manufacturing in Europe and Asia from the US to two companies resident 
in Ireland using cost-sharing agreements.36 The Irish tax authorities considered the two Irish 
affiliates (named AOE and ASI) that were conducting intragroup sales to in-country distribution 
companies in Europe and Asia37 to be managed from a head office in the US. However, this 
head office did not have employees or any physical presence in the US.38 Consequently, the 
two companies were not subject to unlimited tax liability in either the US or Ireland. Only their 
income attributable to the branches in Ireland and thus sourced in Ireland was taxable there. 
Two tax rulings granted by the Irish tax authorities39 ensured that the fraction of profits of AOE 
and ASI that were allocated to the Irish branches was vanishingly small, resulting in an overall 
effective tax rate for Apple’s European sales of less than 1%.40  
This demonstrates that Apple was able to yield comparable tax savings to those of Google using 
profit shifting via intragroup sales and royalty payments. They did this with an even simpler 
strategy that did not involve a conduit company in the Netherlands. Moreover, this example 
suggests that substantial tax avoidance is not only achievable for companies selling services via 
the internet but also for companies selling tangible goods to consumers via on-the-ground busi-
nesses. 
                                                          
35 Since 2015, Apple seems to use a new corporate structure. See European Commission (2016c), p. 42. Details on 
the new structure have not yet been published. 
36 For details on the cost-sharing agreements, see European Commission (2016c), pp. 36-40. 
37 AOE is responsible for manufacturing a certain series of computer products and sells them to related parties. 
ASI buys finished products from third-party contract manufacturers and sells them to related and unrelated parties. 
See Ting (2014), pp. 42-44; European Commission (2016c), pp. 10-12. 
38 See European Commission (2016c), pp. 10. 
39 On 30 August, 2016, the European Commission announced that these tax rulings constitute illegal state aid. For 
the Commission Decision and detailed information on the rulings, see European Commission (2016c). For an 
overview of state-aid investigations on this and other tax rulings, see Linn, A. (2015). 
40 See European Commission (2016d). 
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The latter becomes particularly obvious when considering the tax-planning strategy of Star-
bucks. Starbucks features a retail business model that relies heavily on significant presence at 
the location of the final customer.41 In 2012, it was revealed that Starbucks in the United King-
dom (UK) reported losses and consequently paid almost no tax for most of the years present in 
the UK.42 The losses seem to have been derived from substantial intragroup payments. Star-
bucks UK paid royalties to a Dutch company for using the brand and trademark, as well as for 
related IP rights. The Dutch company in turn payed royalties to a UK-based partnership liable 
to tax in neither the Netherlands nor the UK. It seems that this company is owned via two other 
Dutch partnerships that are themselves ultimately owned by a U.S. holding company.43 The 
U.S. tax status of the partnerships is unclear. The UK partnership is possibly part of a hybrid 
structure not considered to be liable to unlimited taxation in the US or any other country.44 In 
addition to the royalty payment, Starbucks UK also paid high mark-ups on the coffee purchased 
from another Dutch company. This Dutch company roasts coffee and sells roasted coffee beans 
to related and unrelated operators of Starbucks shops in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.45 
It in turn pays inflated prices for green coffee beans traded by a Swiss Starbucks affiliate. This 
Swiss company is likely to benefit from a special tax regime in Switzerland, implying low tax-
ation of the income from the sale of the coffee beans.46 In addition, the Dutch roasting company 
also pays royalties for the roasting technology to the UK-based presumably tax-exempt part-
nership. In a tax ruling, the Dutch tax authorities approved the high royalty rate and mark-up 
for coffee beans paid by the Dutch roasting company.47 
The tax-planning strategy applied by Starbucks illustrates that extensive tax-induced profit 
shifting using royalty payments and transfer pricing is not restricted to companies that offer 
high-technology products. Instead, it seems to be generally available to all companies with a 
well-established brand name and business model. Moreover, the cases of Starbucks and Apple 
                                                          
41 See Kleinbard (2013), p. 1516. 
42 See Bergin (2012). 
43 See also Herzfeld (2014), p. 860. 
44 See Kleinbard (2013), p. 1522 and p. 1525; Tavares/Bogenschneider/Pankiv (2016). On this kind of Dutch CV-
BV structures in general, see Vleggeert (2016a). 
45 See European Commission (2015a), pp. 8-9. 
46 Starbucks reported that it faced an effective tax rate of 12% over its history in Switzerland. This number might, 
however, refer to the aggregate tax payments for all Starbucks operations in Switzerland, while commodity traders 
as the Swiss coffee-trading company are often subject to even lower taxation in Switzerland. See Kleinbard (2013), 
p. 1527. 
47 On 21 October, 2015, the European Commission announced that those tax rulings constitute illegal state aid. 
For the Commission Decision and detailed information on the rulings, see European Commission (2015a). For the 
reaction of the Netherlands and Starbucks to this decision, see Finet (2015). 
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suggest that favorable tax rulings are a crucial element of tax avoidance strategies of multina-
tionals.48 
Certain European countries (Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) play a central role in 
the previous examples. Besides these, Luxembourg has also become known as a very favorable 
location for multinational corporations engaging in aggressive tax planning. Amazon, for ex-
ample, conducts its sales to customers in Europe via a company resident in Luxembourg. This 
company in turn pays a high royalty and presumably a high level of interest49 to a limited lia-
bility partnership that is also established in Luxembourg, thus reducing the taxable profit of the 
operating company to a very low level. 50 A ruling from the Luxembourg tax authorities has 
confirmed the adequacy of the royalty rate.51 The IP holding company is classified differently 
by Luxembourg and the US. This difference results in neither the company in Luxembourg nor 
its U.S. partners being subject to tax on the royalty income as long as the profits are not dis-
tributed.52  
Another example of a multinational corporation using a hybrid mismatch arrangement and a 
tax ruling from Luxembourg is McDonalds. The franchisors and related-party operators of 
McDonalds restaurants pay franchise fees and royalties to a Swiss branch of a Luxembourg-
based company. This Swiss branch forwards the royalties to a U.S. branch of the Luxembourg 
company and receives a small service fee on a cost-plus basis.53 Luxembourg has testified in a 
tax ruling that the royalty income is attributable to the two foreign branches and that these are, 
as permanent establishments, not subject to taxation in Luxembourg. In a revised version of the 
tax ruling requested a few months later, it was also confirmed that the non-existence of a per-
manent establishment in the US for U.S. tax purposes (and thus the U.S. tax-exemption of the 
profits) did not engender taxation in Luxembourg either.54 Consequently, the royalties received 
by the U.S. branch of the Luxembourg IP holding are tax-exempt in both the US and Luxem-
bourg. The “LuxLeaks” scandal illustrated that it is common practice in Luxembourg to issue 
favorable tax rulings to multinational corporations.55 
                                                          
48 Google may also have received a tax ruling by the Irish tax authorities, but no information about this is available. 
49 For indices for those interest payments, see Sheppard (2015), p. 292. 
50 European Commission (2014), p. 5-6; Sheppard (2015), p. 291-292. 
51 The European Commission has launched a formal state-aid investigation concerning this ruling. See European 
Commission (2014). 
52 See European Commission (2014), p. 8. 
53 See European Commission (2015b), p. 7. 
54 The European Commission has launched a formal state-aid investigation concerning this ruling. See European 
Commission (2015b). 
55 For the process through which Luxembourg issued tax rulings, see Marian (2016). 
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All prior examples refer to multinational corporations headquartered in the US that can avoid 
paying taxes in Europe while also escaping taxation under U.S. CFC rules using these rules’ 
available exceptions. However, the use of aggressive tax planning structures is not limited to 
U.S. multinational corporations. Anecdotal evidence for extensive profit-shifting activities also 
exists for several companies headquartered in other countries.56 Ikea, for example, requires all 
country subsidiaries to pay a royalty of 3% of total sales to a Dutch company.57 A study com-
missioned by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament suggests that the royalty in-
come is further channeled to a financing company in Luxembourg potentially via interest pay-
ments on a hybrid loan.58 Under a hybrid loan arrangement, the interest is deductible in the 
residence country of the payer and tax-exempt at the level of the recipient, since the residence 
country of the recipient considers it to be dividend income.59 The Luxembourg financing com-
pany featured an effective tax rate of only 0.06% during the years 2012-2014 and paid dividends 
to a tax-exempt foundation in Liechtenstein.60 
Another report provides hints that the German-headquartered company BASF engages in a 
broad range of different profit-shifting strategies.61 For example, there are indicators that BASF 
channels profits from the US to Belgium via interest payments and further via a hybrid loan to 
the Netherlands.62 This would allow for almost complete avoidance of any tax payment on these 
profits. In addition, there is evidence that BASF makes use of the Dutch innovation box, which 
applies a tax rate of 5% to income from intangible property.63 Moreover, BASF seems to hold 
some intangible assets in a Swiss branch of a Dutch company. The effective tax rate of this 
company is reported to have been 6.2% over the years 2010-2014.64 The report further suggests 
that profits of BASF’s operating companies are shifted to a Belgium company via transfer pric-
ing of services. These profits seem to remain largely tax-exempt at the level of the Belgium 
company due to the use of the notional-interest-deduction-regime in Belgium. This regime al-
lows for the deduction of a certain percentage of new equity (NE) from the tax base.65 
                                                          
56 In addition to the following examples, there is a report on the aggressive tax-planning strategies of Inditex, 
which owns Zara and other fashion brands, see Tataret (2016). 
57 See Auerbach (2016a), p 15. Previously, a slightly different structure applied. 
58 The report commissioned by the Greens/EFA in the European Parliament suggests that Luxembourg has granted 
a favourable tax ruling for the taxation of the interest income. 
59 An overview of the taxation of financial instruments is given in Bärsch (2012). 
60 See Auerbach (2016a), p. 18. 
61 See Auerbach (2016b). In the following, only some of these strategies are covered. 
62 See Auerbach (2016b). 
63 See Auerbach (2016b). For details on the Dutch innovation box, see Nijhof/Kloes (2010) and Chapter 3.2.3.3. 
64 See Auerbach (2016b). 
65 For details on this regime, see Bombeke/v. Frenckell (2006). 
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2.2 Empirical evidence of BEPS 
As well as anecdotal evidence, there is also broad empirical evidence for tax-induced profit 
shifting within multinational corporations.66  
The main conceptual framework used to identify the existence of profit shifting in the empirical 
literature has been established by Grubert and Mutti67 and Hines and Rice68. The underlying 
assumption of this strand of literature is that the reported profit of companies consists of true 
profit and shifted profit. To control for the value of true profit, most studies include measures 
of production factors in their analysis, including capital and employees.69 The tax incentive, 
measured by either the tax rate or different forms of the tax rate differential,70 defines the level 
of shifted profit. While early studies using this approach have relied on aggregate country-level 
data, more recent papers have used firm level panel data, which allows scholars to control for 
confounding factors and yields more reliable estimates.71 The studies have generally shown that 
a firm’s pre-tax profitability decreases as the tax rate or tax rate differential increases. Hecke-
meyer and Overesch have conducted a comprehensive literature survey by qualitatively and 
quantitatively analyzing 25 empirical studies that regress a tax-rate incentive on companies 
profit or EBIT.72 The authors concluded that an increase of one percentage point in the tax 
differential between a given firm and its affiliates reduces its reported profits by 0.8%.  
While most studies of profit shifting use corporate tax rates as a source of identification, a study 
of Dharmapala and Riedel has examined exogenous earnings shocks at the parent firm and 
investigated their impact on low-tax and high-tax subsidiaries.73 The authors have found evi-
dence for a tax-motivated increase in reported profits of low-tax (but not high-tax) affiliates. 
The results suggest that 2% of the additional profit is shifted to low-tax affiliates. Another ap-
proach to estimate the loss in taxes due to profit shifting compares the tax payments of multi-
national and domestic companies that are highly similar in relevant firm characteristics. This 
approach has been proposed by Egger et al.74 and Finke75. The former have reported a 30% 
                                                          
66 For an overview of these studies, see Dharmapala (2014a); Riedel (2014); Schjelderup (2016). 
67 See Grubert/Mutti (1991). 
68 See Hines/Rice (1994). 
69 See also Dharmapala (2014a), p. 424. 
70 A tax differential was first used by Huizinga/Laeven (2008). 
71 See Dharmapala (2014a), p. 4. 
72 See Heckemeyer/Overesch (2017). 
73 See Dharmapala/Riedel (2013). 
74 See Egger/Eggert/Winner (2010). 
75 See Finke (2013). 
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lower tax burden for multinational corporations in European high-tax countries, while Finke 
has highlighted a 27% lower tax burden for German-headquartered multinationals.76 
Furthermore, numerous empirical studies have focused on analyzing single profit-shifting chan-
nels. These studies provide evidence that multinationals use both debt financing and non-finan-
cial transactions, such as the intragroup transfer of goods and services or licensing of IP, to shift 
income earned in high-tax countries to lower taxed group entities. With respect to debt financ-
ing, Desai et al. have used data of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to provide 
empirical evidence that multinationals use intra-company loans to mitigate tax payments of 
subsidiaries in high-tax locations.77 They reported that higher tax rates are associated with 
higher affiliate debt-to-asset ratios, and they stated that internal debt levels are particularly sen-
sitive to tax rates. Huizinga et al. have also found an effect of the international tax system on 
leverage for a sample of European firms,78 while Buettner and Wamser have confirmed these 
results for affiliates of German multinationals.79 A study of Egger et al. has shown that the debt-
to-asset ratio of multinational firms is significantly higher than the debt-to-asset ratio of domes-
tic firms.80 In a meta-study, Feld et al. have surveyed 48 empirical studies of the relationship 
between taxation and capital structure choices.81 Across all studies, the authors found a signif-
icant relationship between tax incentives and firms’ capital structures. Accounting for different 
study characteristics, they predicted a marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of approximately 
0.27. Hence, an increase of the tax rate differential by one percentage point results in an increase 
of the debt ratio by 0.27. 
Regarding the use of intrafirm trade as a channel of profit shifting, two different studies of 
Clausing have shown that taxation significantly influences the intragroup trade flows between 
U.S. firms and foreign affiliates.82 In one study, Clausing has argued that an increase of the 
statutory tax rate by one percentage point in one country is associated with a 1.9% drop in 
intrafirm trade between affiliates in this country and their parents.83 In another study, Clausing 
has found that not only the magnitude of intragroup transactions, but also the prices used in 
intrafirm trade respond to tax rate changes.84 Bartelsman and Beetsma have confirmed these 
                                                          
76 See also Riedel (2014), p. 5. 
77 See Desai et al. (2004). 
78 See Huizinga et al. (2008). 
79 See Buettner/Wamser (2013). 
80 See Egger/Eggert/Keuschnigg/Winner (2010). 
81 See Feld et al. (2013). 
82 See Clausing (2001) and Clausing (2006). 
83 See Clausing (2006). 
84 See Clausing (2003). 
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findings using data on intra sectoral trade between OECD countries,85 while Overesch and 
Schreiber have found similar results for a sample of German multinationals.86 Furthermore, 
there is robust evidence that the strategic location of intangibles is sensitive to the tax rate. A 
study of Karkinsky and Riedel reports that a 1% increase in the corporate income tax (CIT) rate 
decreases the holding of patents by approximately 3.5%.87 In addition, Desai et al. have pro-
vided evidence that large multinationals engaging in extensive intrafirm trade and featuring a 
high R&D-intensity are the most likely to have affiliates in tax havens.88 
Empirical evidence relating to the relative importance of the profit-shifting channels is not uni-
fied. Heckemeyer and Overesch have found that the volumes of shifted tax bases are driven to 
one third by the channel of internal debt financing and to two thirds by tax-motivated adjust-
ments of related-party transactions.89 The results of Dharmapala and Riedel,90 on the other hand, 
suggest a larger effect of debt financing, whereas the findings of Grubert point to equal shares.91 
To conclude, empirical evidence related to corporate tax avoidance is robust and significant. 
Moreover, it has been clearly demonstrated that both licensing and transfer pricing, as well as 
group financing strategies, are used to reallocate profits within the group. However, it is less 
clear which strategy of tax avoidance is most relevant. Finally, very little is known about the 
actual revenue consequences of these strategies.92 
2.3 Summarized findings 
The tax planning structures described in Chapter 2.1 and the empirical evidence summarized in 
Chapter 2.2 reveal that opportunities for aggressive tax planning are not restricted to companies 
active in a particular industry or headquartered in a specific country. Basically, most multina-
tional companies seem to have certain opportunities to take advantage of existing flaws and 
incentives in the international CIT systems, thus making BEPS possible. 
The presented tax planning arrangements are fostered by the following three key elements of 
the international tax system: 
                                                          
85 See Bartelsman/Beetsma (2003). 
86 See Overesch/Schreiber (2010). 
87 See Karkinsky/Riedel (2012). 
88 See Desai et al. (2006). 
89 See Heckemeyer/Overesch (2017). 
90 See Dharmapala/Riedel (2013). 
91 See Grubert (2003). 
92 The last paragraph is taken from Fuest et al. (2013), p.316. 
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(1) a lack of concurrent taxation of worldwide income at the level of the ultimate parent 
company; 
(2) the existence of tax havens, preferential tax regimes, tax rulings, and hybrid mismatch 
arrangements offering non- or low-taxation of interest, royalty, and transfer pricing in-
come; 
(3) a lack of taxation of interest and royalty payments or other transfer prices in the residence 
country of the payer. 
Obtaining an advantage from base erosion and profit-shifting strategies firstly requires shelter-
ing income of foreign subsidiaries from taxation at the level of the parent company. This is 
generally the case for all companies headquartered in countries applying the exemption method 
to dividend income, and it may also be achieved for companies resident in a country with a 
credit system by deferring the distribution of profits.93 CFC rules are often either inexistent or 
ineffective. For example, the latter is true for the US and EU member states. In the US, the 
check-the-box regulations and several exceptions make it easy to circumvent the application of 
CFC rules.94 Following the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, EU member states 
must exempt subsidiaries resident in EU or EEA member states from the application of CFC 
rules if the structure does not constitute a wholly artificial arrangement.95 
Non- or low-taxation of interest and royalty income and income from other transfer prices can 
be achieved by locating the affiliates receiving interest, royalties, and transfer prices in zero- or 
low-tax countries or countries that offer preferential tax regimes. An alternative is to make use 
of hybrid mismatch arrangements under which the income is not subjected to tax by the in-
volved countries (thanks to a conflicting qualification of either the company or the income).                          
This strategy is fostered by favorable tax rulings and the ability to enter into cost-sharing agree-
ments that allow for the transfer of IP to low-tax locations without triggering exit taxation. 
The opportunity to erode the tax base via interest and royalty payments as well as other transfer 
prices is a basic element of most international tax systems. This is because factor remunerations 
are usually deductible at the level of the payer and taxed in the residence country of the recipi-
ent.96 Countries may generally levy a WHT on outgoing payments. Within the EU, however, 
                                                          
93 Most countries currently apply the exemption method to dividends, see Kofler (2012). 
94 See Ting (2015), p. 411-413. 
95 See European Court of Justice (2006). See also Fontana (2006); Smit (2014). An empirical study confirms that 
this exemption strongly weakens the effectiveness of CFC rules in a European context, see Ruf/Weichenrieder 
(2013). 
96 See also Dharmapala (2014b). 
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the Interest and Royalties Directive97 (which was introduced in 2003 with the aim of reducing 
tax obstacles between member states) forbids the levying of WHTs in cases of transactions 
between at least 25%-associated companies. Many countries also do not levy WHT with respect 
to payments to third countries.98 Difficulties in the valuation of royalty payments, as well as 
other transfer prices, facilitate the shifting of large parts of profit via intragroup payments. This 
is especially true if transfer pricing regulations are weak.99 
  
                                                          
97 Directive 2003/49/EC. 
98 For an overview, see Chapter 4.2.1. 
99 For the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations, see Chapters 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. 
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3 The impact of tax planning on forward-looking effective tax rates100 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, both anecdotal and empirical evidence for extensive tax-induced 
profit shifting within multinational corporations exists. The purpose of this chapter is to provide 
a more general insight into the impact of representative tax-planning strategies on forward-
looking effective tax rates considering cross-border investments between the EU member states 
and the US. The Devereux/Griffith model is used to calculate CoC and EATRs for cross-border 
investments using typical tax-planning strategies. This allows for comparison of the results for 
different tax planning structures to the results for direct cross-border investments. The latter are 
provided by the annually updated report on effective tax rates conducted by the Centre for Eu-
ropean Economic Research (ZEW) and commissioned by the European Commission.101 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Chapter 3.1, the Devereux/Griffith model used to com-
pute CoC and EATR is briefly described. This section also lists the underlying economic as-
sumptions of the model. Chapter 3.2 provides an overview of the different tax-planning strate-
gies and countries considered, before summarizing relevant tax parameters. Chapter 3.3 ex-
plains which adaptions to the basic cross-border formula of the Devereux/Griffith model have 
been made to generate the results for CoC and EATR for the different tax-planning strategies. 
Chapter 3.4 summarizes the baseline results that present the most tax-efficient way for a multi-
national parent company to directly finance an investment in a wholly owned foreign sub-      
sidiary. Chapter 3.5 discusses the effective tax levels computed for all considered tax-planning 
strategies and compares them to the baseline results. Chapter 3.6 examines the potential effects 
of anti-avoidance measures on the results. Finally, Chapter 3.7 concludes. 
3.1 Methodology: The Devereux/Griffith model 
To quantify the impact of tax planning on forward-looking effective tax rates the Deve-
reux/Griffith model, developed by Devereux and Griffith, 102 is used. The model has already 
been applied in several studies on behalf of the European Commission, such as the annual report 
on effective tax levels in the EU prepared by ZEW.103  
                                                          
100 This chapter is a slightly modified version of a study co-authored by Christoph Spengel, Jost H. Heckemeyer, 
Oliver Klar, and Frank Streif (2016). It was commissioned by the European Commission and published as Euro-
pean Commission Taxation Paper No 64-2016, see Spengel et al. (2016b). 
101 For 2015, see Spengel et al. (2016a). 
102 See Devereux/Griffith (1999). 
103 For the annual report 2015, see e.g. Spengel et al. (2016a). Other reports include European Commission (2001); 
Devereux et al. (2008).  
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The basic approach proposed by Devereux and Griffith considers a hypothetical incremental 
investment located in a specific country. This investment is undertaken by a company that may 
reside in either the same or in a different country. The hypothetical investment takes place in 
one period and generates a return in the following period. 
Given a post-tax real rate of return required by the company's shareholder, it is possible to use 
the tax code to compute the implied required pre-tax real rate of return, known as the CoC. The 
proportionate difference between the CoC and the required post-tax real rate of return is known 
as the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). This approach assumes that firms undertake all in-
vestment projects that earn at least the required rate of return. A complementary approach 
would be to consider discrete investment choices and, in particular, discrete location choices. 
Devereux and Griffith have proposed using an EATR as a measure to identify the effect of 
taxation on such discrete location choices. 
The investment and financial structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Structure of the supposed investment 
 
For the hypothetical investment project and its underlying economic conditions, the following 
assumptions from the annual reports on effective tax levels in the EU (prepared by ZEW) ap-
ply:104 
                                                          
104 For 2015, see Spengel et al. (2016a). 
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- the pre-tax rate of return on profitable investment projects is assumed to amount to 20%; 
- the real interest rate of an alternative investment is assumed to be 5%; 
- the inflation rate is assumed to be 2% in all countries; 
- investments in five different assets – intangibles (purchase of a patent), industrial build-
ings, machinery, financial assets and inventories – are considered; 
- the depreciation rates are 15.35% for intangibles, 3.1% for industrial buildings, and 
17.5% for machinery (financial assets and inventories are not depreciated); 
- there are three possible ways of financing the investment – retained earnings (RE), NE, 
and debt; 
- to represent averages over different forms of investment, equal weights for each asset 
type (20%) apply;  
-  for the refinancing of the parent company, the financing weights are 55% RE, 10% NE, 
and 35% debt. 
3.2 Study design 
The aim of this study is to show the impact of typical tax-planning strategies on the CoC for 
marginal investments and the EATR for profitable investments. It considers cross-border in-
vestments of multinational (parent) corporations located in any of the EU member states and 
the US. Due to a lack of detailed information about relevant shareholders and the high mobility 
of the international capital market, personal taxes are of little importance for decision making 
in MNEs.105 Thus, the analysis is limited to the corporate level (i.e. excluding shareholder tax-
ation). As BEPS focuses on large multinational corporations, the case of incorporated SMEs 
and partnerships is ignored. 
As a consequence of the complexity and diversity of international tax rules, multinationals en-
joy manifold tax planning opportunities. Below, this dissertation focuses on basic strategies that 
play a central role in international tax planning and are generally available to all multinational 
corporations.106 The cases considered represent simplified forms of the tax-planning strategies 
discussed in Chapter 2.1 and the study on structures of aggressive tax planning conducted by 
Ramboll Management Consulting and Corit Advisory.107 All tax-planning strategies studied are 
                                                          
105 See Spengel (2003), p. 81-85. 
106 For anecdotal and empirical evidence on the use of these strategies, see Chapter 2. 
107 See Meldgaard et al. (2015). 
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variations of the fundamental tax planning tool of profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax coun-
tries.108 Profits can be shifted via either interest payments, royalty payments, or transfer pricing 
of goods and services. These payments are usually deductible from the tax base at the level of 
the payer and are included in the tax base of the recipient.109 Of these three profit-shifting chan-
nels, the study of Ramboll Management Consulting and Corit Advisory110 focuses on the use 
of intragroup interest and royalty payments. While the following quantification is restricted to 
the same two channels, some of the results for profit shifting via royalty payments, excluding 
those for tax planning via IP-box regimes, are transferable to other transfer pricing strategies. 
Chapter 3.2.1 provides details of the tax-planning strategies considered. In Chapter 3.2.2, the 
tax parameters of the fictitious financing and IP holding locations involved in the tax planning 
arrangements are summarized. Chapter 3.2.3 provides an overview of relevant country-level 
tax information used in the calculations that is not provided by the annually updated report on 
effective tax rates conducted by ZEW.111 
3.2.1 Tax-planning strategies 
Multinationals can reduce their global tax payments by shifting profits via intragroup interest 
payments from affiliates resident in high-tax countries to other affiliates resident in low-tax 
countries. The study considers the following four tax-planning strategies, which allow for profit 
shifting by means of debt financing. 
(1) “Financing via Offshore”: loan structure via a tax-exempt country 
The multinational parent company (MNPC) located in an EU member state or the US indirectly 
owns a subsidiary (SUBS) located in another EU member state or the US, via an intermediate 
company (OFFSHORE). The intermediate company is located in a tax-exempt country (re-
ferred to as Offshore). The tax parameters for Offshore are specified in Chapter 3.2.2. MNPC 
provides funds via the most tax-efficient financing channel to OFFSHORE. OFFSHORE grants 
an interest-bearing loan to SUBS. 
 
 
                                                          
108 The terms high-tax countries and low-tax countries are used in relative terms and always refer to the tax level 
of a country relative to the tax level of other countries considered. 
109 See also Dharmapala (2014b). 
110 See Meldgaard et al. (2015). 
111 For 2015, see Spengel et al. (2016a). 
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(2) “Financing via Average”: loan structure via an average EU country 
This case replicates the tax planning structure of “Financing via Offshore” but models an inter-
mediate financing company (AVERAGE) located in a fictitious average EU member state (re-
ferred to as Average). The tax parameters for the average EU member state are specified in 
Chapter 3.2.2. 
Figure 3: Tax-Planning Strategies 1 and 2 
 
(3) “Hybrid financing via Offshore”: hybrid loan structure via a tax-exempt country 
This case also replicates “Financing via Offshore”, with the difference that OFFSHORE grants 
a hybrid interest-bearing loan to SUBS, a subsidiary of OFFSHORE located in an EU member 
state or the US. The hybrid loan is considered as equity by the country of residence of             
OFFSHORE and as debt by the country of residence of SUBS. 
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(4)  “Hybrid financing via Average”: hybrid loan structure via an average EU country 
The last case of debt shifting replicates the tax planning structure of “Hybrid financing via 
Offshore” but models an intermediate company (AVERAGE) located in a fictitious average EU 
member state.112 
Figure 4: Tax-Planning Strategies 3 and 4 
 
Another profit-shifting channel takes advantage of the intragroup licensing of IP. If IP is li-
censed from an affiliate resident in a low-tax country to an affiliate resident in a high-tax coun-
try, the corresponding royalty payments reduce the tax base in the high-tax country and shift 
the profits to the low-tax country. The study considers the following three tax-planning strate-
gies that employ profit shifting via royalty payments: 
 
                                                          
112 Following an amendment of the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive (Council Directive 2014/86/EU of 8 July 2014), 
EU member states had to implement an anti-avoidance rule against hybrid financing arrangements in their regula-
tions for the taxation of dividends by the end of 2015. Hence, the tax-planning strategy “Hybrid Financing via 
Average” should be more difficult to obtain in practice in the future. 
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(5) “IP tax planning via Offshore”: IP is owned in a tax-exempt country 
The multinational parent company located in an EU member state or the US provides funds to 
its subsidiary (IPOFFSHORE), which is located in a tax-exempt country, via the most tax-effi-
cient financing channel. IPOFFSHORE uses these funds to invest in an intangible.              
IPOFFSHORE then licenses the IP to SUBS, which in turn pays royalties. SUBS, which is 
owned by MNPC, invests in the remaining four assets considered in the Devereux/Griffith 
model and yields the same return as it would have done had it also invested in an intangible 
directly. 
(6) “IP tax planning via Average”: IP is owned in an average EU country 
This case replicates the tax planning structure of “IP tax planning via Offshore” but models an 
IP holding company (IPAVERAGE) located in an average EU member state. 
Figure 5: Tax-Planning Strategies 5-7 
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(7) “IP tax planning via IP-box countries”: IP is owned in an EU member state offering an 
IP-box regime 
This case replicates “IP tax planning via Offshore” but considers an IP holding company     
SUBSPB located in one of the 11 EU member states that offered an IP-box regime in 2015 
(Belgium, Cyprus, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, UK). 
To analyze the tax-minimization potential of the different tax-planning strategies described 
above, the CoC and EATR resulting from those strategies are compared to those from direct 
cross-border investments involving only MNPC and SUBS. In this comparison the most tax-
efficient way of financing (RE, NE and debt) of the respective financing company (financing 
structures), the IP holding company and SUBS (IP structures) as well as the most tax-efficient 
way of directly financing SUBS by MNPC (direct cross-border investment) are considered. 
3.2.2 Tax parameters for the “tax-exempt country” and the “average EU country” 
Tax-Planning Strategies 1, 3 and 5 (defined in Chapter 3.2.1) consider a fictitious “tax-exempt 
country”. Two different assumptions for this country are made, which are explained below.  
(1) “Offshore treaty” is defined as a non-EU country that effectively does not levy profit or 
non-profit taxes on dividends, interest, and royalties. Offshore treaty has concluded a tax 
treaty with all EU member states and the US, reducing all WHT to zero.  
Several EU member states generally exempt dividends from taxation but will tax divi-
dends if certain preconditions are not met (for an overview see Chapter 3.2.3.2). Exam-
ples for such preconditions are either a minimum level of taxation of the distributed in-
come or economic substance of the distributing company. Upon assumption, these 
switch-over rules do not apply to dividends received from Offshore treaty in the 29 parent 
countries considered. Dependent on the specific requirements of the switch-over clause, 
circumventing these rules will be possible if either the general CIT in Offshore treaty is 
above the required minimum tax level, other active business income is generated in Off-
shore treaty, or the dividends are channeled via a high-tax country that fully exempts 
dividends from taxation. For countries that generally apply the credit method to dividends 
from non-EU member states without exception, this method is also assumed to apply to 
dividends received from Offshore treaty.  
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Some countries deny the deduction of interest or royalties from taxable income if the 
corresponding income is subject to low taxation. These rules are only considered for tax 
planning via Offshore treaty if they apply regardless of the residence country of the com-
pany receiving the interest or royalty income, as these rules are difficult to circumvent. 
Amongst EU member states and the US, such a regulation only exists in Austria.113  
Overall, arrangements using Offshore treaty reflect tax-planning strategies that achieve 
the non-taxation of interest and royalty income by shifting profits to a zero-tax country 
and successfully circumventing the application of anti-avoidance rules that target aggres-
sive tax-planning strategies. The financing and IP holding company resident in Offshore 
treaty is termed OFFSHORE treaty in the following. 
(2) “Offshore no treaty” is defined as a tax-exempt country outside of the EU that does not 
levy any kind of profit or non-profit taxes and has not concluded any tax treaties with EU 
member states or the US. Tables 3, 4, and 5 and the explanations in Chapter 3.2.3.1 pro-
vide an overview of WHTs on dividends, interest and royalties flowing into the tax-ex-
empt country.  
Switch-over clauses for dividend taxation are assumed to apply to dividends received 
from Offshore no treaty (see Chapter 3.2.3.2). Anti-avoidance rules that deny the deduc-
tion of interest and royalty expenses from the tax base in the case of low taxation of the 
corresponding income will be considered if they apply to payments to non-treaty coun-
tries and cannot be easily avoided by proving the economic substance of the transaction. 
For interest payments, comparable rules exist in Austria, Slovenia, and Sweden. The de-
duction of royalty expenses is restricted only in Austria. 114 
Consequently, arrangements using Offshore treaty reflect tax-planning strategies that are 
targeted at the non-taxation of interest and royalty income and that are effectively tackled 
by anti-avoidance rules existing in the residence country of SUBS and MNPC.115 In the 
following, the financing and IP holding companies resident in Offshore no treaty are de-
noted as OFFSHORE no treaty. 
                                                          
113 For details, see Peyerl (2014). The royalty deduction restriction is only taken into account for IP tax planning 
via Offshore treaty, as in the case of payments to Offshore no treaty WHT on royalties in Austria ensures a mini-
mum taxation of 10%. 
114 For Austria, see Peyerl (2014); for Slovenia, see Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Finance (2016); for Sweden, 
see KPMG (2014a). 
115 However, thin capitalization rules and earnings stripping rules as well as CFC rules are considered for neither 
tax planning via Offshore treaty nor tax planning via Offshore no treaty. For a general discussion of the effect of 
these rules, see Chapter 3.6. 
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Table 2: Tax parameters for “Average” 
 
Tax-Planning Strategies 2, 4, and 6 (specified in Chapter 3.2.1) consider a fictitious “average 
EU country” denoted as “Average”. The relevant tax parameters for this country are the arith-
metic means of the respective tax parameters across all 28 EU member states.116 The CIT rates 
and the capital allowances for intangibles in the EU member states are listed in Table 2. The 
respective rounded averages determine the relevant tax parameters of Average. Dividends are 
tax-exempt in Average. Alternative nominal statutory income tax rates that currently apply to 
                                                          
116 The information on those tax parameters is taken from Spengel et al. (2016a). 
kind of allowance allowance rate (%)
Austria 25 SL 10
Belgium 33.99 SL 20
Bulgaria 10 SL 15
Croatia 20 SL 50
Cyprus 12.5 SL 20
Czech Republic 19 SL 16.66
Denmark 23.5 SL 100
Estonia 20 n.a.
Finland 20 SL 10
France 38.93 SL 20
Germany 30.95 SL 20
Greece 29 SL 10
Hungary 20.86 SL 50
Ireland 12.5 SL 10
Italy 31.3 SL 33.33
Latvia 15 SL 20
Lithuania 15 DB 66.66
Luxembourg 29.22 SL 20
Malta 35 SL 10
Netherlands 25 SL 20
Poland 19 SL 20
Portugal 29.5 SL 10
Romania 16 SL 5.55
Slovak Republic 22 SL 20
Slovenia 17 SL 10
Spain 33.4 SL 5
Sweden 21.48 DB 30
UK 20 SL 10
"Average" 23 SL 21
capital allowances for intangibles
CIT rate (%)
Abbreviations:
SL = straight line; DB = declining balance
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certain types of income in four EU member states (Cyprus, France, Ireland, and Italy) are not 
considered. Interest is considered to be fully deductible in Average, which is in line with the 
rules in 23 of the 28 EU member states. Capital allowances for assets other than intangibles are 
irrelevant, as the intermediate company either does not invest in any assets (Tax-Planning Strat-
egies 1-4) or only invests in intangibles (Tax-Planning Strategies 5-7). Tables 3, 4, and 5 in 
Chapter 3.2.3.1 display WHT on inbound and outbound dividends, as well as interest and roy-
alties from and to Average. 
Regarding tax planning via Offshore treaty, switch-over clauses for dividends in the parent 
country are assumed to not apply to tax planning via Average. A restriction of the deduction of 
interest and royalties paid to an EU member state only exists in Austria. The required minimum 
tax rate is 10%. Hence, this rule is assumed to apply to the tax-planning strategy “Hybrid fi-
nancing via Average” as well as to IP tax planning using IP-box regimes that offer an effective 
tax rate below 10%. The IP-box regimes are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.2.3.3. 
3.2.3 Additional relevant tax data 
Most tax law information necessary for the calculation of CoC and EATR is taken from the tax 
database at ZEW, which is also used in the annual report on effective tax rates that is conducted 
for the EU Commission.117 For all calculations, the tax law provisions of 1 July, 2015 are con-
sidered. In the following, tax data that are not included in the annual report on effective tax 
rates are summarized. 
3.2.3.1 WHT on dividends, interest, and royalties 
WHTs play an important role in international tax planning as they prevent the tax-free shifting 
of profits and reduce the tax advantage resulting from profit-shifting activities. An overview of 
the relevant WHT rates on dividends, interest and royalties is provided in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
The WHT rates on intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows between EU member states 
are reduced to zero due to the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive and the EU Interest and Royalties 
Directive. For payments between EU and US companies, the lower of the domestic and tax 
treaty rates applies.118 For dividends, interest and royalties received by a company resident in 
                                                          
117 For an overview on the tax parameters, see Spengel et al. (2016a). 
118 The domestic and treaty WHT rates are obtained from the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) 
tax research platform. Please note that some domestic WHT rates assumed in this study differ from the WHT rates 
reported by the study of Ramboll Management Consulting and Corit Advisory (see Meldgaard et al. (2015)). Dif-
ferences result from specific assumptions underlying the tax planning structures considered in this study. For Cy-
prus, this study considers a 10% domestic WHT on royalties as the IP rights are used within Cyprus and not abroad. 
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Offshore no treaty, it is assumed that the general domestic WHT rates for corporations apply in 
the country of residence of the paying company. However, if existent, the higher WHT rates on 
intragroup payments to low-tax countries or listed tax havens in the 29 countries are considered. 
The WHT rates for payments from and to Average are calculated by taking the respective arith-
metic means across all 28 EU member states. 
Dividends distributed to US parent companies are subject to WHT in 11 EU member states at 
rates between 5% and 12%. The average WHT rate of 3% for dividends paid from EU member 
state companies to US companies is defined to apply to dividend payments from Average to the 
US. The US levy WHTs on dividend payments to parent companies in most EU member states. 
The respective tax rates vary between 5% and 30%. The average value of 6% is assumed to 
apply for dividends distributed from a U.S. company to its parent company resident in Average. 
Table 4 shows that most (20) EU member states do not levy any WHTs on interest payments to 
100% US-affiliated companies. In the remaining eight EU countries, the WHT rates range from 
5% to 15% and are always lower than the countries’ respective CIT rates. On average, the WHT 
rate for interest payments from EU member states to the US amounts to 3%. This rate is as-
sumed to apply to interest payments from the US to Average. Intragroup interest payments from 
the US to 16 EU member states are free of WHT. For intragroup payments to companies that 
are resident in the remaining 12 EU member states, the WHT rates range between 5% and 30%. 
The 30% U.S. CIT rate only applies for payments to Croatian related companies. This is due to 
the lack of a tax treaty between the US and Croatia. On average, the WHT rate for intragroup 
interest payments made from U.S. companies to those resident in EU member states is 5%. In 
the calculations, this value is considered for interest payments from Average to the US. 
The US exempt royalty payments made by U.S. companies to recipients in 14 EU member 
states from WHT. For the remaining EU countries, the rates range between 5% and 30%. In 
total, the EU average value for intragroup royalty payments received from U.S. companies is 
5%. This rate is assumed to apply to royalty payments from the US to Average. WHTs on 
royalties paid from Average to the US are not relevant for the tax-planning strategies considered 
in this study. 
                                                          
For Ireland, a 0% WHT on dividend payments to Offshore no treaty applies since the tax-planning strategies 
assume that the intermediate company is always controlled by persons who are resident in another EU member 
state or in a tax treaty state. For Malta, the study considers a 0% WHT rate on interest and royalties because the 
recipient of the respective payments is not controlled by individuals that are resident in Malta. For Luxembourg, 
a 0% WHT rate on interest is considered since higher WHT rates in this country only apply to special types of 
interest. 
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Most of the 29 countries apply high WHTs on dividends, interest, and royalties paid to specified 
low-tax countries or listed tax havens with which no tax treaty has been concluded. The rates 
for dividends range between 10% and 35% while the rates for interest and royalty payments 
range between 10% and 75%. Only Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, and the Netherlands do not 
levy WHTs on royalties irrespective of the recipient country. These countries also generally 
exempt interest. Additionally, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Finland, and Sweden exempt 
interest from WHTs irrespective of the recipient country. Dividends distributed to countries 
with which no tax treaty has been concluded remain tax-exempt only in Cyprus, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Malta, the Slovak Republic, and the UK. It follows that only Hungary and Malta 
apply no WHTs to either type of the three different intragroup payments.  
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Table 3: WHT on dividends 2015 (in %) 
   
From/to AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK US Average
Offshore 
treaty
Offshore 
no treaty
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 25
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
BG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 5
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 35
DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26.38
DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10
ES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 19.5
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 12
HU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 26
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 19
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 35
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 16
SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 15
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
US 5 0 5 5 5 0 0 5 30 10 0 0 30 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 10 0 5 5 0 6 0 30
Average 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Offshore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Abbreviations: 
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; 
NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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Table 4: WHT on interest 2015 (in %) 
  
From/to AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK US Average
Offshore 
treaty
Offshore 
no treaty
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
BG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 10
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35
DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 15
ES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 19.5
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 20
HU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 26
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 35
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 50
SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 15
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
US 0 0 5 10 0 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 30 0 0 10 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 10 0 5 0 0 5 0 30
Average 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Offshore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Abbreviations: 
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; 
NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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Table 5: WHT on royalties 2015 (in %) 
  
From/to AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK US Average
Offshore 
treaty
Offshore 
no treaty
AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
BG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 10
CY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
CZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 35
DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15.825
DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25
EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10
EL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
ES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 24
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75
HR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 20
HU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 22.5
LT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 10
LU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 20
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 35
RO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 50
SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21.48
SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 15
SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 35
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
US 0 0 5 0 10 0 0 10 0 10 0 0 30 0 0 8 10 0 10 10 0 10 10 15 0 5 10 0 5 0 30
Average 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Offshore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Abbreviations: 
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; 
NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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3.2.3.2 Taxation of intercompany dividends 
Table 6 provides an overview of the tax treatment of intercompany dividends in the EU member 
states and the US. Most countries considered in this study apply the exemption method to in-
tercompany dividends. Only Ireland and the US generally apply the credit method to all foreign 
intercompany dividends. Bulgaria, Greece, and Poland restrict the application of the exemption 
method to dividends received from other EU member states and apply the credit method in all 
other cases. Finland and Romania only exempt dividends distributed by companies that are 
resident in EU member states and countries with which a tax treaty has been concluded. More-
over, most EU member states have implemented switch-over clauses that apply the credit 
method instead of the exemption method to dividends in certain cases of low taxation.119  
Table 6: Taxation of dividends in the EU member states and the US 2015 
 
                                                          
119 For a detailed overview of these rules, see Maisto (2012). 
Credit method Exemption method Switch-over clause Credit of underlying CIT
Austria x x x
Belgium x x
Bulgaria x (non-EU) x (EU)
Croatia x
Cyprus x x
Czech Republic x x
Denmark x
Estonia x x
Finland x (non-treaty) x (EU + treaty) x
France x x
Germany x
Greece x (non-EU) x (EU)
Hungary x x
Ireland x x (higher tax rate) x
Italy x x
Latvia x x
Lithuania x x
Luxembourg x x
Malta x
Netherlands x x
Poland x (non-EU) x (EU) x (treaty)
Portugal x x x
Romania x (non-treaty) x (EU + treaty) x
Slovak Republic x
Slovenia x x
Spain x x x
Sweden x x
UK x
US x
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In Ireland and the US, underlying CIT paid by direct and lower tier subsidiaries can be credited. 
Poland credits underlying CIT in the case of dividends received from treaty countries. The re-
maining countries that apply the credit method to dividends received from companies that are 
not resident in EU member states or treaty countries do not credit underlying CIT. Of the coun-
tries applying a switch-over clause, only Austria, Spain, and Portugal credit underlying CIT 
paid abroad against domestic income tax. 
3.2.3.3 IP-box regimes in the EU member states 
In 2015, 11 EU member states offered a preferential tax treatment of income accruing from 
certain intangibles. The key element of these IP-box regimes is an effective tax rate for specific 
types of IP income that is significantly lower than the general CIT rate in the respective coun-
tries. In the EU, the effective IP-box tax rates range from 0% in Malta to 21.9% in Italy.120 
Besides the IP-box tax rates, the IP-box regimes differ with respect to their types of qualifying 
IP, their types of qualifying IP income, and their treatment of current and past IP-related ex-
penses. 
The Devereux/Griffith model considers intangibles in the form of patents acquired from third 
parties. Following the basic assumptions of the model, SUBSPB is assumed to acquire a patent 
that qualifies for beneficial treatment under all 11 EU IP-box regimes. In 9 of the 11 IP-box 
countries, acquired IP does in fact benefit from low-taxation under the IP-box regimes (subject 
to certain conditions). Considering that self-developed IP would yield identical or even lower 
CoC and EATRs and taking into account that possibilities to work around the self-development 
criterion usually exist, the assumption of a qualifying acquired patent in Portugal and Italy 
should not bias the results. 
In all considered EU member states listed in Table 7, royalties qualify for the reduced effective 
tax rates of the IP-box regimes. Only five countries additionally include income from the sale 
of patented products or notional royalties. As SUBSPB receives royalty income, all IP-box re-
gimes in EU member states are applicable to its income. 
                                                          
120 The overview of IP-box regimes is based on Evers (2014); Evers et al. (2014), and the country information 
available on the IBFD tax research platform. With respect to France, the IP-box tax rate of 18.34% is a result of 
cumulatively considering the 15% IP-box tax rate, the exceptional tax surcharge, the social surcharge, and local 
taxes. For Italy, the IP-box tax rate amounts to 70% of the CIT and the local tax imposta regionale sulle attività 
produttive (IRAP). With respect to Portugal, the IP-box tax rate equals 50% of the CIT increased by the state 
surtax and the municipal surtax. For Spain, the IP-box tax rate is a result of 40% of the CIT rate and the added 
effective tax rate for the local business tax impuesto sobre actividades económicas (IAE). 
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Table 7: IP-box regimes in the EU member states 2015 
 
IP-box 
tax rate 
(%) 
Acquired 
IP 
Royalties 
Notional  
royalties 
Gross 
approach 
interest 
Gross 
approach  
depreciation 
Belgium 6.8 xa x x x  
Cyprus 2.5 x x    
France 18.34 xc x    
Hungary 9.5 x x  x x 
Italy 21.9  x x   
Luxembourg 5.84 xc x x   
Malta 0 xc x    
Netherlands 5 xa x x   
Portugal 14.75  x  x x 
Spain 17.86 xb x    
UK 10 xa x x x  
Notes:  
a = under the condition of further development/improvement by the taxpayer; b = 25% of the costs must have been 
borne by the taxpayer; c = acquired from a third party 
Concerning the treatment of current and past expenses, the IP-box countries apply two different 
approaches; the net approach and the gross approach. In most countries, current expenses can 
only be deducted at the IP-box tax rate; it follows that the net income is taxed at the favorable 
IP-box tax rate. In contrast, some countries apply the IP-box tax rate to the gross IP income, 
allowing for the deduction of current expenses at the general CIT rate. In the Devereux/Griffith 
model, the only current expenses considered are interest payments. Four EU IP-box countries 
apply the gross approach to interest payments related to IP income. Concerning past expenses, 
all 11 countries require the capitalization of acquired IP. However, they differ with respect to 
the treatment of the related depreciation expenses. While depreciation expenses are deductible 
from IP-box income in most countries (net approach), some countries allow the deduction of 
these expenses from other income taxed at the higher general CIT rate (gross approach). Among 
the 11 EU IP-box countries, only Hungary and Portugal apply the gross approach for the depre-
ciation of the intangible asset. An asymmetric treatment of income and current and past ex-
penses that applies under the gross approach further increases the attractiveness of IP-box re-
gimes.  
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3.3 Adaption of the formulas of the Devereux/Griffith model 
The starting point of the Devereux/Griffith model is the change in firm value in period t due to 
an increase in the capital stock of one unit in this period that is reversed in the next period (t+1). 
The basic formulas underlying the Devereux/Griffith model for cross-border settings involving 
a parent company and its subsidiary located in different countries have been established and 
explained in prior studies.121 The starting point is the post-tax rent attributable to an investment 
of the subsidiary that is financed with RE ( RER ). As the tax consequences differ with respect 
to different forms of company financing, the baseline formula must be modified in the case of 
equity or debt financing of the subsidiary. This can be done by adding the present value of 
equity or debt financing, respectively ( RER F ). In the following, first the basic formulas for 
the post-tax rent of an investment financed with RE ( RER ) and the present value of debt financ-
ing ( DER ) are presented. In a second step, the necessary modifications of these formulas to 
implement Tax Planning Strategies 1-4 and Tax Planning Strategies 5-7 are explained. 
3.3.1 Basic formulas 
In a cross-border setting in the basic Devereux/Griffith model (MNPC and SUBS are located 
in different countries), the formula for RE financing is defined as follows:  
(1 )( )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
RE SP S SP S
SP S
p A
R A
      

 
       
     
 
 (1) 
Term 1 of Equation (1) depicts the waiver of dividends in period t at the level of MNPC due to 
the earlier investment. The funds required to finance the investment are equal to 1 minus the 
present value of tax savings from depreciation of the acquired asset (
SA ). SP represents the tax 
burden on dividends paid by SUBS to MNPC. 
Term 2 models the additional dividends in period t+1 at the level of MNPC, arising from the 
post-tax cash flow of the investment. p  depicts the real return of the investment,   denotes 
the economic depreciation, and 
S  stands for the CIT rate in the subsidiary country.   denotes 
the discount factor. 
Term 3 of Equation (1) measures the additional dividend in t+1 at the level of MNPC that results 
from saving a substitute investment because the investment was brought forward by one period. 
                                                          
121 See Devereux/Griffith (1999); Schreiber et al. (2002); Devereux/Griffith (2003); Lammersen (2005). 
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The formula used in the Devereux/Griffith model for the present value of debt financing of the 
subsidiary DER  reflects the tax savings from debt financing or alternative scenarios. In a cross-
border setting (MNPC and SUBS are located in different countries), the present value of the 
debt financing of the subsidiary as currently implemented in the baseline scenario of the Deve-
reux/Griffith model results in 
0 0
0
0
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )
1 1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
1
DE SP S S SP S S
SP S S
SP S S S
i
R
i
   
 
 
  

    
     
 
   


 (2) 
The funds required to finance the investment are equal to 1 minus the immediate depreciation 
of the acquired asset 
0(1 )S Sτ  . These are provided by a loan from MNPC to SUBS. In com-
parison to the case in which the investment is financed with RE of the subsidiary, the parent in 
period t pays an additional amount of 
0(1 )S Sτ   and receives an additional dividend of 
0(1 )(1 )S S SP    . This causes net extra cost of 0(1 )SP S S     (Term 1 of Equation (2)). 
The repayment of the loan by the subsidiary in period t+1 results in a corresponding correction 
term of 
0(1 )SP S S    at the level of the parent company (Term 2 of Equation (2)). In addition, 
the parent company receives interest income from the loan (Term 3 of Equation (2)). 
SP  de-
notes the tax burden on interest income at the level of the parent company. However, the interest 
payments reduce the dividend payment received from the subsidiary by 
0(1 ) (1 )(1 )SP S S Si      (Term 4 of Equation (2)). S  accounts for the deductibility of inter-
est payments from the subsidiary’s tax base. 
3.3.2 Necessary modifications to implement Tax-Planning Strategies 1-4 
Tax-Planning Strategies 1-4 involve profit shifting via interest payments. Accordingly, the in-
vestment of SUBS is financed with debt received from OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. Therefore, to 
obtain the total post-tax rent, the formula for the present value of debt financing must be added 
to the basic formula for the post-tax rent attributable to an investment of the subsidiary that is 
financed with RE ( RE DER R R  ). 
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In scenarios 1-4, SUBS is assumed to have no RE because all former marginal profits have been 
channeled to OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. As SUBS itself has no RE and the funds for the invest-
ment, the interest payments, and the profits are channeled via a third company (OFFSHORE/ 
AVERAGE), the basic formulas for both RER  and DER  must be combined and modified. 
3.3.2.1 RE financing of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE 
In Tax-Planning Strategies 1-4, SUBS receives debt financing from OFFSHORE/AVERAGE 
instead of MNPC. The funds provided as loans from OFFSHORE/AVERAGE to SUBS may 
either be taken out of the RE of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE or result from NE or debt contribution 
from MNPC. For the case of RE financing of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE, combining and modi-
fying Equations (1) and (2) yields 
/
0 0
0 0
0
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )( )
(1 )(1 )( )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 )(1
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OP S S SO OP S S S
SO OP S SO OP s
OP S S SO OP S S
S S SO OP
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    
        
 
    
 
  
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 
 
      
 
 
   
 0
) (1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
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
 
 
(3) 
When comparing this to the basic formula for RER , a few differences arise. Firstly, Term 1 of 
Equation (1) is now split up into two parts. Under Tax-Planning Strategies 1-4, as opposed to 
the baseline scenario, OFFSHORE/AVERAGE instead of SUBS holds RE that are used to fi-
nance the investment and are forwarded to SUBS as debt. The result is a reduction in dividends 
paid from OFFSHORE/AVERAGE to MNPC in period t. The financial demand of SUBS for 
the investment equals 1 minus the tax savings from immediate depreciation 
0(1 )S S  . This 
amount is granted to SUBS as a loan and reduces the dividend payments from OFFSHORE/ 
AVERAGE to MNPC (term 1 of equation (3)).  
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The tax burden on dividends paid from OFFSHORE/AVERAGE to MNPC is denoted by      
OP .
122 The present value of tax savings from depreciation reduced by the tax savings from 
immediate depreciation, that are used for the investment, increases the firm value of SUBS and 
results in an additional dividend paid from SUBS to OFFSHORE/AVERAGE (Term 2 of Equa-
tion (3)). All values of SUBS are first distributed to OFFSHORE/AVERAGE and then for-
warded to MNPC. Hence, differently to the base case scenario, those values are multiplied by 
(1 )(1 )SO OP   , where SO  denotes the tax burden on dividends paid from SUBS to           
OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. Except for this different distribution factor, Terms 2 and 3 of Equa-
tion (1) remain unchanged (see Terms 3 and 4 of Equation (3)). 
In addition, similarly to Equation (2), the effects of the loan at the level of both SUBS and 
OFFSHORE/AVERAGE must be considered. In period t+1, the loan payback to OFFSHORE 
reduces the firm value of SUBS measured at the level of MNPC by 
0(1 )(1 )(1 )SO OP S S       (Term 6 of Equation (3)). It also increases the firm value of     
OFFSHORE, measured at the level of MNPC by 
0(1 )(1 )OP S S     (Term 5 of Equation (3)). 
The effect of the interest payments on the loan is modelled by Terms 7 and 8 of Equation (3). 
Term 7 considers the after-tax interest income of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. 
SO  denotes the 
tax burden on interest in OFFSHORE/AVERAGE while Term 8 refers to the decrease in divi-
dends paid from SUBS via OFFSHORE/AVERAGE to MNPC resulting from the interest pay-
ments. In this scenario, the tax shield generated by the deductibility of interest payments from 
the tax base of SUBS is also considered. 
Equation (3) equally applies to Tax-Planning Strategies 1-4 for RE financing of                        
OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. If OFFSHORE/AVERAGE was financed with NE or debt, /NEoff avgR  
and /DEoff avgR  would have to be added to /REoff avgR .  
3.3.2.2 NE financing of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE 
If OFFSHORE/AVERAGE was financed with NE from MNPC, /NEoff avgR  would have to be 
added to Equation (3). /NEoff avgR  is given by: 
                                                          
122 For credit countries, 
OP depends on the taxation of distributed profits in OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. As dis-
tributed profits stem from both interest and dividends received by OFFSHORE/AVERAGE and these two types 
of income may be taxed differently, the assumption is made that 90% of the distributed income of                           
OFFSHORE/AVERAGE is attributable to interest, while 10% is attributable to dividends received in cases of 
marginal investments. For profitable investments, it is assumed that 35% of the distributed profit stems from in-
terest and that 65% stems from dividends. 
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/ 0
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 
    

 (4) 
The first term takes into account that, differently to the scenario in which the investment is 
financed with RE of the subsidiary, a dividend is distributed in period t. However, the equity 
financing reduces the income of the parent company compared to the case of RE financing by 
0(1 )S S  . Term 2 of Equation (4) considers that MNPC foregoes a dividend in period t+1 
compared to the case of RE financing, as the NE is paid back to MNPC in t+1. The only change 
compared to the basic formula for NER  is MNPC contributing capital to OFFSHORE/             
AVERAGE instead of SUBS and receiving or missing out on dividends from OFFSHORE/ 
AVERAGE. Hence, 
OP  applies instead of SP . 
3.3.2.3 Debt financing of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE 
If OFFSHORE/AVERAGE was financed with debt from MNPC and forwarded this debt as a 
loan to SUBS, /DEoff avgR  would have to be added to /REoff avgR . /DEoff avgR  is given by: 
/ 0 0
0
0
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1 1
(1 )(1 )
1
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     
 
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

 (5) 
With respect to Terms 1-2, please see the explanations for equity financing in Chapter 3.3.2.2. 
In addition, two more terms must be added. Term 3 refers to the reduction of dividend payments 
due to interest payments made from OFFSHORE/AVERAGE to MNPC. 
O  represents the de-
ductibility of interest payments from the tax base of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. Term 4 adds the 
interest income of MNPC received from OFFSHORE/AVERAGE to the formula. The taxes on 
interest (represented by
OP ) reduce interest income. 
3.3.2.4 Additional modifications for Tax-Planning Strategies 3 and 4 
For Tax-Planning Strategies 3 and 4 that consider a hybrid loan, the main difference to Tax-
Planning Strategies 1 and 2 lies in Term 7 of Equation (3). 
SO  is replaced by SOhyb , which 
denotes the combined tax burden on the interest payment from SUBS to OFFSHORE/             
AVERAGE, considering WHTs on interest in the country of SUBS and the taxation of dividend 
income in the country of OFFSHORE/AVERAGE. 
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3.3.3 Necessary modifications to implement Tax-Planning Strategies 5-7 
Under Tax-Planning Strategies 5-7, profits are shifted via royalty payments instead of loans. 
While SUBS continues to invest in four of the five assets considered in the Devereux/Griffith 
model, IPOFFSHORE/IPAVERAGE/SUBSPB invests in the intangible asset instead of SUBS. 
Hence, only the formulas for the investment in the intangible asset must be modified. 
For the investment in the intangible asset, primarily the baseline net present value formula for 
RER  (see Equation (1)) has to be adapted as follows: 
(1 )( )(1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 )
1
(1 )( )(1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )(1 )
1 1
IPRE OP O
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SP S OP O
p x
R A
p x A
   


      
 
   
    

        
 
 
 (6) 
While IPOFFSHORE/IPAVERAGE/SUBSPB invests in the intangible asset, SUBS generates 
profits using the asset. A fraction of x  of this profit is shifted to IPOFFSHORE/                     
IPAVERAGE/SUBSPB via royalty payments for the use of the intangible asset. In the follow-
ing it is assumed that all profits arising from the use of the IP are paid out as royalties ( 1x ). 
Thus, the profit earned at the level of SUBS is split up into post-royalty profits of SUBS and 
royalty income of IPOFFSHORE/IPAVERAGE/SUBSPB. Both post-tax profits are distributed 
to MNPC. To model this, Terms 1 and 3 of the baseline formula (Equation (1)) remain basically 
unchanged (see Terms 1 and 4 in Equation (6)). Term 2 is split into two terms. Term 2 in 
equation (6) refers to the share of profit x  that is shifted from SUBS to IPOFFSHORE/      
IPAVERAGE/SUBSPB via royalty payments. Term 3 in Equation (6) refers to the after-royalty 
profit that is distributed directly to MNPC. 
If IPOFFSHORE/IPAVERAGE/SUBSPB is financed with NE or debt, the financing formulas 
for either NE or debt have to be added to this modified IPRER  to calculate the total post-tax rent. 
The baseline formulas for NE and debt financing remain unchanged. However, differently to 
the baseline scenario, the applicable parameters for dividend and interest payments are between 
IPOFFSHORE/IPAVERAGE/SUBSPB and MNPC instead of SUBS and MNPC. 
3.4 Baseline results: Tax-efficient direct financing 
To illustrate the effects of the tax-planning strategies covered in this study, the CoC and EATR 
calculated for those strategies are compared to the cross-border results calculated in the 2015 
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effective tax rates report prepared for the European Commission.123 The minimum values of 
the RE, NE and debt financing of the subsidiary serve as baseline results. In both the baseline 
calculations and the tax planning calculations, the parent company is refinanced by a weighted 
average (i.e. 55% RE, 10% NE and 35% debt, see Chapter 3.1) across all three financing alter-
natives.  
The tables summarizing the financing-specific and most tax-efficient CoC and EATRs for 
direct cross-border inbound and outbound investments for the 29 countries (baseline results 
without tax planning) are listed in Chapter A of the Annex available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/publications/taxation-services-papers/taxation-papers_de 
(referred to as Annex in the following).124 
From a theoretical perspective, the CoC of cross-border investment reflects the differences in 
the optimal investment volume, conditional on location choice. In other words, the lower the 
CoC, the higher the investment volume of the respective subsidiary compared to other sub-
sidiaries of the parent company. Moreover, CoC is an indicator for the competitiveness of com-
panies producing in the host economy, as they codetermine lower price limits of supplied goods 
and services.125 EATRs, on the other hand, are relevant if companies must make a discrete 
choice of where to allocate profitable investment. From a theoretical perspective, other factors 
held constant, a parent company will invest in the subsidiary located in the host country that 
offers the lowest EATR.126 
As a basic principle, the most tax-efficient source of financing of the subsidiary is determined 
by the relation between the tax rates in the parent and the subsidiary countries. If the CIT rate 
in the country of the subsidiary is higher than in the parent country, debt financing is the most 
favorable financing alternative. For marginal investments financed by debt, the tax level in the 
parent country is decisive, since profits are shifted from the subsidiary country to the parent 
country. For profitable investments, the effect is less pronounced because the positive net pre-
sent value is not shifted via interest but is instead taxed at the level of the subsidiary and dis-
tributed to the parent as a dividend. Nevertheless, the advantage stemming from shifting part of 
the profit to the low-tax parent country means that the debt financing of high-tax country sub-
sidiaries usually remains favored. 
                                                          
123 See Spengel et al. (2016a). 
124 Differences compared to the Annex concerning outbound investments from Estonia result from a finer modu-
lation of the distribution tax in the Devereux/Griffith model. The detailed tables are available from the author. 
125 See Lammersen/Schwager (2005), p. 14. 
126 See Schreiber et al. (2002), pp. 21-22; Lammersen (2002), p. 28. 
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If the CIT rate in the country of the subsidiary is lower than in the parent country, financing the 
investment with RE is usually the most tax-efficient alternative. In the case of marginal invest-
ments financed by RE, the tax burden is primarily determined by the CIT rate in the subsidiary 
country. For profitable investments financed by RE, taxes on dividends (which potentially re-
duce the profit shifting advantage) also play a role. Differences between RE- and NE financing 
of the subsidiary will arise if dividends are only partially tax-exempt in the parent country or if 
the parent country applies the indirect tax credit method to dividend income and if simultane-
ously the tax level of the parent country is higher than that of the subsidiary country. In these 
cases, the CoC and the EATR of NE financing of the subsidiary are higher than those of RE 
financing of the subsidiary. In the other cases, RE- and NE financing of the subsidiary result in 
the same CoC and EATR. If RE- and NE financing of the subsidiary result in the same CoC 
and EATR, RE financing is classified as the most tax-efficient way of financing. 
Table 8 lists the mean CoC and EATR for each country, averaged over all partner countries for 
inbound and outbound investments using the most tax-efficient way of financing the subsidiary. 
The averages of the inbound investment values across all parent countries (given in Table 8) 
demonstrate the following: in general, low-tax countries are the most attractive cross-border 
investment locations, while high-tax countries (such as France or the US) are less attractive. 
For profitable inbound investments, the ranking of the countries is very similar to the ranking 
according to the countries' effective statutory profit tax rates (i.e. the statutory profit tax rate 
increased by surcharges and local profit taxes, denoted as CIT in Table 8). This is because 
taxation in the country of residence of the subsidiary plays the decisive role for profitable in-
vestments. In contrast, the country ranking with regard to the CoC for marginal inbound invest-
ments differs more noticeably from the respective ranking with regard to the CIT. In that case, 
some high-tax countries like Italy and Belgium are among the jurisdictions with the lowest CoC 
for inbound investments. This is because in the case of marginal investments, the total profit 
(not simply fractions of it) can be allocated to the country with the lower tax rate. This is 
achieved by means of either RE- or debt financing, which reduces the relevance of the level of 
taxation in the subsidiary’s country of residence. In addition, tax base effects in the subsidiary 
country have a strong effect on the CoC. This in turn makes marginal investments in high-tax 
countries with favorable depreciation rules particularly attractive, since they yield high tax sav-
ings when they are financed with debt. However, a total mitigation of taxes in high-tax sub-
sidiary countries by means of debt financing often remains impossible. This is due to re-
strictions on the deductibility of interest payments or the existence of non-profit taxes in the 
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subsidiary country. It follows that low-tax countries are generally also the most attractive in the 
context of marginal investments. With respect to Italy, the low average CoC results from the 
availability of an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), which allows to deduct a certain per-
centage of equity from the tax base. Such a regime only exists in Italy and Belgium.127 Despite 
the country’s high CIT rate, its ACE regime makes RE financing the most favorable source of 
finance for investments into Italy. 
Table 8: Mean CoC and EATR – Direct cross-border investment (in %) 
 
                                                          
127 See Zangari (2014) for a comparison of the two regimes. 
CoC CIT EATR CIT CoC CIT EATR CIT
US 5.3 37.9 BG 19.3 10.0 EE 4.4 20.0 BG 8.8 10.0
IT 5.3 31.3 IT 19.5 31.3 IT 4.9 31.3 EE 13.2 20.0
BG 5.3 10.0 MT 19.6 35.0 BG 5.0 10.0 LT 13.6 15.0
FR 5.5 38.9 LV 20.1 15.0 HR 5.2 20.0 IE 14.1 12.5
LV 5.5 15.0 LT 20.1 15.0 BE 5.3 34.0 LV 14.3 15.0
LT 5.5 15.0 PT 20.3 29.5 LT 5.4 15.0 RO 14.8 16.0
BE 5.6 34.0 LU 20.3 29.2 CZ 5.4 19.0 CY 15.3 12.5
MT 5.6 35.0 UK 20.4 20.0 SI 5.5 17.0 SI 15.5 17.0
SI 5.6 17.0 ES 20.4 33.4 RO 5.5 16.0 HR 16.4 20.0
RO 5.6 16.0 BE 20.5 34.0 IE 5.5 12.5 CZ 16.6 19.0
UK 5.7 20.0 NL 20.5 25.0 LV 5.5 15.0 PL 17.5 19.0
PL 5.7 19.0 FI 20.5 20.0 LU 5.5 29.2 FI 18.5 20.0
HU 5.7 20.9 HU 20.5 20.9 SK 5.6 22.0 SE 19.2 21.5
FI 5.7 20.0 DK 20.5 23.5 PL 5.6 19.0 HU 19.3 20.9
CY 5.7 12.5 PL 20.5 19.0 SE 5.6 21.5 SK 19.3 22.0
PT 5.7 29.5 SE 20.5 21.5 CY 5.6 12.5 DK 20.9 23.5
SE 5.7 21.5 AT 20.5 25.0 NL 5.7 25.0 UK 21.4 20.0
LU 5.7 29.2 RO 20.6 16.0 DK 5.7 23.5 NL 21.9 25.0
DK 5.8 23.5 CY 20.8 12.5 FI 5.7 20.0 AT 22.3 25.0
AT 5.8 25.0 SI 20.8 17.0 PT 5.8 29.5 IT 23.0 31.3
NL 5.8 25.0 CZ 21.0 19.0 HU 5.8 20.9 LU 24.2 29.2
HR 5.8 20.0 HR 21.1 20.0 AT 5.8 25.0 PT 25.2 29.5
ES 5.8 33.4 DE 21.3 31.0 MT 6.0 35.0 EL 25.8 29.0
DE 5.8 31.0 EE 21.4 20.0 EL 6.0 29.0 BE 26.7 34.0
CZ 5.8 19.0 SK 21.6 22.0 DE 6.0 31.0 DE 27.1 31.0
EE 5.9 20.0 IE 22.2 12.5 FR 6.3 38.9 MT 29.7 35.0
SK 6.0 22.0 FR 22.7 38.9 UK 6.4 20.0 ES 31.7 33.4
IE 6.1 12.5 EL 22.9 29.0 US 6.7 37.9 FR 35.2 38.9
EL 6.3 29.0 US 27.3 37.9 ES 7.6 33.4 US 36.2 37.9
Ø 5.7 23.6 Ø 20.9 23.6 Ø 5.7 23.6 Ø 20.9 23.6
Outbound Inbound
Abbreviations : 
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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Overall, Estonia features the lowest CoC for inbound investments. This implies that subsidiaries 
resident in Estonia usually benefit from a competitive advantage over those resident in all re-
maining countries. Financing the Estonian subsidiary with RE avoids profit taxes for a marginal 
investment, since the country does not levy taxes on RE. Distributed dividends are only subject 
to the 20% CIT rate if they do not stem from dividends received from qualifying subsidiaries. 
Dividend taxation also plays a role in the RE financing of profitable investments. Therefore, 
regarding profitable investments, Bulgaria is on average the most attractive investment location, 
as it offers the lowest nominal CIT rate on distributed profits within the EU (10%). 
However, the detailed tables demonstrate that Estonia and Bulgaria are not always the most 
attractive subsidiary location for marginal and profitable investments, respectively.128 For U.S. 
parent companies, investing in an Estonian subsidiary financed by RE remains the most favor-
able investment opportunity in the cases of both marginal and profitable investments. The rea-
son for this lies in the application of the indirect tax credit method to foreign dividends in the 
US. This method prescribes that dividends are taxed at the U.S. CIT rate and that underlying 
foreign income taxes of the subsidiary can be credited. Because of the high U.S. CIT rate, the 
income taxes levied in Bulgaria and Estonia are fully creditable. Hence, the advantage of the 
0% tax rate being levied on retained profits in Estonia is not relativized by a lower tax burden 
on distributed profits in the case of an investment in a Bulgarian subsidiary. 
For low-tax countries like Bulgaria, the most attractive subsidiary location for marginal invest-
ments is Belgium using debt financing of the subsidiary. Debt financing of a Belgian subsidiary 
shifts profits to the low-tax country, while benefits from a tax base reduction arise under the 
high Belgian tax rate. Non-profit taxes, which cannot be reduced by debt financing are compar-
atively low in Belgium and, differently to other high-tax countries, do not have a significant 
effect on the CoC. In addition, Belgium offers very favorable depreciation rates. In the case of 
profitable investments, Lithuania is the most attractive subsidiary location for Bulgarian parent 
companies that finance the subsidiary through loans. Lithuania applies a low CIT rate and offers 
attractive depreciation rules. In the case of profitable investments, since only parts of the profits 
are shifted from the subsidiary to the parent via interest payments, investing in high-tax coun-
tries like Belgium is less attractive for Bulgarian parent companies. 
For outbound investments, both low- and high-tax countries rank among the most attractive 
parent company locations. Considering investments in high-tax countries, the most favorable 
                                                          
128 See Annex. 
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parent location for both marginal and profitable investments is usually Bulgaria. If the Bulgar-
ian parent company finances the high-tax subsidiary with debt, the entire profit will be shifted 
to Bulgaria which offers the lowest tax rate on interest income among all considered countries. 
Focusing on marginal investments in low-tax countries, the most attractive parent location is 
the US. Under RE financing, profits are only taxable in the respective low-tax countries. In 
addition, the advantage of interest deductibility regarding debt refinancing of the parent com-
pany is largest in the US, which applies the second highest CIT rate among all 29 countries 
whilst allowing the full deduction of interest for tax purposes. In the case of a profitable invest-
ment, Malta is usually the most attractive parent location for investments in low-tax subsidiaries 
that are financed with RE. Malta fully exempts dividends from taxation, triggering profit taxes 
exclusively in the low-tax countries. Moreover, Malta applies one of the highest CIT rates 
among the 29 countries considered, which results in a significant advantage in the debt refi-
nancing of the parent company.  
Overall, the baseline results show that under tax-efficient financing of the subsidiary, the tax 
burden of a cross-border investment is influenced by both the taxation at the level of the sub-
sidiary and the taxes that accrue at the level of the parent company. For marginal investments, 
the CoC will be particularly low if the parent company is subject to very high taxation and the 
subsidiary is subject to very low taxation. Using RE financing of the subsidiary causes the tax-
ation of profits in the low-tax country and enables the deduction of refinancing costs of the 
parent at the high tax rate in the parent company’s country of residence. A low CoC will also 
occur if the parent company is subject to very low taxation while the subsidiary company is 
subject to very high taxation and benefits from favorable depreciation rules. In such a case, 
profits can be shifted to the low-tax parent country via debt financing, while depreciation is 
deductible in the subsidiary country at the high CIT rate. In summary, there are both countries 
with very high-tax rates and very low tax rates among the countries with the lowest mean CoC 
for inbound and outbound investments. For profitable investments, the tax level in the sub-
sidiary country is the decisive factor. It follows that the attractiveness of countries as investment 
locations generally decreases with an increasing CIT rate.  
3.5 CoC and EATR for the considered tax-planning strategies 
3.5.1 Profit shifting via interest payments 
The first two tax-planning strategies consider investments in SUBS that are financed via a loan 
granted by an intermediate holding company. The intermediate holding company can either be 
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OFFSHORE treaty, OFFSHORE no treaty, or AVERAGE. Tax-Planning Strategies 3 and 4 
additionally assume that the loan granted to SUBS has a hybrid element that results in its clas-
sification as equity at the level of the intermediate company. 
3.5.1.1 “Financing via Offshore treaty”: Loan from OFFSHORE treaty 
The first tax-planning strategy involves an intermediate company (OFFSHORE treaty) resident 
in Offshore treaty. The fictitious country Offshore treaty does not levy taxes on dividends, in-
terest, and royalties. Moreover, it has concluded tax treaties with all 28 EU member states and 
the US reducing WHTs on these payments to zero. No switch-over clauses apply to dividends 
received from Offshore treaty. The scenario assumes that it is only in Austria that interest pay-
ments are non-deductible if paid to Offshore treaty (see Chapter 3.2.2). 
In the case of a marginal investment, the investment return of SUBS is shifted to OFFSHORE 
treaty via interest payments. Since the country Offshore treaty does not levy taxes on interest, 
the marginal return remains untaxed at the level of OFFSHORE treaty. Taxation of dividends 
or interest at the level of MNPC will only be relevant if OFFSHORE treaty is financed with NE 
or debt. Thus, the advantage from the non-taxation of the marginal investment return is largest 
in the context of RE financing of OFFSHORE treaty. Table 9 lists the CoC and EATR for each 
country, averaged over all parent countries for inbound and outbound investments under RE 
financing of OFFSHORE treaty in comparison to the baseline results summarized in Chapter 
3.4.129 
Table 9 shows that all mean CoC for outbound investments are below 5%. This implies that 
taxes under the considered tax-planning strategy generally have a subsidizing effect. The reason 
for this is that the marginal return of the investment is effectively not taxed anywhere, while 
tax depreciation of the acquired assets that usually exceeds economic depreciation reduces other 
profits earned by SUBS. Refinancing costs at the level of MNPC result in additional tax savings. 
                                                          
129 The detailed results for all country combinations are included in Chapter B1 of the Annex. 
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Table 9: Mean CoC and EATR – “Financing via Offshore treaty” (in %) 
 
In comparison to direct cross-border outbound investments (baseline scenario), the mean CoC 
for outbound investments using the tax-planning strategy “Financing via Offshore treaty” is 
lower for all countries. This is because taxation of the marginal return cannot be completely 
avoided in the case of direct investments. As outlined in Chapter 3.4, both low- and high-tax 
countries are among the most attractive locations for parent companies with regard to direct 
outbound investments. For the respective high-tax countries, the most tax-efficient method of 
subsidiary financing is to make use of RE; for the respective low-tax countries, it is the use of 
TP BL TP BL TP BL TP BL
US 3.0 5.3 MT 12.5 19.6 BE 3.1 5.3 BG 6.4 8.8
EL 3.5 6.3 ES 13.3 20.4 LU 3.4 5.5 LT 9.8 13.6
FR 3.6 5.5 PT 13.3 20.3 HR 3.6 5.2 IE 10.3 14.1
MT 3.7 5.6 LU 13.4 20.3 MT 3.6 6.0 LV 10.5 14.3
BE 3.7 5.6 AT 13.6 20.5 FR 3.6 6.3 RO 10.7 14.8
ES 3.8 5.8 BE 13.7 20.5 PT 3.6 5.8 SI 11.1 15.5
PT 3.8 5.7 NL 14.0 20.5 NL 3.8 5.7 CY 11.2 15.3
LU 3.9 5.7 DK 14.2 20.5 IT 3.8 4.9 HR 11.4 16.4
DE 3.9 5.8 IT 14.3 19.5 SK 3.8 5.6 CZ 11.7 16.6
AT 3.9 5.8 DE 14.4 21.3 CZ 3.9 5.4 PL 12.5 17.5
IT 3.9 5.3 SE 14.5 20.5 DK 3.9 5.7 FI 13.6 18.5
NL 4.0 5.8 UK 14.6 20.4 DE 3.9 6.0 SK 13.8 19.3
DK 4.0 5.8 FI 14.7 20.5 SE 3.9 5.6 SE 13.9 19.2
PL 4.0 5.7 HR 14.8 21.1 EL 3.9 6.0 EE 14.3 13.2
SE 4.1 5.7 HU 14.8 20.5 US 4.0 6.7 HU 14.4 19.3
UK 4.1 5.7 CY 15.3 20.8 PL 4.1 5.6 DK 15.3 20.9
FI 4.1 5.7 LV 15.4 20.1 SI 4.1 5.5 NL 16.1 21.9
HR 4.2 5.8 LT 15.4 20.1 LT 4.1 5.4 UK 16.3 21.4
HU 4.2 5.7 SI 15.6 20.8 FI 4.1 5.7 LU 18.0 24.2
SI 4.2 5.6 FR 16.1 22.7 RO 4.2 5.5 PT 19.1 25.2
IE 4.2 6.1 EE 17.1 21.4 BG 4.2 5.0 EL 19.1 25.8
CY 4.3 5.7 SK 17.1 21.6 HU 4.2 5.8 IT 20.4 23.0
LV 4.3 5.5 CZ 17.2 21.0 IE 4.2 5.5 BE 20.8 26.7
LT 4.3 5.5 RO 17.2 20.6 CY 4.3 5.6 DE 21.1 27.1
BG 4.4 5.3 IE 18.0 22.2 LV 4.3 5.5 MT 23.2 29.7
EE 4.8 5.9 PL 19.2 20.5 EE 4.3 4.4 AT 25.0 22.3
RO 4.8 5.6 BG 21.9 19.3 UK 4.8 6.4 ES 25.4 31.7
CZ 4.8 5.8 US 25.0 27.3 ES 5.2 7.6 US 26.6 36.2
SK 4.8 6.0 EL 30.2 22.9 AT 6.2 5.8 FR 28.6 35.2
Ø 4.1 5.7 Ø 16.2 20.9 Ø 4.1 5.7 Ø 16.2 20.9
Outbound Inbound
Abbreviations:
TP = Tax-planning strategy; BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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debt financing. Opposed to the baseline scenario, the most attractive MNPC locations with re-
gard to the financing of SUBS via OFFSHORE treaty are all high-tax countries. Additionally, 
the CoC for outbound investments via Offshore treaty increases with a decreasing CIT rate of 
MNPC. The reason for this difference to the baseline results is as follows: RE financing of 
OFFSHORE treaty is always most attractive irrespective of MNPC’s country of residence; 
therefore, the differences in CoC for outbound investments only depend on the tax effects of 
refinancing costs at the level of MNPC. The higher the CIT rate and the fewer restricted interest 
deductibility in the parent country is, the higher the tax advantage stemming from the deducti-
bility of debt refinancing costs of MNPC is. 
This finding can best be illustrated for MNPCs resident in countries where interest payments 
related to tax-exempt dividends are not deductible from the tax base (Romania, the Czech Re-
public, and the Slovak Republic). These countries feature the highest CoC for outbound invest-
ments under the “Financing via Offshore treaty” tax-planning strategy, as refinancing costs for 
debt financing of MNPC do not result in a tax advantage. 
The mean CoC for inbound investments into all countries except for Austria and Spain also 
remain below 5%. In addition, except in the Austrian case, they remain lower than the corre-
sponding inbound CoC for direct financing from MNPC to SUBS. Differences in the CoC for 
inbound investments via Offshore treaty arise because the tax effects of depreciation differ 
across source countries. In addition, a restricted deductibility of interest payments at the level 
of SUBS causes differences in the values of inbound CoC across countries. The high mean CoC 
for investments in Austria, which exceeds the mean CoC under optimal direct financing, stems 
from the application of an anti-avoidance rule. This rule denies the deduction of interest ex-
penses from the tax base if the corresponding interest income was not subject to an effective 
taxation of at least 10%. 
The ranking of countries according to their inbound CoC when financing the subsidiary via 
Offshore treaty once again differs from the ranking according to the baseline results. If the 
“Financing via Offshore treaty” tax-planning strategy is applied, the rank of a country according 
to inbound CoC values mainly indicates how beneficial the tax base regulations in this country 
are. Particularly high-tax countries with favorable depreciation rules and no interest deduction 
restrictions, such as Belgium, exhibit the lowest CoC for inbound investments. Consequently, 
for marginal investments, these countries are the most attractive if tax planning via Offshore 
treaty was used. Low-tax countries, which display the on average lowest CoC for direct inbound 
investments (baseline scenario), are comparatively less attractive in the case of financing the 
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subsidiary via Offshore treaty. Thus, if companies decided to use this tax-planning strategy, this 
would particularly increase the investment volume in high-tax countries with favorable depre-
ciation rules and no interest deduction restrictions. In addition, the subsidiaries resident in coun-
tries applying comparatively high tax rates are likely to become more competitive than those 
located in low-tax countries. 
However, differences in the CoC only arise due to different effects of tax base reductions for 
other profits. If there were no other profits or only other marginal profits for which the same 
tax planning structure is applied, and if the interest was fully deductible in the country of resi-
dence of SUBS, the CoC for marginal investments would be the same across different MNPC 
and SUBS locations. 
The EATR results show that RE financing of OFFSHORE treaty is also the optimal strategy in 
the case of profitable investments. Under RE financing, dividend taxes in the country of the 
parent (MNPC) only apply to the return in excess of the marginal return. In contrast, CIT in the 
MNPC location is due on the total profit in the case of NE- and debt financing of OFFSHORE 
treaty. 
For profitable investments, the tax reducing effect of the “Financing via Offshore treaty” tax-
planning strategy is less pronounced, since only a part of the profit escapes profit taxation at 
the level of SUBS. Nevertheless, the EATR for outbound investments remains lower for most 
countries in the case of tax planning than for direct financing from MNPC to SUBS. Differently 
to the baseline scenario, the marginal return is tax-exempt, while the rest of the profit is taxed 
identically under the considered tax-planning strategy and direct financing. Only outbound in-
vestments from countries that apply the credit method to dividends received from OFFSHORE 
treaty but do not credit underlying CITs of lower tier group companies yield higher mean 
EATRs than in the baseline results. For MNPCs resident in such credit countries (here Bulgaria 
and Greece), the advantage of low taxation of the marginal return is overcompensated by the 
additional tax payments on the excess return. Unlike the case of a direct holding of SUBS by 
MNPC, taxes paid at the level of SUBS could not be credited in the country of MNPC if divi-
dends were received via OFFSHORE treaty. Hence, for MNPCs resident in these two countries, 
shifting all profits via OFFSHORE treaty is not an attractive alternative to direct financing. 
However, using a financing company resident in Offshore treaty while directly holding the par-
ticipation in SUBS could also reduce the EATR for investments from these countries to a level 
below the EATR under direct financing. This particular case is not modelled in this study. 
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Compared to the case of direct financing, major differences in terms of the attractiveness of 
countries as parent locations for profitable outbound investments result for low-tax countries 
that apply the credit method to dividends received from Offshore treaty but not to dividends 
from EU countries (such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Poland). Differences between the outbound 
EATRs in the case of “Financing via Offshore treaty” for countries that generally exempt divi-
dends from taxation arise from the potential inclusion of 5% of the dividends. In addition, low-
tax countries usually face slightly higher mean outbound EATRs, as more investments in coun-
tries with a high tax rate are considered when calculating the average across all subsidiary coun-
tries. 
The mean EATRs for inbound investments imply that, with the exceptions of Austria and Es-
tonia, the attractiveness of countries for profitable inbound investments of foreign investors 
generally increases if the “Financing via Offshore treaty” tax-planning strategy is used instead 
of direct financing of the investment. The lower mean EATRs are driven by the results for 
investments from MNPCs residing in countries that exempt foreign dividends, as well as coun-
tries that credit underlying CITs of lower tier subsidiaries. The ranking of the countries accord-
ing to the mean EATR values for inbound investments (and thus the location attractiveness of 
countries for profitable investments) is similar to the baseline scenario. As opposed to marginal 
investments, the attractiveness of high-tax countries as investment locations decreases, since 
the negative effect of high profit taxation cancels out the advantage from high tax depreciation. 
Overall, tax planning via Offshore treaty reduces the mean CoC by 1.6 percentage points (from 
5.7% to 4.1%) and the mean EATR by 4.7 percentage points (from 20.9% to 16.2%). Therefore, 
cross-border investments are on average taxed less when financed via Offshore treaty. For mar-
ginal investments, if the “Financing via Offshore treaty” strategy is applied, high-tax countries 
become more attractive as a location for both parent and subsidiary companies of multinational 
firms. In the case of profitable investments, similarly to the baseline scenario, low-tax countries 
remain the on average more attractive investment locations. For MNPCs resident in countries 
that apply the credit method to dividends but do not credit CITs of lower tier subsidiaries, hold-
ing SUBS via OFFSHORE treaty generally incurs a higher tax burden on profitable investments 
than MNPC directly investing in SUBS. For Austria, the strategy is also made unattractive by 
the non-deductibility of the interest payments due to the low effective taxation of the interest 
income in Offshore treaty. Overall, this leads to the conclusion that whether this strategy results 
in a tax advantage (and is thus beneficial) depends on the profitability of an investment, the 
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taxation of dividends in the country of residence of the parent company, and the deductibility 
of interest in the subsidiary country. 
3.5.1.2 “Financing via Offshore no treaty”: Loan from OFFSHORE no treaty 
In the following, the effects within the context of the “Financing via Offshore” tax-planning 
strategy of WHTs (on interest and dividends) and switch-over clauses for dividends on the CoC 
and EATR are discussed. In this variation of the tax-planning strategy, the intermediate com-
pany is resident in Offshore no treaty. Offshore no treaty does not levy any taxes on income 
and has not concluded tax treaties with the 28 EU member states and the US. Hence, WHTs on 
interest and dividends levied according to the domestic tax law in the country of residence of 
SUBS apply (see Chapter 3.2.3.1). In addition, switch-over clauses that trigger the inclusion of 
dividends in the taxable income are assumed to apply in the case of tax planning via Offshore 
no treaty (see Chapter 3.2.3.2). Moreover, rules that deny the deduction of interest expenses 
from the tax base if the interest income is tax-exempt, and which cannot be circumvented by 
proving economic substance of the payments, are considered under this tax-planning strategy. 
Such rules apply in Austria, Slovenia, and Sweden. 
The first difference from the results described in Chapter 3.5.1.1 is that, if the intermediate 
company is resident in Offshore no treaty, tax-free shifting of the marginal return to the tax-
exempt country is usually not possible. This can be attributed to the WHTs that most considered 
countries of residence of SUBS levy on interest payments to non-treaty countries. Moreover, 
the non-deductibility of interest payments in Slovenia and Sweden, which is assumed to apply 
only under “Financing via Offshore no treaty”, further increases the tax burden of the marginal 
return for investments in these countries. In addition, WHTs on dividends paid from SUBS to 
OFFSHORE no treaty as well as the switch-over from the exemption to the credit method for 
dividends received by MNPC increase the tax burden of the excess return. Such rules currently 
apply in various EU member states.130 
                                                          
130 Chapter B2 of the Annex contains detailed results for the tax-planning strategy “Financing via Offshore no 
treaty” for all parent-subsidiary-combinations. 
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Table 10: Mean CoC and EATR – “Financing via Offshore no treaty” (in %) 
 
Table 10 shows that, for inbound investments to 9 of the 10 countries that do not levy WHTs 
on interest irrespective of the recipient country, the mean CoC is lower than for the “Financing 
via Offshore treaty” tax-planning strategy. The higher CoC for Sweden is attributable to the 
non-deductibility of interest payments to Offshore no treaty. Lower CoC result if any dividend 
taxes on distributions from SUBS to OFFSHORE no treaty and/or on distributions from       
OFFSHORE no treaty to MNPC are levied. This is because, in the Devereux/Griffith model, 
TP BL TP BL TP BL TP BL
FR 4.3 5.5 MT 28.4 19.6 LU 3.1 5.5 CY 19.9 15.3
BE 5.0 5.6 DK 29.3 20.5 DE 3.4 6.0 BG 21.5 8.8
US 5.1 5.3 DE 29.6 21.3 MT 3.4 6.0 EE 22.2 13.2
EL 5.5 6.3 HR 30.2 21.1 NL 3.5 5.7 HU 22.4 19.3
LU 5.5 5.7 UK 30.3 20.4 FI 3.8 5.7 IE 24.5 14.1
ES 5.5 5.8 AT 32.0 20.5 HU 4.1 5.8 LT 28.7 13.6
IT 5.5 5.3 PT 32.3 20.3 CY 4.1 5.6 UK 29.6 21.4
PT 5.6 5.7 SK 32.6 21.6 IE 4.1 5.5 MT 29.9 29.7
MT 5.8 5.6 US 33.1 27.3 LT 4.8 5.4 NL 30.5 21.9
NL 5.8 5.8 IE 33.9 22.2 BG 4.9 5.0 LV 30.5 14.3
AT 6.0 5.8 ES 34.1 20.4 HR 5.3 5.2 FI 31.2 18.5
SE 6.0 5.7 BG 36.1 19.3 SE 5.3 5.6 HR 31.2 16.4
DE 6.1 5.8 CZ 36.1 21.0 EL 5.3 6.0 SK 31.4 19.3
CZ 6.1 5.8 LV 37.2 20.1 LV 5.5 5.5 LU 31.9 24.2
DK 6.1 5.8 LT 37.3 20.1 IE 5.8 5.5 EL 34.8 25.8
PL 6.1 5.7 SI 37.6 20.8 AT 5.8 5.8 SI 35.3 15.5
FI 6.1 5.7 PL 38.2 20.5 PL 5.9 5.6 PL 35.4 17.5
HU 6.2 5.7 CY 38.3 20.8 BE 6.2 5.3 DE 39.7 27.1
SI 6.2 5.6 FI 38.7 20.5 UK 6.4 6.4 SE 41.0 19.2
UK 6.2 5.7 HU 38.7 20.5 DK 6.6 5.7 RO 41.2 14.8
HR 6.3 5.8 SE 38.8 20.5 SI 6.7 5.5 AT 41.4 22.3
CY 6.4 5.7 RO 39.0 20.6 SK 6.8 5.6 DK 43.1 20.9
LV 6.4 5.5 NL 40.2 20.5 IT 6.9 4.9 ES 45.0 31.7
IE 6.4 6.1 IT 40.5 19.5 ES 7.6 7.6 BE 45.5 26.7
LT 6.4 5.5 EL 41.3 22.9 CZ 8.0 5.4 IT 46.0 23.0
BG 6.7 5.3 LU 41.4 20.3 US 8.3 6.7 CZ 47.7 16.6
RO 7.0 5.6 EE 42.1 21.4 PT 8.4 5.8 PT 52.2 25.2
SK 7.0 6.0 BE 42.5 20.5 RO 8.9 5.5 US 53.2 36.2
EE 7.4 5.9 FR 44.8 22.7 FR 16.0 6.3 FR 67.9 35.2
Ø 6.0 5.7 Ø 36.4 20.9 Ø 6.0 5.7 Ø 36.4 20.9
Outbound Inbound
Abbreviations:
TP = Tax-planning strategy; BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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the value of refinancing costs at the level of MNPC increases with the tax burden on the dis-
tributed return of the investment. This can be explained by tax savings from tax-deductible 
refinancing costs of MNPC associated with the incremental investment, which increase the 
company’s net present value compared to the case of RE financing of MNPC. Due to this ad-
ditional net present value resulting from the refinancing tax shield at the level of MNPC (which 
can effectively be attributed to the investment), the investor’s required pre-tax rate of return 
decreases relative to that in the case of RE financing of MNPC. As the tax burden on returns of 
SUBS at the level of MNPC increases, the required pre-tax rate of return that corresponds to 
the additional firm value generated from tax savings associated with the deduction of refinanc-
ing costs decreases. WHTs on interest increase the CoC above the CoC under “Financing via 
Offshore treaty”. 
The EATRs for inbound investments into the countries that levy WHTs on neither interest nor 
on dividends (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta) are equal to the respective EATRs for the “Fi-
nancing via Offshore treaty” strategy for all parent countries that treat dividends from Offshore 
treaty and Offshore no treaty in the same way (Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Malta, Slovak 
Republic, UK, US). For profitable investments into and from all other countries, the following 
applies: WHTs on interest and/or dividends, as well as the higher taxation of the dividends at 
the level of MNPC due to the application of switch-over clauses, increase the EATR above the 
level of “Financing via Offshore treaty”. 
Marginal investments from seven high-tax countries would on average require lower CoC if tax 
planning via Offshore no treaty was used instead of directly investing in SUBS. As explained 
above, the lower mean CoC for investments from those parent countries mainly results from 
the relatively higher value of refinancing costs, which increases with the tax burden on divi-
dends.  
For the investment constellations where the CoC and EATR are higher than they are in the case 
of “Financing via Offshore treaty”, whether “Financing via Offshore no treaty” yields a lower 
CoC and EATR than direct financing depends on the level of the WHTs on interest and divi-
dends, as well as the level of taxation of the dividends in the parent country. On average, the 
CoC and especially the EATR for this strategy are higher than with optimal direct financing. 
The WHTs on dividends in many countries and the application of switch-over clauses for divi-
dend taxation make tax planning for profitable outbound investments via Offshore no treaty 
rather unattractive. Overall, the “Financing via Offshore no treaty” tax-planning strategy is par-
ticularly advantageous for investments from countries that exempt dividends received from 
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Offshore no treaty into countries without WHTs on interest and dividends. On average, how-
ever, the strategy is not recommendable, as it increases the mean CoC by 0.3 percentage points 
(from 5.7% to 6%) and the mean EATR by 15.5 percentage points (from 20.9% to 36.4%) in 
comparison to the baseline results. 
The “Financing via Offshore no treaty” strategy illustrates that WHTs on interest and dividends, 
as well as switch-over clauses for intragroup dividends, are in principle an effective tool to curb 
the profit-shifting activities of multinationals.131 However, as long as intragroup payments be-
tween corporations resident in EU member states are exempt from WHTs while not all EU 
member states levy WHTs on payments to third countries, domestic WHTs can easily be 
avoided by channeling the respective payments to tax havens via other EU member states with-
out triggering further taxation. Additionally, this strategy often allows for the avoidance of the 
application of switch-over clauses. To conclude, multinationals are usually able to effectively 
achieve the outcome of tax planning via Offshore treaty, even if their country has not estab-
lished treaties with tax havens and levies high WHTs on interest payments. Therefore, the “Fi-
nancing via Offshore treaty” tax-planning strategy is likely to be more relevant than the “Fi-
nancing via Offshore no treaty” strategy in practice. 
3.5.1.3 “Financing via Average”: Loan from AVERAGE 
The second tax-planning strategy involving profit shifting via interest payments considers an 
intermediate company resident in Average: an EU member state that applies a CIT rate of 23%. 
This tax-planning strategy is only attractive for investments between countries that both have a 
higher tax rate than Average. If the profits at either the level of MNPC or the level of SUBS are 
subject to a lower income tax rate than 23%, using RE financing of SUBS or direct debt financ-
ing from MNPC results in a lower taxation of the returns. This is evidenced by the overview of 
mean CoC and EATRs for inbound investments in Table 11, where only high-tax countries 
exhibit lower mean values than in the case of direct financing. 
The ranking of countries according to the results for inbound and outbound CoC and EATR for 
the “Financing via Average” strategy is very similar to the ranking according to the results for 
the case of direct financing. Tax planning via AVERAGE is only favorable for a few country 
combinations. Consequently, the mean CoC across all country combinations compared to the 
                                                          
131 For WHTs, see also Fuest et al. (2013). 
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baseline scenario increases by 0.1 percentage points (from 5.7% to 5.8%) and the EATR in-
creases by 0.7 percentage points (from 20.9% to 21.6%).132 
Table 11: Mean CoC and EATR – “Financing via Average” (in %) 
 
 
 
                                                          
132 The detailed results for the “Financing via Average” strategy for all country combinations are included in 
Chapter B3 of the Annex. 
TP BL TP BL TP BL TP BL
BG 5.3 5.3 BG 19.4 19.3 BE 5.2 5.3 BG 11.9 8.8
IT 5.4 5.3 IT 19.8 19.5 HR 5.3 5.2 LT 15.2 13.6
US 5.4 5.3 MT 20.3 19.6 LU 5.4 5.5 IE 15.6 14.1
FR 5.6 5.5 LV 20.4 20.1 CZ 5.6 5.4 LV 15.9 14.3
LV 5.6 5.5 LT 20.4 20.1 PT 5.6 5.8 RO 16.2 14.8
LT 5.6 5.5 RO 20.6 20.6 SK 5.6 5.6 SI 16.6 15.5
RO 5.7 5.6 ES 21.1 20.4 NL 5.6 5.7 CY 16.6 15.3
MT 5.7 5.6 PT 21.1 20.3 SE 5.7 5.6 HR 16.8 16.4
BE 5.7 5.6 LU 21.2 20.3 DK 5.7 5.7 CZ 17.3 16.6
SI 5.7 5.6 HU 21.2 20.5 MT 5.7 6.0 PL 18.1 17.5
PL 5.9 5.7 PL 21.2 20.5 AT 5.8 5.8 FI 18.9 18.5
HU 5.9 5.7 CZ 21.3 21.0 SI 5.8 5.5 SE 19.4 19.2
CZ 5.9 5.8 UK 21.3 20.4 LT 5.8 5.4 SK 19.4 19.3
CY 5.9 5.7 SI 21.3 20.8 PL 5.8 5.6 EE 19.9 13.2
ES 5.9 5.8 CY 21.3 20.8 BG 5.8 5.0 HU 19.9 19.3
UK 5.9 5.7 BE 21.3 20.5 IT 5.8 4.9 DK 20.8 20.9
PT 5.9 5.7 EE 21.4 21.4 FI 5.8 5.7 NL 21.6 21.9
EE 5.9 5.9 FI 21.4 20.5 RO 5.8 5.5 UK 21.8 21.4
LU 5.9 5.7 HR 21.5 21.1 EL 5.8 6.0 AT 22.1 22.3
FI 5.9 5.7 SE 21.7 20.5 IE 5.9 5.5 LU 23.6 24.2
HR 5.9 5.8 AT 21.7 20.5 DE 5.9 6.0 PT 24.6 25.2
DE 5.9 5.8 NL 21.8 20.5 LV 5.9 5.5 EL 25.2 25.8
SE 6.0 5.7 SK 21.9 21.6 CY 5.9 5.6 IT 26.1 23.0
AT 6.0 5.8 DK 22.0 20.5 HU 6.0 5.8 BE 26.5 26.7
NL 6.0 5.8 DE 22.1 21.3 FR 6.0 6.3 DE 26.7 27.1
SK 6.0 6.0 EL 23.2 22.9 EE 6.1 4.4 MT 29.0 29.7
DK 6.1 5.8 IE 23.2 22.2 US 6.3 6.7 ES 31.1 31.7
IE 6.4 6.1 FR 23.4 22.7 UK 6.6 6.4 FR 34.5 35.2
EL 6.5 6.3 US 27.7 27.3 ES 7.5 7.6 US 35.3 36.2
Ø 5.8 5.7 Ø 21.6 20.9 Ø 5.8 5.7 Ø 21.6 20.9
Outbound Inbound
Abbreviations:
TP = Tax-planning strategy; BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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3.5.1.4 Tax-Planning Strategies 3 and 4: Hybrid loan 
For Tax-Planning Strategies 3 and 4, it is assumed that the loan given to SUBS by OFFSHORE 
treaty, OFFSHORE no treaty, and AVERAGE is categorized as equity capital in the respective 
countries. Meanwhile the countries of residence of SUBS consider the loan to be debt capital. 
This hybrid classification of the loan does not change the CoC and EATR results calculated for 
the “Financing via Offshore treaty” or “Financing via Offshore no treaty” strategies, under 
which the intermediate company is resident in a country that taxes neither dividends nor inter-
est. Since Offshore treaty and Offshore no treaty do not levy CITs on either type of income, it 
is irrelevant whether the remunerations resulting from the loan are treated as dividends or in-
terest. 
However, differences arise if tax planning via the intermediate company AVERAGE is consid-
ered. The mean values across all parent-subsidiary combinations for this tax-planning strategy 
are summarized in Table 12.133 
If AVERAGE granted a hybrid loan to SUBS, the interest would be deductible from the tax 
base of SUBS while it would be taxed as dividends at the level of AVERAGE. In the average 
country, intragroup dividends are assumed to be tax-exempt. Therefore, using the “Hybrid fi-
nancing via Average” strategy, non-taxation of the marginal return is achieved. The results are 
thus very similar to Tax-Planning Strategy 1: “Financing via Offshore treaty”. However, since 
AVERAGE is an EU country that levies taxes at a rate of 23% on other income, several ad-
vantages arise compared to Tax-Planning Strategy 1. Firstly, Bulgaria, Greece, and Poland ap-
ply the credit method for dividends received by non-EU countries such as Offshore treaty, while 
they exempt dividends received from related companies that are resident in the EU. Therefore, 
for these countries, the mean EATRs for outbound investments are significantly lower using 
the “Hybrid financing via Average” strategy than using Tax-Planning Strategy 1. Moreover, 
debt financing of AVERAGE offers additional tax-saving potential for MNPCs resident in 
countries with a lower tax rate than that of Average. While the interest payments made to 
MNPC reduce other taxable profits of AVERAGE, the corresponding interest income is taxed 
at a lower rate at the level of MNPC. Consequently, the CoC and EATRs for outbound invest-
ments are either lower than or virtually equal to the CoC and EATRs in the case of “Financing 
via Offshore treaty”. Slightly higher mean CoC and EATRs are driven by the higher WHTs on 
                                                          
133 Chapter B4 of the Annex includes the detailed results for the “Hybrid financing via Average” tax-planning 
strategy. 
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interest and dividend payments from the US to Average and from Average to the US. In the 
case of outbound investments from Greece, the higher CoC for the “Hybrid financing via        
Average” strategy than the “Financing via Offshore treaty” strategy is caused both by a different 
treatment of dividends and, in particular, by a different treatment of related refinancing costs at 
the level of the parent company in the two scenarios. Regarding inbound investments, the mean 
CoC and EATRs are almost all below those for Tax-Planning Strategy 1. The only exception is 
inbound investments to the US due to the higher WHTs on interest and dividends in the case of 
“Hybrid financing via Average”. 
Table 12: Mean CoC and EATR – “Hybrid financing via Average” (in %) 
 
TP BL TP BL TP BL TP BL
US 3.0 5.3 BG 11.8 19.3 BE 2.8 5.3 BG 4.3 8.8
BG 3.3 5.3 IT 12.3 19.5 LU 3.1 5.5 LT 7.6 13.6
IT 3.3 5.3 MT 12.6 19.6 FR 3.2 6.3 IE 7.9 14.1
LV 3.6 5.5 LV 12.8 20.1 MT 3.2 6.0 LV 8.2 14.3
LT 3.6 5.5 LT 12.8 20.1 HR 3.3 5.2 RO 8.5 14.8
FR 3.6 5.5 RO 13.0 20.6 PT 3.3 5.8 SI 8.9 15.5
RO 3.6 5.6 ES 13.4 20.4 NL 3.5 5.7 CY 8.9 15.3
MT 3.7 5.6 PT 13.5 20.3 IT 3.5 4.9 HR 9.2 16.4
SI 3.7 5.6 LU 13.5 20.3 SK 3.5 5.6 CZ 9.6 16.6
BE 3.7 5.6 HU 13.6 20.5 DE 3.6 6.0 PL 10.4 17.5
PL 3.8 5.7 PL 13.6 20.5 EL 3.6 6.0 FI 11.4 18.5
HU 3.8 5.7 CZ 13.6 21.0 DK 3.6 5.7 SE 11.7 19.2
CY 3.8 5.7 UK 13.7 20.4 CZ 3.6 5.4 SK 11.7 19.3
CZ 3.8 5.8 CY 13.7 20.8 SE 3.6 5.6 EE 12.2 13.2
UK 3.9 5.7 SI 13.8 20.8 PL 3.8 5.6 HU 12.2 19.3
ES 3.9 5.8 EE 13.8 21.4 SI 3.8 5.5 DK 13.1 20.9
PT 3.9 5.7 FI 13.8 20.5 FI 3.9 5.7 NL 13.9 21.9
EE 3.9 5.9 AT 13.8 20.5 LT 3.9 5.4 UK 14.1 21.4
FI 3.9 5.7 BE 13.8 20.5 RO 3.9 5.5 LU 15.9 24.2
LU 3.9 5.7 HR 13.9 21.1 HU 4.0 5.8 PT 16.9 25.2
HR 3.9 5.8 SE 14.1 20.5 IE 4.0 5.5 EL 17.4 25.8
DE 3.9 5.8 NL 14.1 20.5 CY 4.0 5.6 IT 18.4 23.0
AT 3.9 5.8 SK 14.2 21.6 BG 4.0 5.0 BE 18.7 26.7
SE 4.0 5.7 DK 14.3 20.5 LV 4.0 5.5 DE 18.9 27.1
NL 4.0 5.8 DE 14.6 21.3 EE 4.0 4.4 MT 21.2 29.7
SK 4.0 6.0 EL 15.6 22.9 US 4.2 6.7 AT 23.0 22.3
DK 4.1 5.8 FR 16.3 22.7 UK 4.5 6.4 ES 23.4 31.7
IE 4.3 6.1 IE 18.1 22.2 ES 4.8 7.6 FR 26.6 35.2
EL 4.4 6.3 US 25.1 27.3 AT 5.9 5.8 US 29.0 36.2
Ø 3.8 5.7 Ø 14.3 20.9 Ø 3.8 5.7 Ø 14.3 20.9
Outbound Inbound
Abbreviations:
TP = Tax-planning strategy; BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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In conclusion, of the different strategies using profit shifting via interest payments, tax planning 
through a financing company resident in Average granting a hybrid loan to SUBS is on average 
the most attractive strategy for investments from and to the 29 countries considered. In com-
parison to direct financing, it reduces the mean CoC by 1.9 percentage points (from 5.7% to 
3.8%) and the EATR by 6.6 percentage points (from 20.9% to 14.3%). Using both this tax-
planning strategy and tax planning via Offshore treaty results in very low CoC and EATRs and 
increases the attractiveness of cross-border investments in general. Comparing the ranking of 
countries with regard to CoC under both tax-planning strategies to the country ranking in the 
baseline scenario, high-tax countries become relatively more attractive as both parent and sub-
sidiary locations, while the relative attractiveness of low-tax countries decreases for marginal 
investments. The inbound EATRs for the two most favorable tax-planning strategies indicate 
that the relative attractiveness of different investment locations remains largely unaffected for 
profitable investments (compared to direct investments from MNPC to SUBS). 
3.5.2 Profit shifting via royalty payments 
As well as profit shifting via interest payments, profit shifting via royalty payments plays an 
important role in international tax planning. Tax-Planning Strategies 5-7 deal with this oppor-
tunity. All three IP tax-planning strategies share the characteristics that an IP company invests 
in an intangible asset while SUBS invests in the remaining four assets considered in the Deve-
reux/Griffith model (buildings, machinery, inventories, and financial assets). SUBS licenses 
the intangible asset from the IP company and generates income from its use. For the licensing 
arrangement, royalties are paid from SUBS to the IP company. The IP company can either be 
resident in Offshore treaty, Offshore no treaty, Average, or any of the 11 EU member states 
that had an IP-box regime in place in 2015.  
The tax-planning strategies based on intercompany financing only allow for shifting the mar-
ginal return via interest payments to the financing company. For IP tax planning, this study 
assumes that the total profits earned from the use of the intangible can be shifted to the IP 
company via royalty payments. The returns generated from the use of the other four assets are 
not reduced by the royalty payments. This assumption is made to simulate the highest theoret-
ically acceptable arm’s length price of the royalty payment. It takes account of the fact that 
most countries apply the arm’s length principle, which requires royalty payments between re-
lated persons to be priced at a level comparable to similar royalty payments made between 
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unrelated parties.134 Concerning licensing arrangements between unrelated parties, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the maximum price a company is willing to pay for an intangible is the 
share of profit that this intangible contributes to the company’s total profit. However, finding 
comparable transactions between unrelated companies is particularly difficult for intangible 
property that is often unique in its features, which results in considerable leeway when defining 
the arm’s length price.135 Moreover, the tax-planning strategies of multinational corporations 
presented in Chapter 2.1 indicate that companies with valuable intangibles are especially able 
to shift large parts of their profits to low-tax entities. To account for this, in addition to the 
results for an investment in all five assets, CoC and EATRs are also provided for the case where 
IP is the only productive asset the multinational invests in and total profits of SUBS can thus 
be shifted via royalty payments.136 
3.5.2.1  “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” 
Similarly to the “Financing via Offshore treaty” strategy, the first IP tax planning case assumes 
the IP company (IPOFFSHORE treaty) to be resident in Offshore treaty.  
In the case the multinational only invests in an intangible asset, the results for marginal invest-
ments will be comparable to those under Tax-Planning Strategy 1 (“Financing via Offshore 
treaty”), since, in both cases, the marginal return is shifted to the country Offshore treaty, where 
it remains untaxed. Hence, in line with the findings for Tax-Planning Strategy 1, it is always 
most tax-efficient to finance IPOFFSHORE treaty with RE. Table 13 lists mean CoC and 
EATRs for all countries averaged over all possible parent-subsidiary combinations for an in-
vestment in the intangible asset by IPOFFSHORE treaty.137 
Consistent with the results for Tax-Planning Strategy 1, the mean CoC usually amount to 5% 
or less for cross-border investments. The only exception is investments to Austria, where roy-
alty payments are not deductible from the tax base if the corresponding royalty income is sub-
ject to an effective taxation of less than 10%. Deviations from the results for Tax-Planning 
Strategy 1 are due to the missing tax advantage from depreciation of the intangible asset, as the 
asset is owned by OFFSHORE treaty, which is not subject to income taxation. Since there is no 
                                                          
134 For an overview of the application of the arm’s length principle, see Zinn et al. (2014). 
135 See also Owens (2013), p. 443. 
136 In Chapter C of the Annex, the CoC and EATRs are reported separately for the investment in the four assets at 
the level of SUBS (Chapter C2 of the Annex) and the investment in the intangible asset at the level of the IP 
company (Chapter C1 of the Annex). In the following subchapters, separate tables summarize the combined mean 
values for cross-border investments in all five assets. 
137 The detailed results for an investment in an intangible conducted via OFFSHORE treaty are included in Chapter 
C1-1 of the Annex. 
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tax base reducing effect, the inbound CoC are the same (i.e. 4.5%) for all countries except 
Austria. This implies that in the case of “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty”, taxes do not 
influence the investor’s decision as to the location where the intangible is used to generate 
profits, if royalty payments are deductible in the residence country of SUBS. The same also 
holds true for purely domestic investments, where SUBS and MNPC are located in the same 
country but IP is licensed from IPOFFSHORE treaty. Hence, capital export neutrality138 will 
apply with respect to the location of the use of intangibles in the production process if the “IP 
tax planning via Offshore treaty” strategy is used. 
Table 13: Mean CoC and EATR – “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” – Intangible (in %) 
 
                                                          
138 The principle of capital export neutrality requires domestic and foreign investments to be taxed equally. For 
this and alternative economic neutrality concepts, see Endres/Spengel (2015), pp. 19-36; Spengel (2013); Schön 
(2009), pp. 78-84. 
US 3.8 AT -3.0 CZ 4.5 US -0.2
EL 4.2 MT -2.7 EE 4.5 EL -0.1
FR 4.3 PT -2.0 RO 4.5 PL 0.2
MT 4.4 LU -2.0 SK 4.5 IE 0.3
BE 4.4 ES -1.8 BG 4.5 BG 0.4
AT 4.4 NL -1.5 CY 4.5 FR 0.6
PT 4.5 BE -1.3 IE 4.5 CZ 0.6
LU 4.5 DK -1.3 LT 4.5 EE 0.6
IT 4.5 SE -1.0 LV 4.5 RO 0.6
ES 4.6 FI -0.9 SI 4.5 SK 0.6
DE 4.6 HR -0.9 HU 4.5 SI 0.6
NL 4.6 UK -0.9 FI 4.5 CY 0.6
DK 4.7 IT -0.8 HR 4.5 LT 0.7
PL 4.7 HU -0.7 UK 4.5 LV 0.7
SE 4.7 DE -0.6 SE 4.5 DE 0.7
FI 4.7 LT -0.2 PL 4.5 HU 0.7
HR 4.7 LV -0.2 DK 4.5 IT 0.7
UK 4.7 CY 0.1 NL 4.5 UK 0.7
HU 4.8 SI 0.1 DE 4.5 FI 0.7
SI 4.8 CZ 1.6 ES 4.5 HR 0.7
LT 4.9 EE 1.6 IT 4.5 SE 0.7
LV 4.9 RO 1.6 LU 4.5 DK 0.7
IE 4.9 SK 1.6 PT 4.5 BE 0.7
CY 4.9 FR 2.1 BE 4.5 NL 0.7
BG 5.0 BG 7.7 MT 4.5 ES 0.7
CZ 5.2 IE 9.2 FR 4.5 LU 0.7
EE 5.2 PL 13.2 EL 4.5 PT 0.7
RO 5.2 EL 19.3 US 4.5 MT 0.7
SK 5.2 US 22.7 AT 11.1 AT 43.0
Ø 4.7 Ø 2.0 Ø 4.7 Ø 2.0
Outbound Inbound
Abbreviations:
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; 
DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; 
HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; 
MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
CoC EATR EATRCoC
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Different CoC for outbound investments across countries result from different tax consequences 
of refinancing MNPC. The higher the value of the tax savings from interest deduction at the 
level of MNPC is, the lower the outbound CoC is. Due to a lack of tax advantages from depre-
ciation, the CoC for inbound and outbound investments are slightly higher than that of Tax-
Planning Strategy 1. 
As opposed to cross-border tax-planning strategies using debt financing, the model assumes 
that total profits (i.e. IP profits including economic rents that are attributed to the usage of the 
intangible) can be shifted under tax planning with IP. Thus, considering only the investment in 
the intangible, the resulting EATRs lie notably below their counterparts resulting from debt 
financing of the subsidiary via Offshore treaty (Tax-Planning Strategy 1). 
Outbound investments from countries that fully exempt dividends from taxation whilst apply-
ing high CIT rates that result in high tax savings from deductible refinancing costs of MNPC 
yield the lowest EATR. The advantages stemming from the deductibility of refinancing costs 
even lead to negative outbound EATRs for investments from most countries. This implies that 
the investments do not trigger any tax payments but are instead subsidized by tax savings. Out-
bound investments to all countries except Austria and from jurisdictions that forbid the deduc-
tion of refinancing costs related to tax-exempt dividends (e.g. the Slovak Republic, Romania) 
feature an EATR of 0%. For MNPCs resident in credit countries that fully tax received divi-
dends, outbound investments yield the highest EATR. It follows that those countries become 
the least attractive parent company locations in the case of “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty”.  
For profitable investments, the decision on the location of SUBS that uses the intangible to 
generate profits is also generally unaffected by taxation. Differences in the mean EATR for 
inbound investments in intangibles only arise due to a different composition of included parent 
countries in the calculation of the mean values. For Austria, the inbound EATRs are far higher 
than for the remaining subsidiary locations, which is a result of the non-deductibility of royalty 
payments from the tax base. 
Overall, the comparison shows that, for profitable investments in intangibles, using an IP com-
pany in Offshore treaty and shifting profits via royalty payments to the tax-exempt country may 
result in tax burdens close to zero. This is the case when profits are not subject to high dividend 
taxation in the parent country and royalty payments are deductible in the residence country of 
SUBS. Therefore, for companies with valuable intangibles that are of outstanding importance 
 65 
 
to profit generation, tax planning via royalties offers far higher tax savings than tax planning 
via interest payments.  
For companies that do not solely rely on intangibles but instead derive profits from a combina-
tion of several assets, the CoC and EATR calculated for the combined investment in all five 
assets (as in the case of tax planning with interest payments and in the baseline scenario) are 
more relevant. As SUBS invests in the remaining four assets, the tax-efficient financing strategy 
for the investment in these assets depends on the relative tax rate difference between the country 
of residence of MNPC and the country of residence of SUBS. To illustrate the combined effect 
of the tax-planning strategy in the case of an investment in an asset mix, the results for optimally 
financing SUBS and optimally financing IPOFFSHORE treaty are weighted by 0.8 and 0.2. 
This is in line with the basic assumptions of the model defined in Chapter 3.1. Table 14 provides 
the resulting mean values for all investment combinations between the 29 countries considered. 
As the marginal returns of the remaining four assets are subject to tax either at the level of 
SUBS (RE- or NE financing of SUBS) or the level of MNPC (debt financing of SUBS) and 
hence do not remain completely untaxed, the overall mean values for inbound and outbound 
CoC are higher than for the “Financing via Offshore treaty” strategy. Nevertheless, the effect 
of the low taxation of profits from IP still reduces the mean CoC by 0.1 percentage points (from 
5.7% to 5.6%) compared to an investment of SUBS in all assets directly financed by MNPC 
(baseline results). 
For profitable outbound investments in an asset mix, using “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” 
as opposed to “Financing via Offshore treaty” either increases or decreases the EATR. Inde-
pendently, the mean EATRs for outbound investments always remain below those for direct 
investments. For countries that apply the exemption method to foreign dividends, the EATRs 
will be lower if the “Financing via Offshore treaty” strategy is used, since this involves a larger 
share of total profits (the marginal return of all five assets) being shifted to the tax-exempt 
country. For credit countries that do not permit the crediting of underlying CITs of lower tier 
subsidiaries, the EATRs will be lower if “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” is applied. This 
is due to the lack of double taxation avoidance in Tax-Planning Strategy 1, where profits above 
the marginal return are fully taxed at the level of both SUBS and MNPC. This negative effect 
overcompensates the advantage of a larger share of total profits that is tax-exempt at the level 
of OFFSHORE treaty under the “Financing via Offshore treaty” strategy. 
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Table 14: Mean CoC and EATR – “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” – All assets (in %) 
 
Overall, the outbound EATRs considering all five assets for “IP tax planning via Offshore 
treaty” vary less between different parent countries than those calculated for the “Financing via 
Offshore treaty” strategy. The ranking of the attractiveness of different countries as investment 
locations for profitable investments changes only slightly compared to the baseline scenario 
and Tax-Planning Strategy 1. In all three cases, the level of taxation in the source country re-
mains decisive for profitable investments. Nevertheless, the mean EATR decreases by 3.4 per-
centage points (from 20.9% to 17.5%) compared to the baseline scenario, making investments 
TP BL TP BL TP BL TP BL
US 5.0 5.3 MT 15.4 19.6 EE 4.4 4.4 BG 7.2 8.8
IT 5.2 5.3 IT 15.7 19.5 BG 4.9 5.0 EE 10.7 13.2
BG 5.3 5.3 PT 16.1 20.3 IT 5.1 4.9 LT 11.6 13.6
FR 5.3 5.5 AT 16.1 20.5 HR 5.1 5.2 IE 11.9 14.1
BE 5.4 5.6 LU 16.2 20.3 SI 5.3 5.5 LV 11.9 14.3
MT 5.4 5.6 LV 16.3 20.1 CZ 5.3 5.4 RO 12.3 14.8
LV 5.5 5.5 LT 16.3 20.1 LT 5.3 5.4 SI 12.4 15.5
LT 5.5 5.5 ES 16.3 20.4 IE 5.3 5.5 CY 13.3 15.3
SI 5.5 5.6 BE 16.4 20.5 RO 5.4 5.5 CZ 13.6 16.6
PL 5.6 5.7 NL 16.4 20.5 LV 5.4 5.5 HR 13.6 16.4
AT 5.6 5.8 UK 16.4 20.4 LU 5.4 5.5 PL 14.4 17.5
PT 5.6 5.7 DK 16.4 20.5 SK 5.4 5.6 FI 14.9 18.5
UK 5.6 5.7 SE 16.5 20.5 FI 5.5 5.7 SE 15.8 19.2
LU 5.6 5.7 FI 16.5 20.5 PT 5.5 5.8 SK 15.9 19.3
HU 5.6 5.7 HU 16.6 20.5 SE 5.5 5.6 HU 16.0 19.3
FI 5.6 5.7 CY 16.9 20.8 PL 5.5 5.6 UK 17.8 21.4
DK 5.6 5.8 SI 17.0 20.8 BE 5.5 5.3 DK 17.8 20.9
SE 5.6 5.7 HR 17.0 21.1 CY 5.5 5.6 NL 18.1 21.9
NL 5.6 5.8 RO 17.1 20.6 NL 5.6 5.7 IT 19.3 23.0
DE 5.6 5.8 DE 17.2 21.3 MT 5.7 6.0 LU 19.8 24.2
ES 5.6 5.8 BG 17.3 19.3 HU 5.7 5.8 PT 20.1 25.2
CY 5.6 5.7 CZ 17.4 21.0 DK 5.7 5.7 EL 20.6 25.8
RO 5.6 5.6 EE 17.7 21.4 EL 5.7 6.0 DE 22.3 27.1
HR 5.7 5.8 SK 17.9 21.6 DE 5.9 6.0 BE 22.8 26.7
CZ 5.8 5.8 FR 18.8 22.7 US 6.1 6.7 MT 23.8 29.7
EE 5.9 5.9 PL 19.4 20.5 UK 6.2 6.4 ES 24.5 31.7
SK 5.9 6.0 IE 19.8 22.2 FR 6.3 6.3 AT 26.4 22.3
IE 5.9 6.1 EL 22.5 22.9 ES 6.6 7.6 US 28.4 36.2
EL 6.0 6.3 US 26.6 27.3 AT 6.9 5.8 FR 29.1 35.2
Ø 5.6 5.7 Ø 17.5 20.9 Ø 5.6 5.7 Ø 17.5 20.9
Outbound Inbound
Abbreviations:
TP = Tax-planning strategy; BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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into 28 of the 29 countries more attractive when IP tax planning via Offshore treaty is used. 
Even lower CoC and EATRs could be achieved if the “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” and 
“Financing via Offshore treaty” strategies were combined. 
3.5.2.2 “IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty” 
While profits can be shifted to Offshore treaty via royalty payments without triggering tax con-
sequences, most countries levy WHTs on royalty payments to Offshore no treaty. Conse-
quently, “IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty” is most beneficial for inbound investments 
into the four countries that do not levy WHTs on royalties, i.e. Hungary, Malta, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. Table 15 illustrates this result. The latter countries are particularly attrac-
tive for IP-intensive multinational corporations, as royalty payments remain untaxed irrespec-
tive of the recipient country. The higher the WHT on royalties is, the higher the CoC and EATR, 
and consequently the less attractive “IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty” for an investment 
into the respective country, become. 
In addition, the full taxation of dividends received from Offshore no treaty in many EU member 
states due to switch-over clauses reduces the advantage of profit shifting via royalties for prof-
itable investments. Thus, the most attractive parent locations for profitable investments under 
the “IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty” strategy are countries that generally exempt divi-
dends and do not apply a switch-over clause to dividends from passive or low-taxed income. 
For an investment in the intangible only, the CoC and EATRs are exceptionally high for some 
countries (see Table 16). These high CoC and EATRs result from the combination of WHTs 
levied on the total incoming cash flow (including the remuneration for economic depreciation) 
and the missing tax saving from depreciation of the intangible, which is held in the tax-exempt 
country Offshore treaty. For profitable inbound investments into the two countries levying the 
highest WHT rates on royalties (France and Romania), this interaction reduces the post-tax net 
present value of the investment in the intangible to below zero. In the case of France, taxation 
reduces the cash inflows resulting from the investments in the intangible to less than the value 
required for reinvestment due to economic depreciation, which yields a mean EATR for in-
bound investments into France of above 100%.139 
                                                          
139 For the detailed results for an investment in an intangible using IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty, see 
Chapter C1-2 of the Annex. 
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Table 15: Mean CoC and EATR – “IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty” – All assets (in %) 
 
A comparison of the results for “IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty" with the baseline sce-
nario shows that investing in intangibles in a tax-exempt country and licensing them to a foreign 
subsidiary is only an attractive tax-planning strategy if no or low WHTs are levied in the sub-
sidiary country. 
TP BL TP BL TP BL TP BL
FR 6.2 5.5 MT 22.7 19.6 EE 4.8 4.4 BG 12.1 8.8
US 6.4 5.3 DK 23.4 20.5 BG 5.4 5.0 EE 15.5 13.2
IT 6.5 5.3 UK 23.5 20.4 LU 5.4 5.5 LT 16.5 13.6
BE 6.6 5.6 BG 23.7 19.3 NL 5.5 5.7 HU 18.1 19.3
BG 6.7 5.3 HR 24.1 21.1 MT 5.6 6.0 LV 18.2 14.3
MT 6.8 5.6 DE 24.2 21.3 HU 5.6 5.8 CY 18.2 15.3
LV 6.9 5.5 PT 24.5 20.3 LT 5.7 5.4 SI 18.7 15.5
PT 6.9 5.7 LV 24.6 20.1 SI 5.9 5.5 IE 19.6 14.1
LT 6.9 5.5 AT 24.6 20.5 CY 5.9 5.6 NL 20.2 21.9
LU 6.9 5.7 LT 24.6 20.1 LV 6.1 5.5 HR 21.3 16.4
SI 6.9 5.6 IT 24.6 19.5 HR 6.1 5.2 LU 21.9 24.2
PL 6.9 5.7 SK 24.7 21.6 IT 6.2 4.9 PL 22.2 17.5
ES 6.9 5.8 RO 25.0 20.6 IE 6.3 5.5 FI 22.6 18.5
RO 6.9 5.6 CZ 25.0 21.0 FI 6.4 5.7 SE 23.9 19.2
SE 6.9 5.7 PL 25.1 20.5 PL 6.5 5.6 UK 25.5 21.4
FI 6.9 5.7 FI 25.1 20.5 AT 6.5 5.8 AT 25.6 22.3
UK 6.9 5.7 ES 25.2 20.4 SE 6.5 5.6 CZ 25.7 16.6
NL 7.0 5.8 SE 25.2 20.5 DE 6.6 6.0 MT 26.0 29.7
DK 7.0 5.8 HU 25.3 20.5 EL 6.7 6.0 DK 26.9 20.9
AT 7.0 5.8 SI 25.3 20.8 BE 6.8 5.3 IT 27.6 23.0
HU 7.0 5.7 CY 25.3 20.8 DK 7.0 5.7 SK 28.0 19.3
CZ 7.0 5.8 NL 25.5 20.5 UK 7.2 6.4 EL 28.4 25.8
DE 7.0 5.8 LU 25.6 20.3 CZ 7.4 5.4 DE 28.8 27.1
CY 7.0 5.7 BE 25.7 20.5 SK 7.5 5.6 RO 29.0 14.8
HR 7.0 5.8 IE 26.1 22.2 PT 7.6 5.8 BE 31.8 26.7
SK 7.3 6.0 EE 26.6 21.4 US 7.8 6.7 PT 32.2 25.2
EL 7.3 6.3 EL 27.5 22.9 ES 7.9 7.6 ES 33.3 31.7
IE 7.3 6.1 FR 27.6 22.7 RO 9.3 5.5 US 39.2 36.2
EE 7.3 5.9 US 30.4 27.3 FR 18.1 6.3 FR 53.6 35.2
Ø 6.9 5.7 Ø 25.2 20.9 Ø 6.9 5.7 Ø 25.2 20.9
Abbreviations:
TP = Tax-planning strategy; BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Outbound Inbound
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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Table 16: Mean CoC and EATR – “IP tax planning via Offshore no treaty” – Intangible (in %) 
 
3.5.2.3 “IP tax planning via Average” 
Another variation of IP tax planning considers a situation where a company resident in Average 
(IPAVERAGE) invests in the intangible. Consistent with Tax-Planning Strategy 3, Average is 
assumed to have a CIT rate of 23%. Intangibles are depreciated at an annual rate of 21%. 
Whether this tax-planning strategy is attractive or not depends on the CIT rate and tax depreci-
ation schedule for intangibles in the country of residence of SUBS relative to the country of 
residence of IPAVERAGE. If the CIT rate is higher and the depreciation rules are less attractive 
in the country of SUBS, tax planning via IPAVERAGE reduces the CoC and EATR. Consid-
ering an investment in a country with a lower tax rate than Average and faster tax depreciation 
FR 8.6 DK 33.7 HU 4.3 LU 11.2
BE 10.6 MT 33.9 NL 4.3 NL 11.3
US 10.7 DE 34.4 MT 4.3 HU 11.4
EL 11.0 HR 34.4 LU 4.4 MT 12.0
PT 11.0 UK 34.4 EE 6.5 EE 24.9
IT 11.0 SK 35.9 BG 6.5 CY 25.0
ES 11.1 AT 39.1 CY 6.5 LT 25.1
LU 11.1 CZ 39.5 LT 6.5 BG 25.1
MT 11.3 PT 39.8 LV 7.8 SI 31.9
CZ 11.4 BG 40.0 SI 7.8 LV 32.0
NL 11.4 IE 40.6 DE 8.1 DE 33.4
SE 11.4 LV 41.0 IE 9.3 EL 38.8
AT 11.4 LT 41.3 HR 9.3 FI 38.9
DE 11.5 RO 41.4 UK 9.3 PL 38.9
DK 11.5 SI 41.5 PL 9.3 IE 39.1
FI 11.5 US 41.6 FI 9.3 AT 39.1
PL 11.5 PL 41.8 AT 9.3 HR 39.2
HR 11.7 FI 42.0 EL 9.3 UK 39.2
UK 11.7 ES 42.3 SE 9.8 SE 41.0
SI 11.7 CY 42.3 IT 10.1 IT 42.4
HU 11.7 SE 42.4 ES 10.6 ES 44.8
RO 11.8 HU 42.8 DK 11.0 BE 46.0
LV 11.8 IT 43.8 BE 11.0 DK 46.3
LT 11.8 NL 44.3 US 12.9 US 53.7
IE 11.9 EL 44.4 SK 15.0 SK 61.1
CY 11.9 LU 45.3 CZ 15.0 CZ 61.1
BG 12.1 BE 45.5 PT 15.0 PT 61.2
SK 12.1 EE 45.7 RO 24.1 RO 84.0
EE 12.6 FR 46.1 FR 63.7 FR 122.9
Ø 11.4 Ø 40.7 Ø 11.4 Ø 40.7
Abbreviations:
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; 
DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; 
HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; 
MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Outbound Inbound
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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of intangibles, investing in IP in Average and licensing out the IP to SUBS is not recommend-
able.  
Table 17: Mean CoC and EATR – “IP tax planning via Average” – all assets (in %) 
 
Table 17 summarizes mean CoC and EATRs for the investment in all five assets for “IP tax 
planning via Average”. It illustrates that, for marginal investments, it is mainly the relationship 
between depreciation rates in Average and those in the residence country of the subsidiary that 
TP BL TP BL TP BL TP BL
IT 5.2 5.3 BG 18.9 19.3 EE 4.5 4.4 BG 10.8 8.8
BG 5.2 5.3 IT 19.2 19.5 BG 5.1 5.0 EE 14.2 13.2
US 5.2 5.3 MT 19.4 19.6 IT 5.2 4.9 LT 15.1 13.6
FR 5.4 5.5 LV 19.7 20.1 HR 5.3 5.2 IE 15.4 14.1
LV 5.5 5.5 LT 19.7 20.1 SI 5.4 5.5 LV 15.5 14.3
LT 5.5 5.5 PT 20.1 20.3 CZ 5.4 5.4 RO 15.8 14.8
BE 5.5 5.6 LU 20.1 20.3 LT 5.4 5.4 SI 15.9 15.5
MT 5.5 5.6 RO 20.1 20.6 IE 5.5 5.5 CY 16.9 15.3
RO 5.6 5.6 UK 20.2 20.4 RO 5.5 5.5 CZ 17.1 16.6
SI 5.6 5.6 HU 20.2 20.5 LV 5.5 5.5 HR 17.1 16.4
PL 5.6 5.7 PL 20.3 20.5 LU 5.5 5.5 PL 18.0 17.5
HU 5.6 5.7 BE 20.3 20.5 SK 5.6 5.6 FI 18.4 18.5
UK 5.6 5.7 FI 20.3 20.5 FI 5.6 5.7 SE 19.3 19.2
CY 5.7 5.7 ES 20.3 20.4 PT 5.6 5.8 SK 19.4 19.3
FI 5.7 5.7 NL 20.3 20.5 SE 5.6 5.6 HU 19.5 19.3
PT 5.7 5.7 SE 20.4 20.5 PL 5.6 5.6 UK 21.3 21.4
LU 5.7 5.7 DK 20.4 20.5 BE 5.7 5.3 DK 21.3 20.9
SE 5.7 5.7 CY 20.4 20.8 AT 5.7 5.8 AT 21.4 22.3
DK 5.7 5.8 AT 20.4 20.5 CY 5.7 5.6 NL 21.6 21.9
HR 5.7 5.8 SI 20.5 20.8 NL 5.7 5.7 IT 22.8 23.0
NL 5.7 5.8 CZ 20.7 21.0 MT 5.8 6.0 LU 23.3 24.2
AT 5.7 5.8 HR 20.8 21.1 HU 5.8 5.8 PT 23.6 25.2
CZ 5.7 5.8 EE 21.0 21.4 EL 5.8 6.0 EL 24.3 25.8
DE 5.8 5.8 DE 21.1 21.3 DK 5.8 5.7 DE 25.8 27.1
ES 5.8 5.8 SK 21.2 21.6 DE 6.0 6.0 BE 26.3 26.7
EE 5.8 5.9 IE 22.0 22.2 US 6.2 6.7 MT 27.3 29.7
SK 5.9 6.0 FR 22.5 22.7 UK 6.3 6.4 ES 28.0 31.7
IE 6.1 6.1 EL 22.6 22.9 FR 6.4 6.3 US 32.0 36.2
EL 6.3 6.3 US 27.1 27.3 ES 6.7 7.6 FR 32.6 35.2
Ø 5.7 5.7 Ø 20.7 20.9 Ø 5.7 5.7 Ø 20.7 20.9
Abbreviations:
TP = Tax-planning strategy; BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; 
EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; 
SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
Outbound Inbound
CoC EATR CoC EATR
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is relevant. In contrast, the tax rate difference proves to be the decisive factor for profitable 
investments.140 
3.5.2.4 “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” 
The last tax-planning strategy assumes that the intangible is acquired by SUBSPB: a company 
resident in one of the 11 EU member states that offer an IP-box regime. SUBSPB licenses the 
intangible to SUBS. 
Tables 18-25 compare mean values for inbound and outbound CoC and EATRs for all coun-
tries, averaged over all partner countries, for IP tax planning via the 11 EU IP-box countries. In 
Tables 18-21, only the investment in the intangible is considered. In Tables 22-25, the combined 
investment in all five assets is considered. The columns are ranked according to the attractive-
ness of the IP-box regimes (measured by taking the mean of the average values for optimal 
financing across all possible investment combinations). The rows are ranked according to the 
attractiveness of MNPC (outbound) and SUBS (inbound) locations, respectively, for when IP 
tax planning is conducted via the (on average) most attractive IP-box regime.141 
Tables 18 and 20 illustrate that, for marginal investments, IP tax planning using the IP-box 
regimes in Portugal and Hungary is the most attractive option. While these two countries do 
not offer the lowest IP-box tax rates among the 11 IP-box countries, they permit the deduction 
of interest payments related to the IP-box income, as well as depreciation of the intangible asset 
at the higher ordinary CIT rate (gross approach). For marginal investments via these two IP-
box countries, the tax saving from deductible depreciation at the higher general income tax rate 
combined with the taxation of returns at the lower IP-box tax rate yields a CoC, that is far below 
5% (only considering the investment in intangibles). 
IP tax planning using the IP-box regime in Portugal is most attractive for marginal outbound 
investments from low-tax countries applying debt financing of SUBSPB. According to the 
gross approach, the tax reduction due to deduction of the interest under debt financing of     
SUBSPB exceeds the taxation of the profits in Portugal. For investments from parent companies 
that are resident in low-tax countries, this tax saving in Portugal combined with the taxation in 
the parent country is lower than the tax burden on IP income in Hungary. Hence, for MNPCs 
                                                          
140 The detailed results for an investment in intangibles using IP tax planning via Average are listed in Chapter C1-
3 of the Annex. 
141 Chapter C1-4 of the Annex includes the detailed results for an investment in an intangible for IP tax planning 
via all EU member states that offer an IP-box regime. 
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resident in these countries, using the IP-box regime in Portugal for marginal outbound invest-
ments is more attractive than using the IP-box regime in Hungary. For marginal outbound in-
vestments from high-tax countries, IP tax planning taking advantage of the Hungarian IP-box 
regime usually proves most attractive. This is because in Hungary, a lower IP-box tax rate ap-
plies. 
For IP tax planning using the IP-box regime in Belgium, the deductibility of interest and the 
ACE at the high CIT rate are the main reasons for the very low mean CoC. The tax saving from 
this interest and ACE deductibility is especially significant due to the large difference between 
the general CIT rate and the IP-box rate, resulting in excess tax savings (i.e. the tax savings are 
higher than the tax payments) concerning all MNPC locations. In addition, the annual tax de-
preciation rate in Belgium is comparably high. This further increases the tax advantage and 
reduces CoC. However, investing in IP in Belgium is less attractive than using the IP-box re-
gimes in Portugal and Hungary, as depreciation does not reduce other income at the general 
CIT rate in the case of acquired IP that benefits from the IP-box regime in Belgium. 
Although neither interest nor depreciation are deductible at the higher CIT rate, Italy also ranks 
among the most attractive IP-box locations for marginal investments. This is due to the compa-
rably fast depreciation schedule and the resulting high tax savings from depreciation, combined 
with the additional tax savings from the application of the ACE regime.142 The least attractive 
IP-box countries for marginal investments are France and Spain. The reasons for this lie in the 
relatively high tax rates on IP-box income in both countries combined with comparably low 
annual depreciation rates and the application of the net principle for both interest deductibility 
and tax depreciation. In the UK, the annual depreciation rate is also low, and a comparably high 
IP-box tax rate applies. However, as interest is deductible at the ordinary income tax rate in the 
UK, this IP-box regime is more attractive than the IP-box regimes of France and Spain. 
                                                          
142 Please note that both Italy and Belgium have implemented specific anti-avoidance provisions to tackle abuses 
of the ACE regime. However, these regulations do not apply to the tax-planning strategies considered in this study. 
For a comparison of the anti-avoidance provisions in Italy and Belgium, see Zangari (2014). 
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Table 18: Mean CoC – Outbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – Intangible (in %) 
Portugal Hungary Belgium Italy Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK France Spain
BG 1.7 2.6 3.3 4.4 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 4.6 4.9 7.1
IT 1.7 2.6 3.3 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.9 7.1
LT 2.0 2.8 3.5 4.2 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.2 7.4
LV 2.0 2.8 3.5 4.2 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.2 7.4
RO 2.0 2.9 3.6 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 4.9 5.2 7.5
SI 2.1 2.9 3.6 4.2 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.3 7.5
US 2.2 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.4 6.7
CZ 2.2 3.0 3.7 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.1 5.4 7.6
PL 2.2 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 7.5
HU 2.2 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 7.5
CY 2.2 3.0 3.7 4.3 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.4 7.7
EE 2.3 3.1 3.8 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.1 5.5 7.7
FI 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 7.5
HR 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 7.5
UK 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 7.5
SE 2.3 2.9 3.8 4.0 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.2 7.4
SK 2.4 3.2 3.9 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.6 7.8
DK 2.4 2.9 3.9 4.0 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 7.4
AT 2.5 2.6 3.8 3.9 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 5.0 5.1 7.3
NL 2.5 2.9 4.0 3.9 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.1 7.3
FR 2.6 2.5 3.8 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.7 7.0
MT 2.6 2.6 3.8 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 7.0
BE 2.6 2.6 3.8 3.6 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 7.0
EL 2.7 3.5 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.8 8.1
LU 2.7 2.7 4.0 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.9 7.2
PT 2.8 2.7 4.0 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.9 7.2
ES 2.8 2.8 4.0 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 7.2
DE 2.8 2.8 4.0 3.8 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 7.2
IE 2.9 3.2 4.4 4.3 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 7.7
Ø 2.4 2.8 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 7.4
CoC - Outbound - Intangible
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; 
IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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Table 19: Mean EATR – Outbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – Intangible (in %) 
 
Hungary Portugal Belgium Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK Italy France Spain
AT -3.7 0.5 -0.7 -2.4 -0.7 1.6 2.4 7.5 12.2 16.2 19.0
BG -3.4 -2.9 -2.5 1.0 2.7 5.0 5.8 5.9 14.1 15.5 19.1
MT -3.3 0.8 0.1 -2.1 -0.3 2.0 2.8 6.3 11.0 15.0 17.8
PT -2.7 1.5 0.8 -1.4 0.3 2.7 3.4 7.0 11.7 15.7 18.4
LU -2.6 1.4 0.8 -1.4 0.4 2.7 3.5 7.0 11.7 15.7 18.5
ES -2.5 1.7 0.9 -1.2 0.5 2.8 3.6 7.2 11.9 15.9 18.6
LT -2.3 -1.8 -1.4 0.4 2.1 4.4 5.2 7.0 13.5 16.7 20.2
LV -2.3 -1.8 -1.4 0.4 2.1 4.4 5.2 7.0 13.5 16.7 20.2
IT -2.3 -1.8 -1.4 -0.2 1.5 3.8 4.6 6.9 12.7 16.4 19.4
NL -2.1 0.5 0.9 -0.8 0.9 3.2 4.0 7.5 12.2 16.2 19.0
RO -2.1 -1.6 -1.1 2.2 3.9 6.3 7.0 7.2 15.3 16.9 20.4
BE -2.0 2.1 1.4 -0.7 1.0 3.3 4.1 7.5 12.1 16.1 18.8
DK -1.9 0.1 0.6 -0.7 1.1 3.4 4.2 7.7 12.4 16.4 19.2
SE -1.7 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 1.3 3.6 4.4 7.9 12.7 16.7 19.4
FI -1.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 1.5 3.8 4.6 8.1 12.8 16.8 19.6
HR -1.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 1.5 3.8 4.6 8.1 12.8 16.8 19.6
UK -1.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 1.5 3.8 4.6 8.1 12.8 16.8 19.6
PL -1.4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 1.6 3.9 4.7 7.9 13.0 17.0 19.7
HU -1.4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 1.6 3.9 4.7 7.9 13.0 17.0 19.7
CZ -1.4 -0.9 -0.5 2.2 3.9 6.3 7.0 7.9 15.3 17.6 21.1
CY -1.3 -0.8 -0.4 0.7 2.4 4.7 5.5 8.0 13.8 17.6 20.5
DE -1.2 2.9 2.1 0.0 1.7 4.0 4.8 8.2 12.8 16.8 19.5
EE -1.2 -0.7 -0.2 2.2 3.9 6.3 7.0 8.1 15.3 17.8 21.3
SI -1.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.8 2.4 4.8 5.5 8.1 13.7 17.6 20.4
SK -0.7 -0.2 0.2 2.2 3.9 6.3 7.0 8.6 15.3 18.3 21.8
EL 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.2 3.9 6.3 7.0 10.2 15.3 19.3 22.0
FR 1.5 5.4 4.7 2.7 4.3 6.5 7.2 10.5 14.8 18.6 21.2
IE 1.8 2.0 7.0 9.6 9.7 10.2 10.3 10.8 13.8 17.8 20.5
US 17.2 17.1 20.3 22.7 23.0 23.4 23.5 23.8 20.0 24.3 28.5
Ø -1.0 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.9 5.1 5.8 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
EATR - Outbound - Intangible
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; 
IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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Table 20: Mean CoC – Inbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – Intangible (in %) 
 
Portugal Hungary Belgium Italy Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK France Spain
IE 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
DE 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
ES 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
PT 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
LU 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
EL 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
BE 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
MT 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
FR 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
AT 2.3 9.5 10.4 4.1 11.1 11.5 11.8 12.0 5.0 5.1 7.4
NL 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
DK 2.3 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
SK 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
SE 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
EE 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
FI 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
HR 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
UK 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
CY 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
HU 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
CZ 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
PL 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
US 2.4 2.6 3.6 4.1 6.8 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.2 7.4
SI 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
RO 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
LT 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
LV 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
IT 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
BG 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.4
Ø 2.4 2.8 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.1 7.4
CoC - Inbound - Intangible
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; 
IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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Table 21: Mean EATR – Inbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – Intangible (in %) 
  
Hungary Portugal Belgium Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK Italy France Spain
US -3.1 0.1 -1.2 15.7 0.7 2.9 3.7 7.9 13.3 16.9 19.8
IE -2.6 0.6 -0.7 -1.1 1.1 3.4 4.2 8.3 13.5 17.1 20.1
FR -2.6 0.5 -0.6 -0.9 1.3 3.5 4.3 8.3 13.4 17.1 20.1
EL -2.5 0.7 -0.5 -0.8 1.4 3.5 4.3 8.3 13.4 17.0 20.0
SK -2.5 0.7 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.5 4.3 8.4 13.4 17.1 20.0
SI -2.5 0.7 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.3 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
EE -2.5 0.7 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.5 4.3 8.4 13.4 17.1 20.0
DE -2.5 0.6 -0.5 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
CY -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.3 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
CZ -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.5 4.3 8.4 13.4 17.1 20.1
HU -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
PL -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
FI -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
HR -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
UK -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
SE -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
BE -2.4 0.6 -0.5 -0.7 1.5 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.2 20.1
DK -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.5 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
RO -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.5 4.3 8.5 13.4 17.1 20.1
NL -2.4 0.7 -0.5 -0.7 1.5 3.6 4.4 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
IT -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.4 8.5 13.5 17.1 20.1
LT -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.3 8.5 13.5 17.1 20.1
LV -2.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.3 8.5 13.5 17.1 20.1
ES -2.4 0.7 -0.5 -0.7 1.5 3.7 4.4 8.5 13.6 17.2 20.1
LU -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.5 3.7 4.4 8.5 13.6 17.2 20.2
PT -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.5 3.7 4.4 8.5 13.6 17.2 20.2
MT -2.4 0.7 -0.4 -0.7 1.5 3.7 4.4 8.5 13.6 17.2 20.2
BG -2.4 0.8 -0.3 -0.8 1.4 3.6 4.3 8.5 13.5 17.2 20.1
AT 41.1 0.7 43.0 42.5 44.8 47.0 47.8 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
Ø -1.0 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.9 5.1 5.8 8.4 13.5 17.1 20.1
EATR - Inbound - Intangible
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; 
IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States
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According to Tables 19 and 21, for profitable investments, the attractiveness of the Hungarian 
IP-box regime is greater than that of the IP-box regime in Portugal. For the EATR, tax base 
effects are less relevant, and the IP-box tax rate in Hungary is lower than in Portugal. For the 
same reason, tax planning via Belgium becomes more attractive than IP tax planning via Por-
tugal. Investments in Austria pose an exception, as royalty expenses are deductible from the tax 
base when paid to Portugal but not when paid to Hungary or Belgium, due to the lower IP-box 
tax rates in these countries. In addition to a lower IP-box tax rate, Belgium offers more favorable 
depreciation rules for intangibles than Portugal and additionally offers an ACE regime. The 
advantage of deducting depreciation at the higher general CIT rate in Portugal is overcompen-
sated by the lower IP-box tax rate in Belgium for profitable investments. Despite the reduced 
relevance of tax base rules for profitable investments, the three countries applying the gross 
income approach to IP income (Hungary, Portugal, and - with respect to interest payments and 
the ACE – Belgium) remain among the four most attractive IP-box locations considering prof-
itable investments. The only country that is similarly attractive while applying the net approach 
with respect to both interest and depreciation expenses is Malta. Malta features the lowest IP-
box tax rate among the 11 countries considered, which is decisive for profitable investments. 
The ranking of the other IP-box regimes applying the net approach generally corresponds to the 
level of their IP-box tax rates. However, Italy poses an exception, since its ACE regime results 
in an additional tax advantage. This makes Italy more attractive for IP tax planning than France 
and Spain, despite their lower IP-box tax rates. While the IP-box tax rates in France and Spain 
are similar, the restriction of interest deductibility in Spain results in higher EATRs for tax 
planning using the Spanish IP-box regime. 
As with tax planning via IPOFFSHORE, the inbound CoC and EATRs for the investment in 
the intangible are identical across investment locations. This is because irrespective of the coun-
try where profits are generated from IP, only the tax base and tax rate effects of the country in 
which the intangible is owned are relevant if royalty payments are fully deductible from the tax 
base of SUBS. 
Comparing the “IP tax planning via IP-box regimes” and “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” 
strategies, it becomes clear that for marginal investments, tax planning using the IP-box regimes 
in Portugal, Hungary, Belgium, and Italy is the most attractive alternative. This is due to favor-
able tax base effects and, in particular, the application of the gross approach under the respective 
IP-box regimes. Since Malta does not levy taxes on IP income eligible for the IP–box regime, 
the CoC and EATR for using Malta as an IP holding location are, for most parent-subsidiary 
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combinations, identical to those for IP tax planning via Offshore treaty. Differences arise for 
inbound investments into the US, as the US levies WHTs on royalties paid to Malta, while 
royalties paid to Offshore treaty are by assumption tax-exempt. Moreover, some countries apply 
the credit method to dividends received from OFFSHORE treaty, while they exempt dividends 
distributed by a company resident in Malta. Due to the low IP-box tax rate of only 2.5%, the 
resulting rates for IP tax planning via Cyprus are similar to the results for the “IP tax planning 
via Offshore treaty” strategy. Other IP-box regimes provide on average lower tax saving poten-
tial for marginal investments than the “IP tax planning via Offshore treaty” strategy. This is 
because the higher taxes on IP income in the IP-box countries overcompensate any potential 
tax advantages from depreciation and interest deductibility that are available under the IP-box 
regimes. For profitable investments, taking advantage of the IP-box regimes in Hungary, Por-
tugal, Belgium, and Malta is generally preferable to conducting IP tax planning via Offshore 
treaty. 
Tables 22-25 list the combined inbound and outbound CoC and EATRs for investments in all 
five assets. The tables illustrate that the country ranking according to the CoC for both inbound 
and outbound investments is very similar to the respective country ranking in the baseline sce-
nario. The attractiveness of countries for marginal inbound investments relative to other invest-
ment locations decreases especially for countries with very favorable depreciation rules and 
high tax rates, such as Belgium. On the other hand, the attractiveness increases for countries 
with comparably less favorable depreciation rules. Nevertheless, the CoC and EATRs for all 
inbound investments decrease compared to the baseline scenario if SUBSPB is located in one 
of the most attractive IP-box countries. For tax planning via Hungary, the mean CoC decreases 
by 0.5 percentage points (from 5.7% to 5.2%), and the mean EATR decreases by 4 percentage 
points (from 20.9% to 16.9%). On the other hand, the CoC and EATR could increase compared 
to the base case if SUBSPB was located in one of the countries with a less favorable IP-box 
regime. If SUBSPB was located in Spain, the mean CoC would always be higher for inbound 
investments than for direct investments (the mean value increases to 6.1%). The only exception 
is Spain itself. When the IP-box regime in Spain is used for inbound investments into the coun-
try, the CoC is reduced compared to the baseline scenario, where IP-box regimes are not con-
sidered.  
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Table 22: Mean CoC – Outbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – all assets (in %) 
 
Portugal Hungary Belgium Italy Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK France Spain BL
IT 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.7 5.3
BG 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.7 5.3
US 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.6 5.3
LV 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 5.5
LT 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 5.5
FR 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.5
RO 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.6
SI 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.6
BE 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.6
PL 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7
UK 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7
HU 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7
MT 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.6
CY 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.7
FI 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.7
SE 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.7
HR 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.8
DK 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.8
CZ 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.8 6.2 5.8
NL 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.8
AT 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.8
PT 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.7
LU 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7
EE 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.9 6.4 5.9
DE 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.8
ES 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.8
SK 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.4 6.0
IE 5.5 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.1
EL 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.3
Ø 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7
CoC - Outbound - All assets
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; 
IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United 
States
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Table 23: Mean EATR – Outbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – all assets (in %) 
 
Hungary Portugal Belgium Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK Italy France Spain BL
BG 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.9 16.3 16.7 16.9 16.9 18.5 18.8 19.5 19.3
MT 15.3 16.1 16.0 15.6 15.9 16.4 16.5 17.2 18.2 19.0 19.5 19.6
IT 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.8 16.2 16.6 16.8 17.2 18.4 19.2 19.7 19.5
LV 15.9 16.0 16.1 16.4 16.8 17.2 17.4 17.8 19.1 19.7 20.4 20.1
LT 15.9 16.0 16.1 16.4 16.8 17.3 17.4 17.8 19.1 19.7 20.4 20.1
PT 16.0 16.8 16.7 16.2 16.6 17.1 17.2 17.9 18.9 19.7 20.2 20.3
AT 16.0 16.8 16.6 16.3 16.6 17.1 17.2 18.3 19.2 20.0 20.5 20.5
LU 16.0 16.8 16.7 16.3 16.6 17.1 17.3 18.0 18.9 19.7 20.2 20.3
ES 16.2 17.0 16.9 16.5 16.8 17.3 17.4 18.1 19.1 19.9 20.4 20.4
BE 16.2 17.1 16.9 16.5 16.8 17.3 17.4 18.1 19.0 19.8 20.4 20.5
NL 16.3 16.8 16.9 16.5 16.9 17.3 17.5 18.2 19.1 19.9 20.5 20.5
UK 16.3 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.9 17.4 17.5 18.2 19.2 20.0 20.5 20.4
DK 16.3 16.7 16.8 16.6 16.9 17.4 17.5 18.2 19.2 20.0 20.5 20.5
RO 16.3 16.4 16.5 17.2 17.5 18.0 18.1 18.2 19.8 20.1 20.8 20.6
SE 16.4 16.7 16.7 16.6 17.0 17.4 17.6 18.3 19.3 20.1 20.6 20.5
FI 16.4 16.6 16.7 16.7 17.0 17.5 17.6 18.3 19.3 20.1 20.6 20.5
HU 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 17.0 17.5 17.6 18.3 19.3 20.1 20.6 20.5
PL 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 17.0 17.5 17.7 18.3 19.3 20.1 20.7 20.5
CY 16.6 16.7 16.8 17.0 17.3 17.8 18.0 18.4 19.6 20.4 21.0 20.8
SI 16.7 16.8 16.9 17.1 17.5 17.9 18.1 18.6 19.7 20.5 21.1 20.8
CZ 16.9 17.0 17.0 17.6 17.9 18.4 18.5 18.7 20.2 20.6 21.4 21.0
HR 16.9 17.1 17.2 17.2 17.5 18.0 18.1 18.8 19.8 20.6 21.1 21.1
DE 17.1 17.9 17.7 17.3 17.6 18.1 18.3 19.0 19.9 20.7 21.2 21.3
EE 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.9 18.2 18.7 18.8 19.1 20.5 21.0 21.7 21.4
SK 17.4 17.5 17.6 18.0 18.3 18.8 19.0 19.3 20.6 21.2 21.9 21.6
IE 18.4 18.4 19.4 19.9 19.9 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.7 21.5 22.1 22.2
FR 18.7 19.5 19.3 18.9 19.3 19.7 19.8 20.5 21.4 22.1 22.6 22.7
EL 18.8 18.9 19.0 19.1 19.4 19.9 20.1 20.7 21.7 22.5 23.1 22.9
US 25.5 25.5 26.2 26.6 26.7 26.8 26.8 26.9 26.1 27.0 27.8 27.3
Ø 16.9 17.2 17.3 17.3 17.6 18.1 18.2 18.7 19.8 20.5 21.1 20.9
EATR - Outbound - All assets
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; 
IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United 
States
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Table 24: Mean CoC – Inbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – all assets (in %) 
 
Portugal Hungary Belgium Italy Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK France Spain BL
EE 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 5.0 4.4
BG 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.0
IT 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.7 4.9
HR 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.7 5.2
SI 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.5
CZ 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.8 5.4
LT 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.9 5.4
IE 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.9 5.5
RO 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.5
LV 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.0 5.5
LU 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.5
SK 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.6
FI 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 6.0 5.7
PT 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.8
SE 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.6
PL 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.6
BE 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.3
AT 5.1 6.5 6.7 5.5 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.8
CY 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.6
NL 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.7
MT 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.0
HU 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.3 5.8
EL 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.0
DK 5.3 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.3 5.7
DE 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.0
US 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.7 6.7
UK 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.8 6.4
FR 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.8 6.3
ES 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8 7.2 7.6
Ø 5.1 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7
CoC - Inbound - All assets
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; 
IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United 
States
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Table 25: Mean EATR – Inbound – “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” – all assets (in %) 
Hungary Portugal Belgium Malta Cyprus Netherlands Luxembourg UK Italy France Spain BL
BG 6.6 7.3 7.0 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.0 8.8 9.8 10.5 11.1 8.8
EE 10.1 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.8 11.3 11.4 12.2 13.2 14.0 14.6 13.2
LT 11.0 11.6 11.4 11.3 11.7 12.2 12.3 13.1 14.1 14.9 15.5 13.6
IE 11.3 11.9 11.7 11.6 12.0 12.5 12.6 13.5 14.5 15.2 15.8 14.1
LV 11.3 12.0 11.7 11.7 12.1 12.5 12.7 13.5 14.5 15.2 15.8 14.3
RO 11.7 12.3 12.1 12.0 12.5 12.9 13.0 13.9 14.9 15.6 16.2 14.8
SI 11.8 12.4 12.2 12.1 12.6 13.0 13.2 14.0 15.0 15.7 16.3 15.5
CY 12.7 13.4 13.1 13.1 13.5 13.9 14.1 14.9 15.9 16.6 17.2 15.3
CZ 13.0 13.6 13.4 13.3 13.7 14.2 14.3 15.1 16.1 16.9 17.5 16.6
HR 13.0 13.6 13.4 13.4 13.8 14.2 14.4 15.2 16.2 16.9 17.5 16.4
PL 13.9 14.5 14.3 14.2 14.7 15.1 15.2 16.1 17.1 17.8 18.4 17.5
FI 14.3 14.9 14.7 14.6 15.1 15.5 15.6 16.5 17.5 18.2 18.8 18.5
SE 15.2 15.8 15.6 15.5 16.0 16.4 16.6 17.4 18.4 19.1 19.7 19.2
SK 15.3 15.9 15.7 15.6 16.0 16.5 16.6 17.4 18.4 19.2 19.8 19.3
HU 15.4 16.0 15.8 15.7 16.1 16.6 16.7 17.5 18.5 19.3 19.9 19.3
UK 17.2 17.8 17.6 17.5 18.0 18.4 18.5 19.4 20.4 21.1 21.7 21.4
DK 17.2 17.8 17.6 17.5 18.0 18.4 18.6 19.4 20.4 21.1 21.7 20.9
NL 17.5 18.1 17.8 17.8 18.2 18.7 18.8 19.6 20.6 21.4 22.0 21.9
IT 18.7 19.3 19.1 19.0 19.4 19.9 20.0 20.8 21.8 22.6 23.2 23.0
LU 19.2 19.8 19.6 19.5 20.0 20.4 20.6 21.4 22.4 23.1 23.7 24.2
PT 19.5 20.1 19.9 19.9 20.3 20.7 20.9 21.7 22.7 23.4 24.0 25.2
EL 20.1 20.8 20.5 20.5 20.9 21.3 21.5 22.3 23.3 24.0 24.6 25.8
DE 21.7 22.3 22.1 22.0 22.5 22.9 23.0 23.8 24.9 25.6 26.2 27.1
BE 22.2 22.8 22.5 22.5 22.9 23.4 23.5 24.3 25.3 26.1 26.7 26.7
MT 23.2 23.8 23.6 23.5 24.0 24.4 24.5 25.3 26.4 27.1 27.7 29.7
ES 23.9 24.5 24.3 24.2 24.7 25.1 25.2 26.1 27.1 27.8 28.4 31.7
AT 26.0 17.9 26.4 26.3 26.7 27.2 27.3 19.5 20.5 21.2 21.8 22.3
US 27.8 28.5 28.2 31.6 28.6 29.0 29.2 30.0 31.1 31.8 32.4 36.2
FR 28.5 29.1 28.9 28.8 29.3 29.7 29.9 30.7 31.7 32.4 33.0 35.2
Ø 16.9 17.2 17.3 17.3 17.6 18.1 18.2 18.7 19.8 20.5 21.1 20.9
EATR - Inbound - All assets
IP-box country
Abbreviations:
BL = Baseline scenario
AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; EL = Greece; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; HR = Croatia; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; 
IT = Italy; LT = Lithuania; LU = Luxembourg; LV = Latvia; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO = Romania; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovak Republic; UK = United Kingdom; US = United 
States
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3.6 Effect of anti-avoidance regulations 
Countries have implemented a broad range of anti-avoidance measures restricting tax-planning 
strategies such as those discussed in this study. Switch-over clauses for certain foreign inter-
company dividends, WHTs, and rules that fully deny the deduction of interest and royalty pay-
ments if the corresponding income is taxed at a low rate have already been considered in this 
dissertation’s calculations (for details see Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). Other important and     
prevalent anti-avoidance measures include CFC legislation, interest deduction limitation rules, 
and transfer pricing regulations. The calculations presented so far assume that the loan and 
interest volume remain below the respective threshold values of interest deduction limitation 
rules that the countries may apply.143 In addition, the level of the royalty payments in Tax-
Planning Strategies 5-7 is assumed to be in line with transfer pricing rules requiring arm’s 
length pricing of intra-company transactions. While CFC rules are disregarded in the calcula-
tions, the following paragraph discusses in detail the features of CFC rules in the EU member 
states and the US, as well as their potential application in the case of the considered tax-planning 
strategies. In addition, Chapter 3.6.2 illustrates the effect of binding interest deduction re-
striction rules and CFC rules on the presented CoC and EATR in a worked example. 
3.6.1 CFC rules in the EU member states and the US 
Many countries use CFC legislation to fight BEPS. In principal, CFC rules are designed to tax 
certain (usually low-taxed) foreign base company income irrespective of its actual distribution 
at the level of the parent company. As a result, advantages stemming from shifting profits to 
low-tax jurisdictions are neutralized. The overall tax burden may even turn out to be higher 
than it would have been had the profits never been shifted. 
Table 26 provides an overview of CFC rules in the different EU member states and the US.144 
It shows that among the 28 EU member states, 14 countries have implemented CFC rules. These 
rules are also in place in the US. 
Most countries considered in Table 26 apply CFC rules only to foreign income that is taxed 
below a certain threshold. This threshold may be defined as a percentage of the domestic income 
tax rate or in terms of an absolute value. Usually, countries refer to the actual tax paid in the 
foreign country when testing whether CFC rules apply. The threshold value for most countries 
                                                          
143 For an overview on interest deduction limitation rules, see Chapter 4.2.1 and Spengel et al. (2016c). 
144 The overview is based on Bräutigam et al. (2017), Deloitte (2014), and the country information available on 
the IBFD tax research platform. 
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varies between 50% and 75% of the domestic tax rate. In Germany and the US, the threshold 
value amounts to approximately 85% and 90%, respectively. In the US, the applicable high 
threshold rate is relativized by a broad range of exemptions from the application of the CFC 
rules.145 
Eight EU member states apply a mixed approach by referring to a low-tax threshold while also 
listing specific countries that are covered (black list) or not covered (white list) by the CFC 
rules. Following the decision of the European Court of Justice in the case of Cadbury-
Schweppes146, almost all EU member states have implemented special EU-/EEA-clauses ex-
empting subsidiaries resident in EU or EEA member states from the application of the CFC 
rules if the subsidiaries do not constitute wholly artificial arrangements. An exception is Den-
mark, where authorities decided to extend the existing CFC rules to domestic cases after the 
Cadbury-Schweppes ruling. In Denmark, it is not the level of taxation but only the type of 
income that is decisive for the application of CFC rules.147 Lithuania applies no EU/EEA-clause 
but includes all EU member states in a white list. However, companies that are resident in white 
list countries may also be subject to CFC rules if they benefit from preferential tax regimes. 
Similarly to the case of Lithuania, the UK CFC rules do not include a general EU-/EEA-
clause.148 
The Netherlands do not employ CFC rules in the narrower sense but require the annual revalu-
ation of shareholdings in subsidiaries at market value in certain cases. If the revaluation is re-
quired, the revaluation amount is included in the taxable income of the Dutch parent company, 
which effectively results in the same outcome as that achieved by CFC rules. A revaluation is 
required if the subsidiary is taxed at a rate below 10% and at least 90% of the assets are low-
taxed and passive. In addition, the subsidiary needs to be held for the primary purpose of provid-
ing a return that is comparable to the return of portfolio investments. 
  
                                                          
145 See e.g. Ting (2014) and Ting (2015). 
146 See European Court of Justice (2006). 
147 The rules might be in conflict with the freedom of establishment, see Schmidt (2014). 
148 For details on the UK rules, see Smith (2013). 
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Table 26: CFC rules in the EU member states and the US 2015 
 
Approach 
Definition of low taxation 
Tax credit  
availability 
Special EU-/ 
EEA-clause        Threshold Subsidiary  
location 
Parent  
location relative absolute 
Denmark General - - - - yes no 
Finland 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
60% 12% actual tax paid CIT rate yes yes 
France low taxation 50% 16% actual tax paid hypothetical tax paid yes yes 
Germany low taxation  25% actual tax paid  yes yes 
Greece 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
50% 13% CIT rate CIT rate yes yes 
Hungary 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
 10% actual tax paid  yes yes 
Italy 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
50% 13.75% actual tax paid hypothetical tax paid yes yes 
Lithuania 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
75% 11.25% CIT rate CIT rate yes no 
Netherlands low taxation  10% CIT rate  yes no 
Poland 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
75% 14.25% actual tax paid CIT rate yes yes 
Portugal low taxation 60% 12.60% actual tax paid hypothetical tax paid yes yes 
Spain low taxation 75% 15.75% actual tax paid CIT rate yes (except tax haven) yes 
Sweden 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
55% 12.10% actual tax paid CIT rate yes yes 
UK 
low taxation/ 
jurisdictional 
75% 15% actual tax paid CIT rate yes no 
US low taxation 90% 29.97% actual tax paid CIT rate yes no 
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In all included countries, the relevant types of income of the different tax-planning strategies 
considered in this study (royalty and interest income) qualify as CFC income. In most countries, 
foreign taxes can be credited against the taxes levied on CFC income in the parent country. In 
countries where no tax credits are granted, the application of CFC rules is likely to lead to a 
higher overall tax burden than in a scenario without tax planning. In Hungary, CFC rules will 
only apply if the Hungarian parent company is controlled by Hungarian individual investors. In 
all other countries listed in Table 26, CFC rules apply at the level of the parent company. 
For the seven tax planning structures considered in this study, the above summary of CFC rules 
allows for the following conclusions.  
(1) If the intermediate company was located in Offshore no treaty, CFC rules could apply in 
all countries listed in Table 26. 
(2) If the intermediate company was located in Offshore treaty, CFC rules could apply in 
most countries listed in Table 26. No CFC rules should apply in Hungary, as Hungary 
generally excludes treaty countries from its CFC legislation if the tax payer has a real 
economic presence in the subsidiary country. If Offshore treaty only exempted dividends, 
interest, and royalties from taxation but generally levied a CIT rate above the CFC thresh-
old levels, CFC rules could be avoided in those countries that define low taxation based 
on the nominal foreign tax rate in the subsidiary country. 
(3) If the intermediate company was located in Average, CFC rules should not apply in any 
of the EU member states, except for Denmark, as the tax level in Average (i.e. 23%) is 
higher than the low-tax threshold in all of these countries, except for Germany. All EU 
member states that refer to the actual tax paid at the level of the subsidiary in their CFC 
rules (e.g. Germany) have special EU-/EEA-clauses or comparable rules in place. Hence, 
also in the case of “Hybrid Financing via Average”, CFC rules in these countries should 
not apply if the intermediate company had sufficient substance. The U.S. CFC rules may 
apply to the income of AVERAGE. However, there are several exemptions to the U.S. 
CFC rules that allow for the avoidance of the application of the rules.149 
(4) For Tax-Planning Strategy 7, in which the intermediate company (SUBSPB) is resident 
in an EU member state offering an IP-box, the EU-/EEA-clauses should apply if SUBSPB 
had sufficient substance. In Lithuania, no special EU/EEA-clause exists. Companies ben-
efiting from a favourable tax regime in a white list country (including all EU and EEA 
                                                          
149 See e.g. Finley (2015), p. 294; Avi-Yonah (2016), p. 69. 
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countries) are subject to Lithuanian CFC legislation. Thus, the CFC rules in Lithuania 
may apply if the “IP tax planning via IP-box countries” strategy is used. Although the 
CFC rules in the UK do not include a special EU-/EEA-clause either, these CFC rules 
presumably would not apply to income of SUBSPB if the latter had sufficient substance. 
This is because the UK CFC legislation gateway provisions are intended to target only 
profits that have been artificially diverted from the UK. Hence, Denmark and Lithuania 
are likely to be the only EU member states for which CFC rules could apply under Tax-
Planning Strategy 7. In addition, the CFC rules in the US are generally applicable to roy-
alty income of SUBSPB. However, several possible methods to avoid the application of 
U.S. CFC rules exist. 
To conclude, for most parent companies that are resident in countries that apply CFC rules, 
using the “Hybrid financing via Average” strategy or holding IP in a country that offers an IP-
box regime proves to be more beneficial than other tax-planning strategies. This is because 
conducting tax planning via EU member states facilitates avoidance of the application of CFC 
rules. 
3.6.2 Examples of the effect of CFC and interest deduction limitation rules on the CoC 
for “Financing via Offshore treaty” 
Neither CFC rules nor interest deduction limitation rules are considered in the CoC and EATR 
calculations for the tax-planning strategies, as the underlying framework cannot adequately 
model such rules. However, the following simplified example illustrates the effect of binding 
CFC and thin capitalization rules in the case of an outbound investment from France to Belgium 
using the “Financing via Offshore treaty” tax-planning strategy. The example assumes RE fi-
nancing of both OFFSHORE treaty and MNPC, and it considers an investment only in an in-
tangible asset. 
To calculate the CoC for a marginal cross-border investment using the “Financing via Offshore 
treaty” strategy, the following formula applies: 
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(7) 
This formula is derived by setting Equation (3) (see Chapter 3.3.2.1) equal to zero and solving 
it for p . Inserting the respective parameters for the countries of France, Belgium, and Offshore 
treaty, the following equation yields CoC of the investment of about 2%. 
(1 0)(1 0.071) ((0.9439*0.3399) 0)(1 0.071)
(1 0)(1 0.3399)(1 0.02) (1 0.3399)(1 0.02)
(1 0.1535)(1 (0.9439*0.3399)) (1 0) (1 0)
(1 0.3399) (1 0)(1 0.3399)(1 0.02) (1 0.3399)(1 0.02)
0.071(1 0)(1 0)
(1 0)
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(8) 
This very low CoC results from a full exemption of the return of investment from profit taxes 
and the high present value of savings from tax depreciation in Belgium. 
If CFC rules applied in France, the interest income earned in period t+1 by Offshore treaty 
would immediately be taxed as ordinary income in France. As a result, the interest income 
would be subject to the French CIT rate of 38.93%. This is modelled by multiplying Term 7 of 
Equation (3) and correspondingly Term 6 of Equation (7) by (1 )P , which determines the 
additional tax burden on the interest in the parent country. This change results in a CoC of 6.1%. 
Direct debt financing from MNPC to SUBS in the baseline scenario renders the same CoC. The 
CoC under this direct financing strategy is higher than under RE financing of SUBS, which is 
the optimal financing strategy for direct investments from France to Belgium. For intangibles, 
this financing strategy results in a CoC of only 4.7%. 
An application of interest deduction limitation rules in Belgium increases the CoC to 5.6%. To 
calculate this value, the factor 
S  in Term 8 of Equation (3), which represents tax savings from 
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interest deductibility, is set to zero. Although the full interest payment is taxed in Belgium and 
there are no further tax consequences at the level of OFFSHORE treaty, the resulting CoC is 
again higher than it is for tax-efficient direct financing (RE financing) of the Belgium sub-
sidiary. The reason for this lies in the combination of non-deductible interest payments and the 
lack of an opportunity to benefit from the ACE regime under the “Financing via Offshore 
treaty” strategy due to debt financing of the subsidiary.  
These two examples illustrate that anti-avoidance measures, such as CFC rules and interest 
deduction limitation rules, have the potential to fully eliminate tax advantages derived from the 
use of tax-planning strategies. In addition, compared to investing directly in the subsidiary using 
optimal financing from the parent company, anti-avoidance measures are likely to increase the 
tax burden of an investment further if certain tax-planning strategies are applied. 
3.7 Summary 
The ongoing debate on aggressive tax planning of multinationals suggests that companies use 
profit shifting via interest and royalty payments to significantly reduce the effective tax burden 
on their global profits. To provide a more general insight into tax burden effects of international 
tax planning, the Devereux/Griffith model is used to calculate CoC and EATRs for cross-border 
investments between all EU member states and the US, applying representative profit-shifting 
strategies. The results of these calculations are compared to the CoC and EATRs for tax-effi-
cient direct cross-border investments not involving representative profit shifting strategies. 
For tax planning via an intermediate financing company resident in a tax-exempt country that 
grants a loan to its subsidiary and receives the marginal return of the investment as interest, the 
mean CoC across all investment combinations decreases by 1.6 percentage points (from 5.7% 
to 4.1%) and the mean EATR decreases by 4.7 percentage points (from 20.9% to 16.2%). 
If marginal profits were instead shifted via interest payments to an average EU country with a 
CIT rate of 23%, the CoC and EATR would only decrease for investments between high-tax 
countries. On average, if this tax-planning strategy was used instead of an investment directly 
financed by the parent company, the CoC for cross-border investments would increase by 0.1 
percentage points (from 5.7% to 5.8%), and the EATR would increase by 0.7 percentage points 
(from 20.9% to 21.6%).  
If the financing company resident in the average country granted a hybrid loan to the subsidiary 
and the average country treated the returns as tax-exempt dividends, the mean CoC across all 
investment combinations would decrease by 1.9 percentage points (from 5.7% to 3.8%), and 
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the mean EATR would decrease by 6.6 percentage points (from 20.9% to 14.3%), compared to 
direct financing. Hence, this tax-planning strategy is generally superior to using a financing 
company in a tax-exempt country. This result is driven by investments from parent companies 
residing in low-tax countries for which debt financing of the financing company is optimal. 
However, parent companies that are resident in high-tax countries may also benefit from this 
strategy, since it often proves advantageous compared to using a financing company resident 
in a non-EU tax-exempt country. This is because CFC rules are less relevant in a European 
context. 
For IP tax planning using an IP holding company resident in a tax-exempt country that licenses 
IP to the subsidiary abroad, the mean CoC decreases by 0.1 percentage points (from 5.7% to 
5.6%) and the mean EATR decreases by 3.4 percentage points (from 20.9% to 17.5%). These 
results assume that IP tax planning only allows for the shifting of returns derived from the 
intangible but not from the other four assets considered in the model. As anecdotal evidence of 
the tax-planning strategies of multinationals like Google and Ikea suggests,150 companies may 
in reality be able to shift larger shares of profits via royalties. Assuming that a company gener-
ated its income solely through the use of intangibles, the mean CoC would decrease to 4.7%, 
and the mean EATR would decrease to only 2%. This shows that IP tax planning results in 
effective tax rates of close to zero for profitable companies with a business model that mainly 
relies on intangible assets. 
Owning IP in an EU member state that offers an IP-box regime and then licensing that IP to a 
subsidiary reduces the mean CoC and EATR for many cross-border investments below the 
mean CoC and EATR in the baseline scenario. However, depending on the residence country 
of the parent and the subsidiary company, as well as the attractiveness of the IP-box regime, 
the CoC and EATR may also exceed the respective results in the case of direct investments. 
According to the results of this study, Portugal offers the most attractive IP-box regime for 
marginal investments. It allows for the deduction of interest and depreciation expenses at the 
high statutory CIT rate, while it taxes IP income at the low IP-box tax rate. Conducting IP tax 
planning using the IP-box in Portugal reduces the mean CoC by 0.6 percentage points (from 
5.7% to 5.1%) for marginal cross-border investments in all five assets. For profitable invest-
ments, Hungary offers the most attractive IP-box regime, reducing the mean EATR to 16.9%, 
which is lower than for both IP tax planning via a tax-exempt country and intra-company fi-
nancing via a tax-exempt country. When considering only the investment in the intangible asset, 
                                                          
150 See Chapter 2.1 for details. 
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if the Hungarian IP-box regime was used, the mean CoC and the mean EATR would decrease 
to 2.8% and to -1.0%, respectively. These calculations indicate that in particular IP-box regimes 
that permit an asymmetric treatment of income and expenses offer the highest tax-saving po-
tential of all tax-planning strategies considered. 
Anti-avoidance measures, such as WHTs, switch-over clauses for intercompany dividends, thin 
capitalization rules, and CFC regulations, reduce the tax savings from tax-planning strategies. 
Not only this, but they often even increase CoC and EATR above what would result in the case 
of a direct investment in the subsidiary using the most tax-efficient form of direct financing. 
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4 Anti-avoidance measures that extend taxation of interest and royalties at source 
In Chapters 2 and 3, it has been demonstrated that some multinational companies engage in 
extensive profit shifting using different tax-planning strategies. This allows those companies to 
substantially reduce their effective tax burden on cross-border investments. In this chapter, ar-
guments for extending taxation of interest and royalties at source to tackle BEPS are provided. 
In addition, different aspects of existing and alternative regulations that extent the taxation of 
interest and royalties at source are investigated.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Chapter 4.1 refers to the problems of BEPS and analyses 
general options for reform. In Chapter 4.2, an overview of current country practice regarding 
measures that extend the taxation of interest and royalties at source is given. In addition, em-
pirical evidence of the effectiveness of these measures is summarized. An own empirical study 
investigates the interdependency of profit shifting channels and its consequences for the effec-
tiveness of anti-avoidance legislation. Chapter 4.3 presents alternative measures for extending 
taxation of interest and royalties at source. These measures all avoid double taxation but are 
considered by neither the OECD nor the European Commission. Moreover, Chapter 4.3 pro-
vides rough estimates of the tax revenue gains and losses resulting from two of the reform 
options in selected countries. 
4.1 Problems of BEPS and general options for reform151 
While the presented tax-planning strategies make use of existing international tax law and are 
not illegal,152 they are perceived as unfair, since they are only available for certain multinational 
corporations.153 Purely domestic companies, small companies, and individuals cannot avoid 
taxation to such an extent. This harms the ability-to-pay principle: a fundamental legal concept 
that requires all taxpayers with the same ability-to-pay to carry the same tax burden, thus en-
suring tax equity.154 A violation of this principle results in an unequal distribution of the tax 
burden and harms the integrity of the tax system. Moreover, a different taxation of tax-payers 
with the same ability-to-pay is inefficient from an economic perspective.155 The economic prin-
ciple of capital export neutrality requires domestic and foreign investments to be taxed equally. 
                                                          
151 This chapter builds on Fuest et al. (2013); Fuest et al. (2015), and Spengel/Nusser (2015b), and includes extracts 
of these works. 
152 For the distinction between tax fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, and (aggressive) tax planning, see Essers 
(2014), p. 58. 
153 See also Saint-Amans/Russo (2016), p. 236; van de Vijver (2015), p. 240. 
154 See Schön (2009), pp. 71-75; Fleming et al. (2001), p. 309. 
155 See also Wilde (2015), p. 439. 
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An unequal treatment of these types of investment distorts production efficiency because it 
distorts competition between firms with different opportunities to avoid taxes.156 
Both taxation according to the ability-to-pay principle and the principle of capital export neu-
trality can be achieved by full taxation of worldwide profits in the residence country of the 
shareholder.157 In practice, this is difficult to achieve. Profits are therefore taxed at the corporate 
level. At this level, a taxation in line with the two aforementioned principles would require the 
multinational parent company to be liable to tax on its accrued worldwide income.158 This re-
quires that no permanent deferral of taxation in the parent country is possible. 
Generally, an immediate taxation of income arising under the considered tax-planning strate-
gies at the level of the parent company can be achieved using CFC rules. Many countries al-
ready apply such legislation.159 However, the tax planning arrangements summarized in Chap-
ter 2.1 illustrate that, for example, the CFC rules in the US may easily be circumvented due to 
a broad range of exceptions. Action 3 of the OECD BEPS action plan therefore provides rec-
ommendations for the design of CFC rules to ensure an effective prevention of BEPS.160 For 
EU member states, CFC rules will be obligatory by the end of 2018.161 The EU Anti-Tax Avoid-
ance Directive requires that all member states introduce CFC rules that tax certain undistributed 
passive income of subsidiaries (including interest and royalty income) in the residence country 
of the parent. Instead of applying a catalogue of passive income, the member states may also 
use an alternative approach by referring more generally to all income derived under an artificial 
arrangement. The directive determines that CFC rules only need to apply to income taxed below 
50% of the tax rate in the residence country of the parent company. In addition, for low-taxed 
passive income of subsidiaries in EU member states, an exception needs to be provided if the 
subsidiary conducts a substantial economic activity, with employees, assets, and property. This 
takes account of requirements implied by the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and 
offers options for circumventing the application of the rules.162 
Without question, effective CFC rules would render BEPS unattractive for multinational cor-
porations by tackling the first flaw of the international tax system identified in Chapter 2.3. 
                                                          
156 For this and alternative economic neutrality concepts, see Endres/Spengel (2015), pp. 19-36; Spengel (2013); 
Schön (2009), pp. 78-84. 
157 See Spengel (2013); Schön (2009), p. 79; Kleinbard (2011b), p. 103. 
158 The last two sentences are taken from Fuest et al. (2013), p. 317. 
159 For an overview, see e.g. Deloitte (2014) and Chapter 3.6.1. 
160 See OECD (2015c) 
161 See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July, 2016. 
162 See European Court of Justice (2006). On the compatibility of the OECD BEPS Proposals with EU Law, see 
Panayi (2016). 
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However, it is likely that, in particular in an EU context but also in countries like the US that 
actively weaken the application of CFC rules for policy reasons, the regulations will remain 
largely ineffective due to exemptions.163 Besides this, most countries currently apply the ex-
emption method to dividends.164 This requires CFC rules to also target immediately distributed 
profits. Since the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive states that CFC rules shall apply to undis-
tributed passive income, it seems that countries do not need to apply the rules to distributed 
profits. This would enable circumvention of CFC rules by immediately distributing low-taxed 
passive income. Instead of applying CFC rules to income irrespective of its distribution, coun-
tries could apply a switch-over clause that ensures the taxation of distributed low-taxed passive 
income. A similar rule has been considered by the European Commission165 but is not included 
in the final Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. The OECD also does not recommend a switch-over 
clause. 
An alternative option for reducing BEPS is to target the second element of the international tax 
system that fosters aggressive tax planning explained in Chapter 2.3. This includes amongst 
others the existence of tax havens, preferential tax regimes, favourable tax rulings and hybrid 
mismatches. A low taxation of mobile income exists in several countries engaging in tax com-
petition and thus actively promoting BEPS. Different actions of the OECD BEPS action plan 
deal with such regimes. Dual resident corporations are targeted by a new regulation in Art. 4 
(3) of the OECD model treaty, which stipulates a mutual agreement procedure to determine 
residence for purposes of the treaty.166 In addition, under Action 5, countries have agreed on 
the nexus approach, requiring all existing IP-box regimes in Europe to be redesigned. In the 
future, such regimes may only grant beneficial treatment for income related to qualifying ex-
penses that have been carried by the taxpayer itself, excluding to some extent acquisition costs 
and costs from outsourcing to related parties.167 Costs under cost-sharing agreements may qual-
ify if an appropriate portion of R&D activity is undertaken by the firm. Similar substance re-
quirements have also been developed for other preferential regimes. Moreover, OECD member 
states are now obliged to exchange information on certain tax rulings, increasing the trans-
parency of favourable tax treatments granted to individual companies. Since 2017, EU member 
                                                          
163 For the US, see Kane (2014), p. 321, Finley (2015), p. 294; Ting (2015). For EU member states, see Parillo 
(2014). See also Dourado (2015b), p. 5. 
164 See Kofler (2012). 
165 See European Commission (2016b). However, this rule was not only targeted at passive income. 
166 See OECD (2015f). 
167 See OECD (2015e). 
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states must also automatically exchange cross-border rulings.168 In addition, the European Com-
mission has launched state aid investigations into past tax rulings granted to large multinationals 
in different member states. Some tax rulings have already been declared to constitute state 
aid.169 
The binding restrictions for preferential tax regimes and the exchange of rulings are important 
measures against BEPS and will make it more difficult for multinationals to achieve very low 
effective tax rates on interest and royalty income.170 However, these rules do not prevent mul-
tinationals from making use of generally low CIT rates and certain tax havens outside of OECD 
member states. In addition, countries engaging in tax competition may implement alternative 
preferential regimes that are not tackled by the OECD BEPS action plan, or they may generally 
reduce their CIT rates.171 Besides, BEPS is not only related to an unequal taxation of different 
types of taxpayers but also to a perceived unfairness in the distribution of taxing rights, and 
consequently tax revenue, between countries.172 
The latter issue can be targeted with anti-avoidance measures that directly deal with the third 
element of the international tax system generating BEPS risks identified in Chapter 2.3: the 
lack of taxation of interest and royalty payments in the residence country of the payer. Taxing 
(part of) these payments in the residence country of the payer is a way to ensure an effective 
minimum taxation of the worldwide income of multinational corporations while also reallocat-
ing taxing rights.173 For both interest and royalty payments, there exists no clear notion of where 
such interest or royalty income originates and thus should be taxed.174 For royalties, for exam-
ple, up to four different jurisdictions may claim to be the state of origin due to the existence of 
a certain economic link: the country where the intangible has been developed, the country where 
the intangible is owned, the country where the intangible is used in production, and the country 
in which the finished products protected by a patent or trademark are sold.175 The place of value 
                                                          
168 See Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December, 2015. 
169 See also Chapter 2.1.2. For a general introduction to EU state aid, see Kalloe (2011). 
170 See also Aujean (2014), p. 63. 
171 See Hong and Smart (2010), reinterpreting an argument by Keen (2001). The authors argue that limiting profit 
shifting of multinational companies may intensify tax competition because profit shifting can be seen as a form of 
price discrimination between more and less mobile tax bases. Not allowing this price discrimination may force 
countries to reduce the tax burden on all firms. This is taken from Fuest et al. (2015). 
172 See also Sheppard (2013), p. 12. 
173 See also Pinto (2007), p. 282. 
174 See Schön (2015), p. 275. Generally, the following is also transferrable to other transfer prices. However, 
especially for transfer prices of common goods, the risk of extensive profit shifting can more easily be tackled by 
transfer pricing regulations, so that no further anti-avoidance regulations may be necessary. Consequently, the 
focus is on source taxation of interest and royalties in the following. 
175 See Schön (2012), p. 222-223. 
 96 
 
9
6
 
creation of IP is rather ambiguous. Consequently, taxing at least part of interest and royalty 
income in the residence country of the payer can generally be justified. For interest payments, 
a limited taxing right in the residence country of the payer is reflected in Art. 11 (2) of the 
OECD and UN model treaty, while for royalties it is only reflected in Art. 12 (2) of the UN 
model treaty. 
The taxation of interest and royalties in the country where they arise is easy to administer in a 
cross-border context and does not require knowledge of the whole company structure. More-
over, a taxation of outgoing interest and royalties in the residence country of the payer is not 
precluded by either the principle of capital export neutrality or the ability-to-pay principle.176 
However, these principles require that taxes withheld at source are credited in the residence 
country.  
To conclude, partial taxation of interest and royalties in the residence country of the payer is a 
pragmatic way to reduce profit shifting incentives and thus the advantage stemming from tax 
planning. Simultaneously, it ensures that source countries where the multinational uses the cap-
ital and intangibles receive a certain share of the total tax revenue. However, it must be stressed 
that increased source taxation is only recommendable if double taxation is avoided.177 This 
requires cooperation between countries and will lead to a redistribution of tax revenue.  
4.2 Forms and effectiveness of existing measures for taxation of interest and royalties 
at source 
Chapter 4.1 has demonstrated that anti-avoidance measures extending taxation of interest and 
royalties at source are a pragmatic and accurate way of combating BEPS. This chapter provides 
an overview of the different forms of such anti-avoidance rules that are currently applied and 
summarizes the recommendations of the OECD and the European Commission for increased 
source taxation of interest and royalties. In addition, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
these anti-avoidance measures is presented. Chapter 4.2.1 summarizes current country prac-
tice.178 In Chapter 4.2.2, an overview of empirical findings on the effectiveness of transfer pric-
                                                          
176 See Schön (2009), p. 73 and 79. 
177 Although it is actually impossible to unambiguously define the source of interest and royalty income, in the 
following, the residence country of the interest and royalty payer will be referred to as the source state. 
178 This chapter is a slightly modified extract of Finke et al. (2014). 
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ing regulations and interest deduction limitation rules is given. In Chapter 4.2.3, the interde-
pendency of profit-shifting channels and its consequences for the effectiveness of anti-avoid-
ance measures are studied empirically.179 Finally, Chapter 4.2.4 concludes. 
4.2.1 Current country practice180 
In the past two decades, in order to protect tax revenue, many developed countries have intro-
duced regulations limiting opportunities for extensive tax base erosion through interest and roy-
alty payments.  
Most countries have transfer pricing regulations in place that are based on the arm’s length 
principle for intragroup transactions as set out in Art. 9 of the OECD model treaty.181 According 
to the arm’s length principle, the price for transactions between related companies should equal 
the price that independent parties would have agreed on.182 If a country applies the arm’s length 
principle, royalties and interest payments will only be tax deductible up to the arm’s length 
price. However, in many cases no comparable transactions between unrelated parties exist.183 
This is particularly true for royalty payments, since these are usually related to unique intangible 
property.184 Similar difficulties arise for interest income, as a large range of levels of debt and 
corresponding interest rates may be justifiable.185 Besides the general application of the arm’s 
length principle, most countries have introduced detailed transfer pricing documentation rules 
in recent years.186 
The new OECD transfer pricing guidelines developed under BEPS Actions 8-10 put a stronger 
focus on enhancing the alignment of transfer pricing outcomes with value creation.187 While 
                                                          
179 This is a joint work with Katharina Nicolay and Olena Pfeiffer and was published in a modified version as 
ZEW Discussion Paper 17-066, see Nicolay et al. (2017). 
180 The following analysis excludes hybrid mismatch rules that deny the deduction of payments that give rise to 
deduction-no-inclusion or double-deduction outcomes. Such rules may apply in either the source or the residence 
country and are thus not an exclusive tool for enhancing source taxation. Clearly, in the context of BEPS resulting 
from hybrid mismatch arrangements, these rules are superior to the rules explained in this and the following chap-
ter. Anti-hybrid mismatch rules are recommended by the OECD and included in the EU-Anti-Tax Avoidance 
directive. 
181 See Eden (2016), p. 153 and Eden (2009), p. 602. For an overview of country practice, see Zinn et al. (2014). 
182 For an in-depth consideration of the arm’s length standard, see Schoueri (2015). 
183 See also Brauner (2014), p. 619. 
184 See Eden (2016), p. 164. 
185 See also Burnett (2014), pp. 62-63 and 70. 
186 For an overview of country practice with respect to different forms of transfer pricing regulations, see Zinn et 
al. (2014). See also Chapter 4.2.3.2.2. 
187 See OECD (2015h). 
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these new guidelines may help to determine an appropriate price in certain cases they cannot 
overcome the general difficulty in pricing highly company-specific assets and transactions.188 
In addition to transfer pricing rules, an increasing number of countries apply regulations that 
limit interest deductibility. The precise regulations differ across countries and have changed 
over time. Figure 6 provides an overview of current country practices in all EU, EFTA, and 
G20 member states.189 
Countries that do not stipulate specific regulations to limit interest deduction usually include 
excessive debt financing in their transfer pricing or general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR). 
Figure 6: Regulations limiting interest deduction in domestic tax law in all EU, EFTA, and 
G20 member states (2016)190 
 
                                                          
188 See also Owens (2013). 
189 For a comparison of country practice with respect to regulations limiting the deductibility of interest at source, 
see also Webber (2010); Henry et al. (2008); Bohn (2009); Hey (2015). 
190 The figure is based on data available from the IBFD tax research platform. 
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Thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules differ with respect to the defined acceptable level 
up to which interest expenses are fully deductible. This so-called safe haven191 could refer to a 
predefined debt-to-equity ratio (D/E ratio) or debt-to-asset ratio (thin capitalization rules). It 
could also refer to the relation between earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) or earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) and interest expenses (earnings 
stripping rules). Under the debt-to-equity criterion, interest expenses are fully deductible if the 
D/E ratio does not exceed a certain threshold. Interest related to any excess debt is not de-
ductible. However, in some countries that apply a D/E ratio rule, companies may deduct interest 
related to the excess debt if they demonstrate that the debt level is at arm’s length.192 Countries 
that apply a debt-to-asset ratio allow a full deduction of interest only to the extent that the debt 
is within the asset-based ratio. If the safe haven is defined with respect to some profit measure, 
net interest expenses are deductible as long as they do not exceed a certain share of profits (e.g. 
30% of EBITDA in Germany). Some countries, such as France, the US, and Denmark, employ 
two or all three criteria in combination. 
A second dimension in which the thin capitalization and earnings stripping regulations differ is 
the treatment of disqualified interest expenses. In some countries, these are considered as hid-
den profit distributions and are therefore reclassified as deemed dividends. Re-characterizing 
disqualified interest expenses ensures that the tax treatment in the hands of the creditor corre-
sponds to the treatment at the level of the debtor and that the interest is thus not taxed twice. In 
the international setting, this can of course only be achieved if the residence country of the 
creditor endorses this re-classification. In most countries, disqualified interest is a non-de-   
ductible expense, which potentially results in double taxation of the underlying interest even in 
a purely domestic setting. However, in some countries (e.g. Germany), non-deductible interest 
expenses may be carried forward for several years. Especially in cases where the deductibility 
is defined with respect to a volatile measure such as EBIT(DA), this seems reasonable to miti-
gate business-cycle effects. 
Finally, the different regulations can be distinguished with respect to the scope of covered debt. 
Some countries solely include related-party debt or debt that a related party guarantees for. The 
underlying rationale is that these financial contracts are the most likely to be influenced by tax 
planning considerations because they are controlled by the multinational group. Other countries 
                                                          
191 Please note that although the term safe haven often refers to regulations that apply a fixed D/E ratio while still 
allowing excess interest deductions that are proven to be at arm’s length, it is used in a broader sense here. 
192 See also Burnett (2014), p. 54. 
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extend the regulation to all debt. Hence, they target not only intragroup profit shifting but also 
the general tax incentive for debt financing, which is already present in a purely domestic set-
ting. 
Some countries do not apply general thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules but make use 
of regulations denying the deductibility of interest payments in specific cases. In Austria, for 
example, interest is qualified as a hidden profit distribution if the level of equity is considered 
to be inadequate. Moreover, with effect from March 2014, interest and royalties paid to related 
companies will not be deductible if the income is subject to an effective taxation at a rate of 
less than 10 % at the level of the recipient.193 In addition to its thin capitalization rules, France 
applies two other provisions that limit interest deductibility. If the net financial expenses exceed 
€3 million, only 75% of the total net financial expenses on both intragroup and third-party debt 
are deductible for tax purposes. Moreover, interest is not deductible if the tax paid by the lender 
is lower than 25% of the French CIT. Ireland will treat an interest payment as hidden profit 
distribution if it is not paid in the course of trade to a non-EU foreign company that is a 75% 
affiliate. Additionally, interest is non-deductible insofar as it exceeds a (difficult to determine) 
normal commercial rate. The Netherlands abolished their thin capitalization rules in 2013 and 
now apply several complex and highly specific interest deduction restriction rules. Slovenia 
denies the deduction of interest paid to countries outside the EU that offer an average nominal 
tax rate of less than 12.5%. All relevant countries are included in a list published by the Ministry 
of Finance. In Sweden, interest paid to affiliated companies is not deductible if the interest 
income is taxed at a rate of less than 10% at the level of the recipient, unless the recipient is 
resident in an EU member state or treaty state and the loan is motivated by business reasons. In 
addition, Sweden denies the deduction of interest paid to affiliates even if the income is taxed 
at a rate of at least 10% in the case the main reason for the underlying loan is to obtain a sub-
stantial tax benefit. 
A problem of all interest deduction limitation rules based on a fixed ratio is that it is impossible 
to define one ratio that is appropriate for all kinds of businesses.194 Hence, thin capitalization 
and earnings stripping rules usually remain quite broad in their general application and are not 
limited solely to aggressive tax planning. As a consequence, escape clauses may be necessary, 
such as de minimis rules or regulations that exempt companies with an equity-to-assets-ratio 
below the ratio of the worldwide group (as currently applied in Germany). Escape clauses, 
                                                          
193 For details, see Peyerl (2014). 
194 See Burnett (2014), p. 63; Yuan (2015), p. 276. 
 101 
 
1
0
1
 
however, increase the complexity of thin capitalization and earnings stripping rules and provide 
loopholes for multinationals to circumvent the application of the underlying rules. In addition, 
fixed ratio rules may result in double taxation, especially if no carry back or forward of non-
deductible interest is provided or the company suffers from constant losses. 
Another way to prevent extensive tax base erosion is to levy WHTs on interest and royalties. 
Due to the EU Interest and Royalties Directive, however, no WHTs may be levied on interest 
and royalty payments resulting from intragroup transactions within Europe. With respect to 
third countries, country practice differs.  
Figure 7: WHT rates on interest income in domestic tax law in all EU, EFTA, and G20 member 
states (2016)195 
 
As illustrated by Figure 7 and Figure 8, several countries do not apply WHTs on interest and 
royalty income earned by foreigners under domestic law. Other countries levy WHTs on foreign 
interest and royalty income at differing rates. These rates usually remain in a range that corre-
sponds to the applicable CIT rates, and they are reduced under tax treaties. Some countries 
apply specific WHT rates for interest and royalties paid to group entities resident in special low-
tax jurisdictions. The Czech Republic and Romania, for example, apply a higher WHT rate on 
                                                          
195 Figure 7 is based on data available from the IBFD tax research platform. 
 102 
 
1
0
2
 
interest and royalty payments if the receiving company is resident in a country with which no 
treaty or information exchange agreement has been concluded. The Slovak Republic charges 
higher WHT rates on interest and royalty payments to so-called non-contracting countries, 
which are not listed on a white list. Croatia levies a higher WHT if no treaty with the residence 
country of the receiving company has been concluded and the tax level of the residence country 
is below a certain threshold. The same holds true for interest payments in Denmark. Portugal, 
France, and Latvia apply higher WHT rates for interest and royalty payments made to residents 
of listed tax havens.  
Figure 8: WHT rates on royalty income in domestic tax law in all EU, EFTA, and G20 member 
states (2016)196 
 
The OECD deals with base erosion using interest payments through Action 4 of the OECD 
action plan. In the final report on Action 4, the OECD calls on countries to introduce interest 
deduction limitation rules, and it presents best practices for these rules.197 According to these 
best-practices an interest deduction limitation rule should target intragroup payments and re-
strict the allowable level of deductible net interest to 10%-30% of EBITDA. Moreover, the 
report advocates additionally including a group ratio test allowing companies that exceed the 
                                                          
196 Figure 8 is based on data available from the IBFD tax research platform. 
197 See OECD (2015b). 
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acceptable ratio of interest/EBITDA to deduct interest up to the net third party interest/EBITDA 
ratio. Alternatively, the group ratio rule could be designed to compare the D/E ratio of the entity 
to that of the group. To take account of earnings volatility, the report proposes to refer to the 
average EBITDA of current and past years and to include a carry-forward and/or backward of 
non-deductible interest and unused EBITDA levels. In addition, countries may include de min-
imis thresholds, up to which interest is always deductible.198 
Applying an earnings stripping rule will be mandatory for member states of the EU from the 
end of 2018. The rule defined in the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive199, like the rule proposed 
by the OECD, highly resembles the German earnings stripping rule. Under this rule, internal 
and external interest shall only be deductible up to 30% of EBITDA. In addition, the member 
states may apply the following: one of the group ratio tests that are also recommended by the 
OECD, an exemption for interest below €3 million and a stand-alone clause that exempts com-
panies that are not part of a multinational group. For non-deductible interest, member states 
may allow an unlimited carry-forward, which may be combined with an option to carry back 
the interest up to three years. 
Neither the OECD nor the European Commission recommends comparable rules for royalties 
or levying WHTs on interest and royalties as measures against base erosion. 
4.2.2 Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations and interest 
deduction limitation rules 
There are several empirical studies of the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations and in-
terest deduction limitation rules.  
Wamser,200 Weichenrieder and Windischbauer,201 and Overesch and Wamser202 have analysed 
the impact of the 2001 tax reform in Germany, which led to a tightening of thin capitalization 
regulations. They argue that a direct consequence of the reform was a reduction in the amount 
of intra-company loans granted to German companies by their foreign affiliates. Buslei and 
Simmler203 and Dressler and Scheuering204 have investigated the new German interest stripping 
                                                          
198 For an analysis of the OECD recommendations, see also Vleggeert (2016b). 
199 See European Commission (2016b); for details see also Gutmann et al (2016). 
200 See Wamser (2014). 
201 See Weichenrieder/Windischbauer (2008). 
202 See Overesch/Wamser (2010). 
203 See Buslei/Simler (2012). 
204 See Dressler/Scheuering (2012). 
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rule introduced in 2008 and show that companies affected by this reform responded by decreas-
ing their debt-to-assets ratios.  
Buettner et al. have used data on subsidiaries owned by German multinationals and located in 
EU and OECD member states. The data covers the period from 1996-2004.205 This study shows 
that the introduction of thin capitalization regulations with a D/E ratio of 2:1 in a country with 
a tax rate of 34% (sample average tax rate) reduces the share of internal debt. This is by 3.2 
percentage points if the D/E ratio refers to internal debt and 6.6 percentage points if it refers to 
total debt. Based on data for the years 1982-2004, Blouin et al. have provided evidence for a 
reduction of the internal and total debt of foreign U.S. affiliates in response to thin capitalization 
rules.206 The study uses micro-level data on U.S. multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries 
in 54 countries over the period of 1982-2004. In contrast to previous studies, the authors com-
pare the effect of a mere existence of thin capitalization rules with the impact of their stringency 
and the level of enforcement. They find that a presence of interest deduction restrictions reduces 
an affiliate’s debt-to-assets ratio, with more profound results in the case of limitations on bor-
rowing from a parent company. In addition, Blouin et al. have argued that the impact of thin 
capitalization rules on leverage is stronger in countries with an automatic application of the 
restrictions than those with discretionary enforcement.  
The first-known attempt to measure the influence of transfer pricing regulations on profit shift-
ing was carried out by Bartelsman and Beetsma.207 Using sectoral data, they empirically tested 
the effects of a broad range of factors on the reported profits of multinationals. The authors 
argued that differences in CIT rates between countries, along with certain features of their tax 
systems and an enforcement of transfer pricing regulations, constitute major incentives or dis-
couragements for profit shifting by multinationals. Lohse and Riedel208 have used micro-level 
panel data on multinationals from 26 European states. In the first step of their analysis, the 
authors confirmed general findings in the related literature that state that CIT rates have a neg-
ative impact on the reported pre-tax profits of multinationals. In addition, Lohse and Riedel 
have found that transfer pricing regulations mitigate tax incentives to shift profits. According 
to the authors, firms in high-tax jurisdictions with strict transfer pricing regimes are less prone 
to income shifting than companies in high-tax countries without enforced transfer pricing rules. 
                                                          
205 See Buettner et al. (2012). 
206 See Blouin et al. (2014). 
207 See Bartelsman/Beetsma (2003). 
208 See Lohse/Riedel (2013). 
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Beer and Loeprick209 have confirmed these findings, arguing that the introduction of mandatory 
documentation requirements on average decreases the amount of profits shifted between sub-
sidiaries of MNEs by approximately 60% within four years of the introduction. They show that 
the profit-shifting behaviour of subsidiaries with a high intangibles-to-total-assets ratio is less 
influenced by documentation requirements than the profit-shifting behaviour of subsidiaries 
with a low level of intangible assets.  
Klassen and Laplante have investigated the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations, em-
ploying micro-level data on U.S. multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries.210 A major con-
tribution of this study to the previous papers lies in its recognition that profit shifting depends 
not only on the enforcement of transfer pricing regulations in a given country but also on the 
implementation of transfer pricing rules in other jurisdictions. Saunders-Scott has contributed 
to the literature by analysing the relationship between reported profits and transfer pricing rules 
and trying to explain all possible channels through which these regulations might influence total 
tax revenues.211 The author developed a theoretical model and found empirical evidence to sup-
port the idea that a stricter enforcement of transfer pricing laws limits both profit shifting out-
flows and profit shifting inflows. According to Saunders-Scott, if a company has more sub-
sidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions, it reports fewer profits after strict transfer pricing regulations 
are introduced. On the other hand, if the affiliates of this firm are located in low-tax states, the 
firm reports higher profits after the enforcement of transfer pricing rules. Furthermore, Saun-
ders-Scott argued that tighter transfer pricing laws induce greater compliance costs for individ-
ual firms. These additional expenses reduce companies’ profitability and therefore contribute 
to an overall negative effect of the enforcement of transfer pricing regulations on reported prof-
its and thus total tax revenues.  
Another study of Saunders-Scott212 is, as far as can be seen, the only study that investigates the 
impact of thin capitalization rules not on the level of an affiliate’s debt but on its reported proﬁts. 
In this, the author combined identification strategies of two flows of profit shifting literature: 
studies of a strategic use of related-party trade and papers on intragroup financing. Saunders-
Scott used the Orbis database provided by Bureau van Dijk to extract firm-level financial in-
formation on MNEs from 55 countries within the period of 2006-2012. The author shows that 
the implementation of an earnings stripping rule in an affiliate’s country reduces its EBIT by 
                                                          
209 See Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
210 See Klassen/Laplante (2012). 
211 See Saunders-Scott (2013). 
212 See Saunders-Scott (2015). 
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3.8%. Saunders-Scott attributed this ﬁnding to a substitution between debt shifting and transfer 
pricing manipulation, arguing that the costs of shifting via transfer pricing manipulation depend 
on the total volume shifted. Therefore, if the volume of profit shifting using interest is restricted 
by thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules, the marginal costs of shifting via transfer pric-
ing manipulation decrease. 
4.2.3 The interdependency of proﬁt-shifting channels and the effectiveness of anti-avoid-
ance legislation 
Most of the studies presented in Chapter 4.2.2 investigate the impact of either rules limiting 
interest deductibility or transfer pricing regulations, while the literature remains largely silent 
on the relationship between these two countermeasures and their mutual effect on BEPS. In 
order to judge the effectiveness of the two types of anti-avoidance rules, it is crucial to know 
whether restrictions of one proﬁt-shifting channel are substituted by an intensiﬁed use of the 
remaining channels or whether they achieve an overall reduction in shifting activity. 
Saunders-Scott has found evidence that interest deduction limitation rules affect reported EBIT. 
The author concluded that substitution from profit shifting using intragroup interest payments 
towards profit shifting via the transfer pricing channel exists.213 Yet, Saunders-Scott has not 
investigated any interaction with transfer pricing rules. However, the interdependency of the 
two profit-shifting channels is relevant, since it allows for clearer predictions about the reduc-
tion of total profit shifting following the implementation of the respective anti-avoidance regu-
lations. A substitutive relationship between the two channels of profit shifting could also ex-
plain why - despite the measured effectiveness and the suspected increase in the cost of capi-
tal214 - several studies have not found clear evidence of reduced investment following the intro-
duction of thin capitalization rules.215 
Against this background, the purpose of the following empirical study is to analyse the interde-
pendency between different anti-avoidance regulations. The study applies two empirical ap-
proaches. Firstly, firm-level panel data on the reported profits of European companies in 2004-
2012 is used to exploit the variation in tax rates and the strictness of anti-avoidance regulations 
across countries and time. The second empirical method is based on a quasi-experimental set-
ting in France, where in 2007 thin capitalization rules were strengthened for one group of firms 
                                                          
213 See Saunders-Scott (2015) 
214 See Ruf/Schindler (2015). 
215 See e.g. Weichenrieder/Windischbauer (2008) and Buettner et al. (2012). 
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but remained unchanged for the other. Moreover, following the idea that shifting costs are re-
lated to firm characteristics, this study separately investigates the heterogeneity in the shifting 
response of knowledge-intensive companies. 
The contribution of this study to previous literature is twofold: Firstly, it expands the earlier 
literature on the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations by including an indicator for the 
strictness of interest deduction limitation rules and the interaction terms of different anti-avoid-
ance regulations with the tax rate on reported EBIT. This accounts for potential interdependen-
cies of the profit-shifting channels. Secondly, it investigates differences in the profit shifting 
behaviour of IP-intensive and other firms. 
The study is structured as follows. Chapter 4.2.3.1 presents a simple theoretical model and out-
lines the main hypotheses. Chapter 4.2.3.2 provides the data sources and defines key variables 
used in the empirical estimations. Chapter 4.2.3.3 explains the two empirical approaches used 
in the study. Chapters 4.2.3.4 and 4.2.3.5 present the results of the panel data analysis and the 
quasi-experimental estimation. 
4.2.3.1 Model 
The simple model considers a multinational corporation with two affiliates resident in different 
countries: a high-tax country with a tax rate H  and a low-tax country with a tax rate L . The 
affiliate resident in the high-tax country can shift part or all of its exogenous true pre-tax profit 
H  to the affiliate in the low-tax country. H  is defined as the taxable profit that would have 
been reported in the absence of profit shifting incentives and may have already been reduced 
by deductions for intragroup payments for goods and services or debt that are not induced by 
tax incentives.216 This true profit can be shifted from the high-tax affiliate to the low-tax affiliate 
by increasing intragroup debt financing, by manipulating interest rates on existing intragroup 
loans, by using other additional intragroup transactions, or overpaying for goods, intangibles 
and services provided by the low-tax affiliate. The combined volume of shifted profits via both 
channels is denoted as S . The respective intragroup payments are deductible from the tax base 
in the high-tax country, and they increase taxable true profit L  in the low-tax country.  
                                                          
216 See also Fuest et al. (2011). 
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Shifting profits may induce costs of C, which are assumed to be non-deductible from the tax 
base in the high-tax country.217 The aim of the multinational corporation is to maximize its total 
post-tax profit: 
Post-tax profit = (1 )( ) (1 )( )H H L LS S C          (9) 
From Equation (9), it follows that the optimal amount of shifting out of the high-tax country 
*S  arises when the tax advantage from profit shifting equals marginal costs: 
*( ) H LC S      with 0H   for HS   if HS   (10) 
The tax advantage from profit shifting will be 0 or negative for each unit of profit shifted in 
excess of the true profit of the high-tax affiliate. This is because the corresponding deductions 
do not reduce taxable income in the high-tax country in the same year. If the deductions can 
also not be used in future years, the maximum optimal amount of profit shifting will equal total 
true profit. 
Transfer pricing manipulation and excess interest payments are considered as the two input 
factors to produce the output “shifted profit” S . As both shifting channels serve exactly the 
same purpose of reducing profit in the high-tax country and increasing profit in the low-tax 
country, the value of shifting one unit via one channel equals the value of shifting one unit via 
the other channel. Hence, the multinational will be indifferent to the choice between these two 
input factors and will always use the cheaper channel for each unit shifted. Hence, the profit-
shifting channels are assumed to be perfect substitutes. 
This means that the conditional input demand for shifting profit via transfer pricing manipula-
tion is 
* * *
* * * * *
* * *
( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ) 0 ( ), ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
0 ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
D T D D T
T T D T D D T
T T D D T
S S S S if c S S S S c S S S S
S S S S S S S S S if c S S S S c S S S S
S S S if c S S S S c S S S S
      
           
      
 (11) 
and the conditional input demand for shifting profit via intragroup debt is 
                                                          
217 Some costs may in fact be tax deductible but ignoring this here does not fundamentally affect the results. See 
also Dharmapala/Riedel (2013). 
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* * *
* * * * *
* * *
( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ) 0 ( ), ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
0 ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))
T D T T D
D D T D T T D
D D T T D
S S S S if c S S S S c S S S S
S S S S S S S S S if c S S S S c S S S S
S S S if c S S S S c S S S S
      
           
      
 (12) 
with * *( ) ( ) 0 1D TS S S S S S if S     . 
Consequently, the total cost function of profit shifting is given by the minimum cost combina-
tions of the two input factors (the two shifting channels) for all potential output levels: 
* *( ) ( )* *
0 0
( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( )
T Dx S S y S S
T D T Dx y
C S S S S c x c y
 
 
    (13) 
( )Tc x  and ( )Dc y  denote the cost of shifting unit x via transfer pricing and unit y via debt. 
Whether or not substitution between the two profit-shifting channels is optimal depends on how 
these costs per shifted unit are determined. Following existing literature, it is assumed that all 
profit shifting costs are convex in the amount of profit shifted.218 This can be formalized by 
( )i iC S , ( ) 0i iC S   and ( ) 0i iC S  with  , ,i D T Total . 
Firstly, consider the case, that the costs for each profit-shifting channel depend only on the 
volume of profit shifted via this channel (i.e. ( )T TC S  and ( )D DC S ).
219 In this case, the optimal 
amount of profit shifting from the high-tax country to the low-tax country via each channel is 
determined by: 
*
*
( )D D
H L
D
C S
S
 

 

 with 0H   for HS   if HS   (14) 
*
*
( )T T
H L
T
C S
S
 

 

 with 0H   for HS   if HS   (15) 
Whether it is optimal to substitute towards one channel following a cost increase of the other 
channel depends on the level of total profit shifted in the optimum before the change in costs. 
If the optimal amount of profit shifting has been below total true profit ( *
HS  ), an increase 
in the marginal cost of profit shifting via a certain channel will decrease the optimal amount of 
                                                          
218 See e.g. Dharmapala/Riedel (2013), p.7; Saunders-Scott (2015). 
219 See also Saunders-Scott (2015) for different assumptions of the cost function. 
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profit shifted via this channel. The amount shifted via the other channel, however, should re-
main stable, as neither its costs nor the determination of the tax benefit are influenced by the 
reduction in the amount shifted via the first channel. In this case, substitution will not occur. 
On the other hand, if it has been optimal to shift total true profit ( *
HS  ), an increase in the 
cost of shifting via one channel may either have no impact on or reduce the optimal amount 
shifted via this channel. In the considered example of shifting from a high- to a low-tax country 
with ( H L  ), the marginal benefit function is a step function that is constant at the positive 
values of the tax differential H L   up to the amount of total true profit and turns negative for 
all units above total true profit ( HS  ). Thus, it is possible that the last unit shifted via one or 
both profit-shifting channels in the optimum bears marginal costs below the tax advantage of 
H L  . Up to the true profit, the company will always choose the cheaper channel for each 
unit shifted. Hence, if the costs of one channel increase while still staying below the tax differ-
ential and leaving the price ratio of the two channels unaffected for all units of profit shifted, 
the amount shifted via both channels should remain stable. If, ceteris paribus, the price ratio 
reverses for certain units of profit shifted (meaning that the other channel now yields the lowest 
cost), the amount shifted via the channel with increased cost should decline and the amount 
shifted via the other channel should increase. With respect to Equations (14) and (15), this 
substitution between the two channels in reaction to a reversion of the price ratio for certain 
units of profit shifted results from a change in the value of H  (from its real value to zero and 
vice versa) in both equations. In addition, if it is optimal to shift total true profit, an increase in 
the cost of one channel also decreases the amount shifted via this channel if the marginal costs 
rise above the tax advantage of H L  . A move towards the other channel will then only be 
optimal if the last unit shifted via the other channel yields a cost below the tax differential. 
However, companies may also substitute between the profit-shifting channels if it is optimal to 
shift less than total true profit. This is the case if we allow for additional non-channel-specific 
shifting costs that are convex in the total amount shifted via both channels ( )Total TotalC S  with 
( ) 0Total TotalC S   and ( ) 0Total TotalC S  . Such costs may result from an increased audit risk, an 
increased need for mitigation strategies and potential adjustments of intragroup transactions via 
one or both channels if profits are below a certain threshold. Moreover, shifting high volumes 
of profit carries the risk of reputational damage for multinationals, which might require inter-
nally set limits for total profit shifting. In the case of shifting costs that depend on the total 
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amount shifted, the company resident in the high-tax country defines the optimal amount of 
shifting for the two channels according to the following conditions: 
*
*
( )D
H L
C S
S
 

 

 with 0H   for HS   if HS   (16) 
*
*
( )T
H L
C S
S
 

 

 with 0H   for HS   if HS   (17) 
It follows from Equations (16) and (17) that an increase in the channel specific costs of one 
channel will increase its marginal costs of profit shifting and consequently reduce the optimal 
amount shifted via this channel. The reduction in the total amount shifted (S) should then reduce 
the marginal costs of shifting via the other channel that enjoys unchanged channel-specific 
costs, which in turn may increase the optimal level of profit shifted via this channel. 
In summary, if the costs of shifting depend exclusively on the amount shifted via the respective 
channel, companies may only substitute between the channels if it is optimal to shift total true 
profit. However, if there are other non-channel-specific costs of profit shifting that depend on 
the total amount shifted via both channels, it can be optimal to increase the amount shifted via 
one channel as a reaction to a cost increase of the other channel for profit shifting levels below 
true profit. 
In this study, the focus is on substitution between profit-shifting channels as a consequence of 
the introduction or tightening of anti-avoidance regulations. The considerations above show 
that whether substitution between shifting channels is an optimal strategy for a company de-
pends on the structure of the cost function for the two channels before and after the change in 
anti-avoidance legislation. To derive hypotheses, it is thus necessary to make some additional 
assumptions about the elements and structure of the cost functions of the two shifting channels.  
The cost of profit shifting can generally be split into those costs arising from anti-avoidance 
legislation implemented by tax authorities and those costs not related to anti-avoidance regula-
tions (which are referred to as costs from side effects in the following). Such costs arise from 
tax-induced intragroup transactions that deviate from the optimal structure of intragroup trade 
and debt from a management perspective. 
Despite a potentially lower capacity to raise external debt, no obvious costs resulting from side 
effects of profit shifting via intragroup debt exist. Costs from side effects that arise from exter-
nal debt financing, especially bankruptcy costs and costs from information asymmetries, do not 
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play a relevant role for internal financing under the precondition that the total third-party debt 
of the multinational corporation defines bankruptcy risk.220 Costs from side effects of transfer 
pricing mainly result from conflicts with internal performance measurement and incentive set-
ting systems. They constitute inefficiency costs, which increase with an increasing difference 
between the real transfer price and the tax-optimal transfer price.221 If companies use two sets 
of books for tax-optimal transfer prices and internal transfer prices, these inefficiency costs can 
be avoided, and in this case the non-tax costs of transfer pricing are limited to the additional 
administrative effort in operating a two-book system.222  
Costs related to anti-avoidance measures arise from complying with the regulations that tackle 
excessive intragroup profit shifting, as well as from establishing circumvention strategies. In 
addition, if the anti-avoidance regulations are effective, the tax advantage from profit shifting 
will become negative due to the non-deductibility of payments in the high-tax country. 
A basic anti-avoidance regulation that targets both profit-shifting channels is the application of 
the arm’s length principle, which has been adopted by most countries.223 This principle requires 
intragroup transactions to follow similar conditions as transactions between independent third 
parties. As long as the arm’s length principle is not strictly enforced, and no detailed documen-
tation of the intragroup transactions is required, no direct costs from complying with the arm’s 
length principle arise. Costs for circumvention and the cost from double taxation are likely to 
depend on the type of intragroup payments. In the case of intragroup debt, there is usually a 
large range of possible arm’s length amounts of debt and corresponding interest rates, which 
easily allows companies to justify any level of intragroup debt.224 In the case of intragroup 
royalty payments, an arm’s length price is often hard to determine because of the highly specific 
nature of intangible assets.225 Therefore, it is relatively easy to justify high levels of profits 
shifted via this channel, even under an application of the arm’s length principle. With respect 
to the transfer of common tangible goods and services, companies should find themselves more 
restricted in their profit shifting behaviour even in the absence of detailed transfer pricing reg-
ulations. This is because comparable third-party transactions are available and strong deviations 
from the arm’s length price are immediately obvious.226 Hence, for corporations that only trade 
                                                          
220 See also Chowdhry/Nanda (1994); Gordon (2010); Overesch/Wamser (2014). 
221 See Hiemann/Reichelstein (2012). 
222 See Hiemann/Reichelstein (2012), S. 4. 
223 See Eden (2016), p. 153. For an overview on country practice, see Zinn et al. (2014). 
224 See also Burnett (2014), p. 63. 
225 See Eden (2016), p. 164; Brauner (2014), p. 619. 
226 See also Dawson/Miller (2009), p. 35. 
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typical tangible assets or services that are easy to value, severe transfer pricing manipulation 
may result in double taxation, even if no strict transfer pricing regulations exist. This leads to a 
negative tax benefit for high levels of transfer pricing manipulation. 
Based on these considerations, it is likely that, in the absence of specific anti-avoidance regu-
lations, the marginal costs of an application of the arm’s length principle for shifting high vol-
umes of profit are lower in the case of intragroup interest and royalty payments than in that of 
transfer pricing manipulation using common tangible goods and services. If the marginal costs 
are identical for royalty payments and intragroup debt, the high-tax affiliate may either shift via 
one channel only or choose a specific combination of both channels. If the marginal costs are 
higher for one of the two channels, the high-tax affiliate will use the cheaper channel only. The 
costs from side effects may be minimized if the respective transaction is not purely artificial 
but only the price for the transaction is manipulated. Hence, for affiliates of multinational 
groups owning valuable intangible assets, royalty payments may be the profit-shifting channel 
that induces the least cost from side effects, while shifting via intragroup debt may be optimal 
for other companies. Following these considerations, the following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 1: In the absence of strict anti-avoidance regulations, companies belonging to a 
group with a low intangible intensity mainly shift profits via intragroup debt, while companies 
belonging to a group with a high intangible intensity focus on shifting via royalty payments. 
If the high-tax country has interest deduction limitation rules in place, interest payments on debt 
above the safe haven ratio or acceptable EBIT ratio will no longer be deductible and face double 
taxation. Consequently, the tax benefit of profit shifting will turn negative for excess interest 
payments. For companies that are shifting high levels of their total profit via interest payments 
it will be optimal to reduce the amount shifted via intragroup interest payments. These compa-
nies may substitute shifting high levels of debt with an increased use of transfer pricing manip-
ulation if the costs of shifting via the other channel do not exceed the tax benefit.  
Hypothesis 2: If a country introduces strict thin capitalization rules, companies that have been 
shifting high levels of profit via intragroup interest will reduce their interest payments and in-
crease shifting via the transfer pricing channel.  
If the high-tax country introduces transfer pricing documentation rules, the multinational cor-
poration will face additional fixed costs if any intragroup transactions are present. In addition, 
strict transfer pricing regulations and enforcement increase the threat of being audited and hav-
ing transfer prices not accepted by the tax authorities. Transfer pricing rules following the 
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OECD guidelines generally apply not only to intrafirm trade but also to the interest rate of 
intragroup loans. However, less focus is usually put on the level of intragroup debt.227 Most 
countries target this aspect by more specific thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules. Thus, 
the introduction of transfer pricing documentation rules is likely to have a stronger impact on 
the marginal costs for profit shifted via transfer pricing manipulation. The additional fixed costs 
and the reduced potential for receiving a tax advantage derived from the shifting of high levels 
of profit using transfer pricing manipulation should make shifting via interest payments rela-
tively cheaper. Hence, a reduction in shifting via transfer pricing manipulation and an increase 
in shifting via interest payments can be expected. Of course, such a substitution will only take 
place in firms that have been shifting parts of their profit via transfer pricing manipulation be-
fore the introduction of strict transfer pricing regulations. 
Hypothesis 3: If a country introduces strict transfer pricing regulations, companies that have 
been shifting profit via transfer pricing manipulation before this will reduce transfer pricing 
manipulation of tangible and intangible assets and increase shifting via the debt channel. 
If an anti-avoidance regulation targeting one profit-shifting channel is introduced, while the 
other shifting channel is already restricted by another anti-avoidance rule, the observable sub-
stitution depends on the extent to which firms have previously been using the two shifting chan-
nels. If interest deduction limitation rules exist, they should not provide leeway for a move 
towards the debt channel if transfer pricing documentation rules are introduced and if a com-
pany already fully exhausts the debt channel up to the allowed threshold. This should in partic-
ular apply to companies with a low intangible intensity, which are assumed to mainly rely on 
the transfer pricing channel according to Hypothesis 1. However, it may also apply to compa-
nies with a high intangible intensity that have been making greater use of the debt channel after 
the introduction of transfer pricing documentation rules. Strict transfer pricing documentation 
rules, on the other hand, do not pose such a clear limit to profit shifting but are more flexible. 
Determining the arm’s length price is often very difficult, especially in the case of firm-specific 
intangible assets due to a lack of comparable transactions. Hence, most firms should generally 
have some leeway for moving towards the transfer pricing channel if interest deduction limita-
tion rules are introduced even if transfer pricing documentation rules exist. However, the lee-
way for transfer pricing manipulation is likely to be smaller in the case of tangible goods and 
services than in the case of intangible goods. Thus, the marginal costs for an increased use of 
the transfer pricing channel should be higher for companies with a low intangible intensity. 
                                                          
227 See OECD (2012). 
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Consequently, amongst companies affected by thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules, 
the volume of substitution should be higher for affiliates of multinational groups with a high 
intangible intensity than affiliates of groups with a low intangible intensity if strict transfer 
pricing regulations exist. 
Hypothesis 4: If transfer pricing regulations exist and thin capitalization rules are introduced, 
most companies may have some leeway to substitute towards the transfer pricing channel. The 
substitution should, however, be more pronounced for companies with a high intangible inten-
sity. 
4.2.3.2 Data 
4.2.3.2.1 Firm-specific data 
In this study, ﬁrm-level accounting data from the Amadeus database provided by Bureau van 
Dijk is used. The database includes accounting information and information on group structures 
for more than 21 million companies in Europe. The empirical analysis includes two estimation 
strategies. Firstly, it makes use of panel data of European companies belonging to a multina-
tional group. This analysis covers the period of 2004 to 2012. Secondly, a difference-in-differ-
ence estimation based on a reform in France in 2007 (see Chapter 4.2.3.3.2 for details) is con-
ducted. For this analysis, a balanced panel with observations for French affiliates of multina-
tional groups in 2004-2009 is used. Both datasets include only firms that report unconsolidated 
accounts, since the analysis requires information on the activities of the single afﬁliates. Multi-
national groups are defined by using information on direct parent and subsidiary companies, 
and a company is considered to be a part of a multinational group if at least one firm in the 
group is resident in a different country. Since the opportunity for profit shifting requires a sub-
stantial ownership share, this study follows other studies and only considers affiliates that are 
owned with a share of at least 90%.228 
Also in line with other studies, headquarter ﬁrms are excluded from the sample due to the ﬁnd-
ings of Dischinger and Riedel, and Dischinger, Knoll and Riedel, who have argued that the 
location of proﬁts and proﬁtable assets may be biased in favour of these ﬁrms.229 However, 
headquarter firms are again included as part of a robustness check. Moreover, the sample does 
                                                          
228 See e.g. Becker/Riedel (2012) and Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
229 See Dischinger/Riedel (2010); Dischinger et al (2014). 
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not include loss-making companies, because these ﬁrms face different tax planning incen-
tives.230 Finally, firms active in the financial sector and years with implausible values for the 
main variables of interest (such as a negative number of employees) are excluded. The ﬁnal 
sample for the panel analysis covering the years 2004-2012 includes 116,566 ﬁrms located in 
32 countries. Of these companies, 103,714 provide information on all relevant variables of the 
main regression based on Equation (19) (see Chapter 4.2.3.3.1) and are thus included in the 
analysis. Table 35 in the Appendix provides an overview of the country distribution for all 
observations considered in the main regression results. The final sample for the analysis of the 
French tax reform in 2007 includes 1,040 French firms. 
4.2.3.2.2 Tax rate data and measures for anti-avoidance regulations 
The data on tax rates were obtained from the EU Commission’s effective tax rates report and 
augmented by the University of Oxford’s CBT Tax database, Ernst & Young’s Worldwide 
Corporate Tax Guides and the Global Corporate Tax Handbooks published by the IBFD.231 The 
information on transfer pricing regulations was collected from the transfer pricing guides pub-
lished by Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PwC.232 Information on thin capitalization and 
earnings stripping rules was collected from IBFD Tax Handbooks. In the case of both transfer 
pricing rules and regulations against intragroup debt shifting, the study does not focus on their 
mere existence in a country but rather measures their level of strictness This is because only 
rules that bite are likely to have an impact on proﬁt-shifting behaviour.  
This study follows Beer and Loeprick and uses the years since the introduction of mandatory 
transfer pricing documentation requirements in a country as an indicator of the strictness of 
transfer pricing rules.233 Transfer pricing documentation requirements constitute a crucial ele-
ment of increasing the transparency of transfer price determination and the detection of mis-
pricing. In addition, the effect of time is considered to play a significant role in determining the 
actual strictness of the application of these rules, as tax authorities need to gain experience and 
knowledge of intragroup transfer prices to effectively detect mispricing. An advantage of this 
measure is that it brings a great deal of variation and is clearly defined.234 In the robustness 
checks, the baseline findings are tested using a binary transfer pricing variable comparable to 
                                                          
230 See also Huizinga/Laeven (2008); Dischinger/Riedel (2011); Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
231 See Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (2016); Ernst & Young (2006-2012); IBFD (2004-2012). 
232 See Deloitte (2004-2012); Ernst & Young (2005-2012); KPMG (2004-2012); PwC (2004-2012). 
233 See Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
234 Opposed to that, the measure used by Saunders-Scott (2015) and based on a study of Mescall/Klassen (2014) 
cannot be constructed consistently for many country-year combinations due to missing data. Thus, it is not con-
sidered. 
 117 
 
1
1
7
 
the one used by Lohse and Riedel.235 This binary variable also focuses on formal transfer pric-
ing documentation rules but does not take the effect of time into consideration. Thus, it leads 
to significantly less variation in the dataset. It is set to one if formal transfer pricing documen-
tation rules exists and zero otherwise. In a further robustness check, informal transfer pricing 
documentation rules are also taken into account.236 This is done be using a measure that con-
siders the existence of informal transfer pricing rules, while also taking into account the effect 
of time since the introduction of formal transfer pricing regulations. The respective variable is 
set to zero if neither formal nor informal transfer pricing documentation rules exist, and it equals 
one if only informal transfer pricing documentation rules are present. In addition, it considers 
the number of years since and including the year of the introduction of formal transfer pricing 
documentation rules. If neither formal nor informal transfer pricing documentation rules exist, 
the variable is set to zero. Table 36 in the Appendix provides an overview of the existence of 
formal and informal transfer pricing documentation rules in all countries and years of the sam-
ple. 
With respect to regulations that limit intragroup debt financing, a challenge emerges. This is 
the construction of a strictness measure that classifies both thin capitalization rules that limit 
shifting via interest payments to a certain D/E ratio and earnings stripping rules that limit profit 
shifting via interest to a specific percentage of EBIT(DA). As the accepted debt level is defined 
referring to different ratios, it is not feasible to directly use the levels of these ratios as an indi-
cator. For D/E ratio rules, this approach has been previously taken by Buettner et al.237, who 
have used the following non-linear transformation of the safe haven ratio denoted by   as an 
indicator for the strictness of thin capitalization rules: 
1
1
it
it
TC



 (18) 
This measure can only be determined for countries that apply a thin capitalization rule. The 
variable is zero if a country does not apply a thin capitalization rule and it increases up to a 
hypothetical maximum of one for the most restrictive case. The level of the safe haven ratio 
varies between 1.5 and 8 in the sample, which yields a maximum value of the strictness indica-
tor of 0.5. This measure is used in one of the robustness checks by setting the indicator to 
                                                          
235 See Lohse/Riedel (2013). 
236 In some countries, there are no formal transfer pricing documentation rules, but the documentation of transfer 
prices is required in practice. 
237 See Buettner et al. (2012). 
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missing for countries that apply an earnings stripping rule. Table 37 (listed in the Appendix) 
provides an overview of the D/E ratio rules applied in the countries included in the sample.  
In the baseline analysis, a more comprehensive variable that allows for the consideration of 
earnings stripping rules and other anti-avoidance regulations is used. This variable classifies 
the different regulations into three categories. All countries that do not have rules restricting the 
deductibility of interest payments beyond a general application of the arm’s length principle are 
assigned to Category 1. Countries that apply thin capitalization rules with a safe haven ratio 
above the average of all countries in the sample (which is 3) are assigned to Category 2. More-
over, countries that do not use a general thin capitalization rule but apply some anti-avoidance 
regulation against specific forms of excessive intragroup debt shifting are classified into Cate-
gory 2. Table 38 in the Appendix provides some information on these special interest deduction 
limitation rules. In addition, countries that have a general thin capitalization rule with a safe 
haven ratio of 3 or lower but exclude a broad range of transactions from their rules are assigned 
to Category 2. An example of the latter is France during the years 2004-2006, when only interest 
payments to parent companies which were resident in certain non-EU countries were covered 
by the thin capitalization rule. Category 3 comprises all countries that apply a thin capitalization 
rule with a safe haven ratio of 3 or below without broad exceptions. In addition, the earnings 
stripping rules applicable in Germany (from 2008), Italy (from 2008), and Spain (from 2012) 
are assigned to Category 3. While thin capitalization rules and earnings stripping rules are not 
directly comparable, the latter are generally seen as being more binding, since they are less easy 
to manipulate.238 Table 39 in the Appendix summarizes the main interest deduction limitation 
strictness indicators by country and year. 
4.2.3.2.3 Macroeconomic control variables 
Data on gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth and GDP per-capita were extracted from 
the World Bank’s Development Indicators239 and are measured in constant United States dollar 
(USD). The unemployment rate parameters were also obtained from the World Bank’s Devel-
opment Indicators and they reﬂect a country’s total unemployment rate (expressed as a percent-
age of total labour force, as estimated by the International Labour Office). Information on cor-
ruption is derived from the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator.240 Data on inflation 
                                                          
238 See OECD (2015d). 
239 See World Bank (2017). 
240 See World Bank (2016). 
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is taken from the database World Economic Outlook241 provided by the International Monetary 
Fund which reflects the percentage change in average consumer prices. 
Table 40 provides detailed descriptive statistics for all variables included in the panel estima-
tion. Table 41 offers an overview of the main variables of interest in the analysis of the French 
tax reform. Both tables are included in the Appendix. 
4.2.3.3 Estimation approaches 
4.2.3.3.1 Estimation based on the variation of tax parameters over time 
To investigate whether there is substitution from the interest channel towards the transfer pric-
ing channel, this dissertation examines the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT at different strictness 
levels of interest deduction limitation rules and transfer pricing documentation requirements. 
Because they explicitly exclude interest payments, EBIT are not directly influenced by profit 
shifting via intragroup debt. This allows for the separation of the effects of anti-avoidance rules 
on shifting via the transfer of goods, services and intangibles. Firstly, the general tax rate sen-
sitivity of EBIT is investigated. Subsequently, in line with Lohse and Riedel242 and Beer and 
Loeprick,243 a measure for the strictness of transfer pricing documentation requirements is 
added to the estimation. However, the main focus of the study is the interaction of the different 
proﬁt-shifting channels and the respective anti-avoidance regulations. The following basic es-
timation approach is used to test the impact of transfer pricing rules on the tax rate sensitivity 
of EBIT in the context of no or strict thin capitalization rules: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it i jt it
Log EBIT CIT TP CIT TP TC CIT TC
TC TP CIT TP TC x
     
     
       
        
 (19) 
In Equation (19), Log EBIT is the dependent variable and denotes the natural logarithm of EBIT 
of affiliate i in year t. The variable CITit, represents the CIT rate augmented by local proﬁt taxes 
on ﬁrms that is levied in year t in the country where ﬁrm i resides. Following previous literature, 
this variable is used as the main indicator for profit shifting incentive and its coefficient is ex-
pected to be negative. In accordance with the literature on the effect of transfer pricing regula-
tions, strict transfer pricing regulations denoted by TP are expected to effectively reduce the tax 
rate sensitivity of EBIT ( 3 0  ).  
                                                          
241 See International Monetary Fund (2016). 
242 See Lohse/Riedel (2013). 
243 See Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
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Assuming that some companies have leeway to substitute between the two dominant proﬁt 
shifting channels (interest payments and transfer pricing manipulation) the measured tax rate 
sensitivity of EBIT should increase if thin capitalization rules are tightened while transfer pric-
ing regulations are weak, at least for companies that have previously been shifting via in-
tragroup debt. In Equation (19), this is accounted for by an interaction term between the tax rate 
and the existence of strict thin capitalization rules (denoted by TC). Thus, it is expected that 
5 0.  The triple interaction of the corporate income tax rate (CIT), the thin capitalization 
strictness indicator (TC), and the transfer pricing strictness indicator (TP) considers that if there 
is a certain scope to substitute proﬁt shifting via debt with profit shifting via transfer pricing 
manipulation, the impact of one anti-avoidance regulation would be conditional on the level of 
the other. 
Finally, itx  represents a vector of relevant ﬁrm- and country-level control variables that vary 
over time. It includes companies’ main input factors, such as ﬁxed assets and costs of employ-
ees, as an indicator of true profits (as opposed to shifted profits). In addition, it captures a host 
country’s characteristics including GDP (controls for market size), GDP per capita (controls 
for the level of a country’s development), GDP growth rate, and unemployment rate. i  and i  
are company and industry-year ﬁxed effects, respectively. it  is an error term. 
4.2.3.3.2 Exploiting a thin capitalization reform in France 
The estimation approach presented in Chapter 4.2.3.3.1 relies on ﬁrms’ reaction to the variation 
of relevant tax parameters over time and a correct classiﬁcation of anti-avoidance strictness. A 
common concern of studies that use this approach is that the detected results are potentially 
prone to confounding effects that are not controlled for in the regression analysis. Therefore, to 
improve the identiﬁcation of the relationship between shifting strategies and so further validate 
the findings from the panel analysis, a quasi-experimental reform setting in France is studied 
using a difference-in-difference approach. Here, the average changes in EBIT for firms that are 
and are not affected by a reform of thin capitalization rules in France are compared. 
In particular, in 2007, a reform act extended the application of the French thin capitalization 
rules to related parties within the EU. Before 2007, French thin capitalization rules were re-
stricted to interest payments to controlling shareholders. A controlling shareholder was deﬁned 
as a shareholder that directly owns more than 50% of the company’s share capital or voting 
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rights. Under this thin capitalization rule, a D/E ratio of 1.5:1 applied. Due to EU case law,244 
starting from 2004, this thin capitalization rule no longer applied to interest payments to con-
trolling shareholders that were resident in EU member states. In addition, the rule also no longer 
applied to interest payments to controlling shareholders that were resident in countries that had 
signed a treaty with France. This treaty must have contained a non-discrimination clause similar 
to Art. 24(5) of the OECD Model Convention, not explicitly authorized the application of the 
French thin capitalization rules, and been negotiated or renegotiated after 23 July, 1992. 
The Finance Act of 2006 introduced new interest deduction limitation rules for ﬁscal years 
beginning on or after 1 January, 2007.245 These rules limit the tax deductibility for interest on 
loans granted by related parties. Thus, in addition to interest payments to parent companies, 
interest payments to other associated companies were also covered by this new thin capitaliza-
tion rule. Associated companies are defined as two companies of which one directly or indi-
rectly holds a minimum of 50% of the other’s capital, or as two companies of which a third 
company directly or indirectly holds 50% of the capital. While only a D/E ratio of 1.5:1 applied 
before 2007, the new thin capitalization rules introduced an additional test. According to this 
test, interest is only deductible if it does not exceed 25% of the company’s EBITDA. The in-
terest that exceeds the higher of the thresholds is considered to be non-deductible for tax pur-
poses. If the non-deductible interest is €150,000 or less, all interest is considered to be de-
ductible.  
The following difference-in-difference specification is used to study the impact of the 2007 
reform on firms’ EBIT: 
0 1 2 3it it jt i itLog EBIT Treat After Treat After x                 (20) 
Treat is a binary variable with a value of 1 for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group 
and of 0 for all firms assigned to the control group. Firms are classified as treated (Treat=1) if 
they face unrestricted debt shifting opportunities prior to the reform while being subject to in-
terest deduction limitation rules from 2007 onwards. A company must fulfil three criteria to be 
assigned to the treatment group. Firstly, its parent company needs to be resident in one of the 
countries covered by the exemption of thin capitalization rules between 2004 and 2006 (EU 
member states and certain treaty countries). Moreover, companies are only included in the treat-
ment group if their reported median interest paid in the three years prior to the reform exceeded 
                                                          
244 See European Court of Justice (2002). 
245 See Ernst & Young (2008), pp. 12-15. 
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€150,000, as this amount of interest remained deductible after the reform irrespective of the 
D/E ratio of the company. The interest payments reported before the reform are used to ensure 
exogenous treatment. As a third criterion, only companies with a higher tax rate than that of 
their parent companies are included in the treatment group, since other companies have a dis-
incentive to feature high levels of intragroup debt and are thus not likely to be affected by thin 
capitalization rules (either before or after the reform).246 Consequently, the control group 
(Treat=0) includes all companies with a parent firm resident in any of the countries covered by 
thin capitalization rules before 2007, as well as all companies without a tax incentive towards 
the parent firm and all companies with low interest payments.  
The variable “After” in Equation (20) equals zero for the pre-reform years of 2004-2006, and 
it equals one for the post-reform period of 2007-2009. The coefficient of interest in this speci-
fication is 3 . The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the reform, the dependent 
variable would have followed a similar trend in both the treatment and the control group. Since 
treated ﬁrms face a higher cost of shifting proﬁts via interest payments, they are expected to 
rely more on trade mispricing upon policy intervention if they have some discretionary leeway 
to do so. Consequently, the coefficient 3  is expected to be negative. This would suggest that 
the firms affected by the thin capitalization reform on average reduce their EBIT as compared 
to the firms not affected by the reform. itx  comprises the relevant firm-level controls such as 
fixed assets and costs of employees. Industry-specific time trends and time-constant effects are 
accounted for by including industry-year ﬁxed effects jt   and company fixed effects FE i . 
it   is an error term. 
Both the CIT rate and the strictness of transfer pricing regulations remained unchanged in 
France during the years considered in the analysis. In addition, as far as can be seen, there were 
no other major reforms that have had different effects on the treatment and control group. 
                                                          
246 As data on interest paid and the debt level of the affiliates is often missing, it is not possible to additionally 
control for the actual D/E ratio of firms in determining the treatment group as this would reduce the sample of the 
treated firms to a number close to zero. 
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4.2.3.4 Results I: Panel data estimation of the interaction between thin capitalization and 
transfer pricing rules 
4.2.3.4.1 Main analysis 
The first column of Table 27 provides a basic profit shifting estimation, with the CIT rate as 
the main independent variable of interest. Subsequently, the transfer pricing strictness indicator 
and its interaction with the tax incentive is added to the estimation. In the third column, the 
estimation is further augmented by the thin capitalization strictness indicator and all interactions 
between both anti-avoidance strictness indicators and the CIT rate, as depicted in Equation (19). 
The last two columns display the results of splitting the sample into IP-intensive and other 
firms. 
Column I of Table 27 shows a negative and statistically signiﬁcant tax rate sensitivity of re-
ported EBIT. Holding other factors constant, on average, a one percentage point increase in the 
tax rate leads to a 0.43% decrease in a company’s reported proﬁts. This negative relationship 
has already been identified in numerous other studies.247 The effect size is, however, somewhat 
smaller than the average effect size derived in the meta-study of Heckemeyer and Overesch.248 
As for the other variables, a ﬁrm’s input factors (such as fixed assets and costs of employees) 
seem to play an important role in determining its proﬁts, which is also consistent with general 
predictions and ﬁndings of earlier studies.249 A higher GDP growth rate also appears to be pos-
itively correlated with reported proﬁts, while a higher unemployment rate in a country is likely 
to decrease ﬁrms’ earnings. 
Column II of Table 27 reinvestigates the influence of transfer pricing regulations on ﬁrms’ 
proﬁts.250 In a manner consistent with previous studies, it shows that an implementation of 
transfer pricing documentation rules in high-tax countries leads to an increase in a ﬁrms’ re-
ported EBIT (i.e. reduces their tax sensitivity). The coefficient for the interaction between the 
CIT rate and the transfer pricing strictness indicator is positive, and with a t-value of 4.27, 
highly significant. It indicates that, on average, the tax rate sensitivity decreases by 0.10 per-
centage points every year after the introduction of transfer pricing documentation rules. The 
effect size is comparable to that reported in the study of Beer and Loeprick using the same 
                                                          
247 For an overview, see Chapter 2.2 or the meta-study of Heckemeyer/Overesch (2017). 
248 See Heckemeyer/Overesch (2017). 
249 See e.g. Lohse/Riedel (2013); Beer/Loeprick (2015); Saunders-Scott (2015). 
250 Similar to e.g. Lohse/Riedel (2013), Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
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measure for transfer pricing regulation strictness.251 The average marginal effects imply that 
the tax rate elasticity of EBIT is only negative and significant in the first year after the intro-
duction of transfer pricing regulations, while it becomes positive and significant starting from 
year 6. This suggests that transfer pricing regulations fully eliminate tax-motivated profit shift-
ing via transfer pricing manipulation if transfer pricing documentation rules have been existent 
for several years. 
However, the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations also depends on whether profit shift-
ing via transfer pricing can be substituted by profit shifting via interest payments and vice versa. 
To account for this interdependency, the regression in column II is augmented by an indicator 
for interest deduction limitation rules. These rules target the potentially substitutive shifting 
channel (intragroup debt). Column III of Table 27 demonstrates the results of this estimation 
based on Equation (19). t includes the CIT rate, strictness indicators for transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules, and interest deduction limitation restrictions as the main independent variables 
of interest. In addition, it also includes pairwise interactions and an interaction term between 
all three variables of interest. The triple interaction considers that the effect of transfer pricing 
documentation rules on the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT depends on the strictness of interest 
deduction limitation rules in the same country. 
In the presence of the triple interaction, the two-way interaction between the transfer pricing 
strictness measure and CIT reflects the case where only a formal transfer pricing documentation 
rule but no interest deduction limitation rule exists. The coefficient of the two-way interaction 
is highly significant, and its magnitude is substantially higher than in column II. The average 
marginal effects that measure the tax rate sensitivity at different levels of the transfer pricing 
strictness indicator for the case that no interest deduction limitation rule applies yield positive 
and statistically significant coefficients, starting from the first year after the introduction of 
transfer pricing regulations (see Figure 9). This suggests that, in the absence of interest deduc-
tion limitation rules, transfer pricing documentation regulations completely eliminate profit 
shifting via transfer pricing manipulation. Whether companies substitute transfer pricing ma-
nipulation with shifting via the debt channel depends on the effect of the interaction term on 
interest paid. Due to poor data availability, this is not investigated directly in this study. 
 
 
                                                          
251 See Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
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Table 27: Main regression results for Log EBIT as a dependent variable 
Dependent variable: Log EBIT 
 All All All IP Non-IP 
CIT -0.430*** -0.351*** -0.013 -0.507** 0.563* 
 (0.102) (0.107) (0.194) (0.252) (0.308) 
TP  0.020*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT x TP  0.103*** 0.517*** 0.564*** 0.442*** 
  (0.024) (0.079) (0.104) (0.123) 
TC   0.027*** 0.004 0.052*** 
   (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
CIT x TC   -0.358*** -0.065 -0.702*** 
   (0.109) (0.142) (0.171) 
TP x TC   -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.027*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT x TP x TC   -0.228*** -0.266*** -0.170** 
   (0.044) (0.057) (0.070) 
Log Fixed assets 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.074*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log Costs of employees 0.394*** 0.395*** 0.393*** 0.399*** 0.385*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment rate -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.020 0.000 -0.002 -0.010 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.029) 
GDP growth rate 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log GDP 0.174 0.432** -0.109 0.102 -0.341 
 (0.183) (0.189) (0.207) (0.273) (0.320) 
Log GDP/capita -0.055 -0.268 0.349* 0.141 0.574* 
 (0.167) (0.174) (0.195) (0.259) (0.296) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 103,714 103,714 103,714 60,732 42,981 
# Observations 541,323 541,323 541,323 325,494 215,827 
R-squared (within) 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.092 0.082 
Notes:  
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Units of observation are firms. Dependent variable is Log EBIT, which denotes the natural logarithm of a firm’s 
earnings before interest and tax. TP measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC captures the strict-
ness of interest deduction limitation rules. Log Fixed assets and Log Costs of employees are firm-level controls 
and represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and the costs of employees, respectively. Unemploy-
ment rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Corruption represents a corruption index. GDP growth rate 
is a country’s rate of GDP growth. Log GDP denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. 
Log GDP/capita stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP 
represents a sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in Section 4.2.3.4.1 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other 
companies. 
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Figure 9: Average marginal effects of CIT – full sample 
The interaction term between the CIT rate and the indicator for interest deduction limitation 
strictness in column III of Table 27 reflects the case where only interest deduction limitation 
rules exist while transfer pricing documentation rules do not apply. It is negative and statisti-
cally significant. It demonstrates that in the absence of strict transfer pricing documentation 
rules, strict interest deduction limitation rules increase the negative tax sensitivity of EBIT by 
an average of -0.37 percentage points with each increase in the three-stage interest deduction 
limitation strictness indicator. This yields a statistically significant tax rate sensitivity of EBIT 
of -0.73 in countries with very strict interest deduction limitation rules (strictness indicator=2) 
but no transfer pricing documentation requirement. Since EBIT is not directly influenced by 
interest payments, this relationship is an indicator for the existence of a substitutive relationship 
between the two profit-shifting channels. 
The triple interaction of the CIT rate with the transfer pricing strictness indicator and the interest 
deduction limitation strictness indicator is also negative and highly significant. This suggests 
that the level of interest deduction limitation rules moderates the effect of strict transfer pricing 
regulations on the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT. The negative coefficient indicates that transfer 
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pricing documentation rules are less effective in reducing transfer pricing manipulation if there 
are strict thin capitalization rules in the same country. For example, three years after the intro-
duction of formal transfer pricing documentation rules, the average marginal effect yields a tax 
rate sensitivity of -0.54 in the case of strict interest deduction limitation rules (strictness indi-
cator = 2), while it yields one of 1.53 in the case of no thin capitalization or earnings stripping 
rules (strictness indicator = 0). The average marginal effects show that the tax rate sensitivity 
is negative irrespective of the level of transfer pricing strictness if interest deduction limitation 
rules are strict. Furthermore, it is statistically significant up to 6 years after the introduction of 
transfer pricing documentation rules (see Figure 9). Comparing these results to the findings of 
Beer and Loeprick252 and the findings in column II of Table 27 suggests that prior studies may 
have overestimated the effectiveness of transfer pricing documentation rules because of ignor-
ing the potential for substitution between the profit-shifting channels. 
In column III of Table 27, the coefficient of the tax rate on EBIT when neither strict interest 
deduction limitation rules nor transfer pricing regulations exist is not statistically significant. A 
reason for this may be that, in the absence of anti-avoidance regulations, not all companies shift 
profits using transfer pricing manipulation. Some firms will mainly rely on shifting via in-
tragroup debt, especially if costs from side effects of transfer pricing manipulation are higher 
than those of shifting via intragroup debt. This is likely to be the case for multinational groups 
without valuable intangible assets or other intragroup transactions for which transfer prices can 
easily be manipulated. 
According to Hypothesis 1, companies belonging to groups with a high intangible intensity 
mainly shift via transfer pricing manipulation, while others engage in shifting via intragroup 
debt, if none of the profit-shifting channels is restricted by anti-avoidance rules. To test this 
hypothesis and to account for the fact that firms differ in their potential to substitute between 
the two profit-shifting channels, the sample is split into companies belonging to groups with an 
intangible intensity above and below the median. The intangible intensity of the group is used 
instead of the intangible intensity of the firm because the opportunity to shift profit via royalty 
payments does not depend on the company’s own level of intangible intensity but on the exis-
tence of valuable intangible assets at the level of any of the group’s other affiliates. Intangible 
intensity is defined as the median ratio of intangible assets to total fixed assets in the group 
across all years. Since certain countries, such as Germany, do not require or allow the capitali-
zation of self-created intangible assets, all companies active in R&D-intensive industries are by 
                                                          
252 See Beer/Loeprick (2015). 
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default assigned to the subsample of companies with a high intangible intensity. R&D-intensive 
industries are defined based on the Stifterverband report253 on the aggregate internal firm R&D 
investments per industry in 2008 in Germany. All industries that featured aggregate internal 
firm R&D investment of at least €1 billion in 2008 are classified as R&D-intensive.  
This includes the following sectors: 
- Manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products; 
- Manufacturing of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations; 
- Manufacturing of computer, electronic, and optical products; 
- Manufacturing of electrical equipment; 
- Manufacturing of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified; 
- Manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; 
- Manufacturing of air and spacecraft and related machinery; 
- Information and communication; 
- Scientific research and development. 
In a robustness check, alternative definitions of intangible intensity are also tested. 
The regression results in columns IV and V of Table 27 confirm Hypothesis 1, especially in 
that particular companies belonging to a group with a high intangible intensity shift profits via 
transfer pricing manipulation in the absence of any anti-avoidance regulations. For this sub-
group, the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT is statistically significant, with a coefficient of -0.51. In 
contrast, for companies with a low intangible intensity, an increase in the tax rate even has a 
weakly significant positive effect on EBIT. A reason for this may be that, despite the absence 
of strict channel-specific anti-avoidance rules, countries usually apply the arm’s length princi-
ple. Thus, companies that mainly rely on shifting via intragroup debt have an incentive to in-
crease EBIT because, in an arm’s length comparison, higher levels of EBIT may justify higher 
levels of debt. However, this is only reasonable if the increase in EBIT is lower than that in the 
respective interest payments. 
Most companies with a low intangible intensity do not seem to engage in transfer pricing ma-
nipulation in the absence of strict anti-avoidance measures for both profit-shifting channels. 
However, the highly significant negative coefficient of the interaction between the interest de-
duction limitation strictness indicator and the CIT rate in column V of Table 27 indicates that 
                                                          
253 See Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2013). 
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these companies do engage in profit shifting via transfer pricing manipulation if strict interest 
deduction limitation rules exist. On average, with each increase in the strictness indicator of 
interest deduction limitation rules, a company reduces the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT by -0.70. 
In the case of very strict interest deduction limitation rules (a strictness indicator of 2) and the 
absence of strict transfer pricing regulations, this implies that a one percentage point increase 
in the tax rate reduces EBIT by -0.84%. The same interaction term is not significant for com-
panies with a high group intangible intensity. This is plausible if Hypothesis 1 holds true, mean-
ing that most of these companies do not extensively shift via the intragroup debt channel in the 
absence of strict transfer pricing documentation rules and are thus less affected by the introduc-
tion or tightening of an interest deduction limitation rule. Nevertheless, the average marginal 
effect of CIT on EBIT (see Figure 10) is -0.63 and statistically significant if interest deduction 
limitation rules are very strict. Meanwhile, it is only -0.50 if interest deduction limitation rules 
are not strict. This shows that some substitution from debt shifting to shifting via transfer pric-
ing regulations is also observable in companies with a high intangible intensity, if only strict 
interest deduction limitation rules but not transfer pricing regulations exist. 
The interaction of the transfer pricing strictness indicator and the CIT rate is positive and sig-
nificant for both subsamples (columns 4 and 5). The average marginal effects suggest that an 
increase in the tax rate does not trigger profit shifting via transfer pricing manipulation for 
companies in both subsamples if only transfer pricing documentation rules (and no interest de-
duction limitation rules) are present (see Figure 10 and Figure 11). The results do not provide 
direct evidence that these companies substitute transfer pricing manipulation with debt shifting. 
However, the coefficient of the triple interaction in columns IV and V indirectly supports this 
assumption. The triple interaction is negative and significant for both subsamples. For IP-in-
tensive firms, examining the average marginal effect at seven years after the introduction of 
transfer pricing documentation rules demonstrates that a one percentage point increase in the 
tax rate reduces the EBIT by -0.41% if strict interest deduction limitation rules exist. Mean-
while, it increases the EBIT by 3.40% if no interest deduction limitation rules exist. The nega-
tive tax rate sensitivity with strict interest deduction limitation rules is statistically significant 
for all levels up to seven years after the introduction of transfer pricing documentation rules 
(see Figure 10). For companies with a low group intangible intensity, the negative tax rate sen-
sitivity is only significant in the first four years after the introduction of transfer pricing docu-
mentation rules if strict interest deduction limitation rules exist (see Figure 11). The size of the 
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coefficient and its statistical significance declines with each additional year of the existence of 
these rules.  
Figure 10: Average marginal effects of CIT – IP firms 
These findings suggest that strict transfer pricing regulations are less effective in reducing trans-
fer pricing manipulation if interest deduction limitation rules are also strict. This again points 
to a substitutive relationship between the two profit-shifting channels. While transfer pricing 
documentation rules increase the cost of shifting via the transfer pricing channel and induce a 
move towards the debt channel, they still leave considerable leeway for transfer pricing manip-
ulation in case the debt channel is restricted. However, this leeway reduces with each year that 
transfer pricing documentation rules have been in place, which suggests that the increased ex-
perience of the tax authorities clearly enhances the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations 
in tackling transfer pricing manipulation. This effect is particularly true with respect to transfer 
pricing manipulation of companies with a low group intangible intensity. 
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Figure 11: Average marginal effects of CIT – non-IP firms 
Based on the results in columns III-V of Table 27, it can be concluded that, in the absence of 
anti-avoidance regulations for both channels, companies with a high group intangible intensity 
seem to shift profits mainly via transfer pricing. Consequently, the existence of interest deduc-
tion limitation rules does not substantially affect the shifting behaviour of these companies as 
long as no strict transfer pricing regulations exist. Strict transfer pricing regulations, on the 
other hand, increase the marginal costs of shifting via transfer pricing manipulation. This, in 
line with Hypothesis 3, leads to less profit shifting via transfer pricing manipulation in high-tax 
countries. However, if shifting via both channels is restricted by strict anti-avoidance regula-
tions, transfer pricing rules seem to be far less effective in reducing profit shifting via transfer 
pricing manipulation. This confirms Hypothesis 4. 
On the other hand, companies with a low group intangible intensity do not exhibit a negative 
tax rate sensitivity of EBIT in the absence of anti-avoidance regulations for both channels. This 
suggests that these companies either do not shift profits at all or mainly shift via interest pay-
ments. An indicator for the latter is that, if a strict interest deduction limitation rule but no 
transfer pricing documentation rule applies, companies with a low intangible intensity exhibit 
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a significant negative tax rate sensitivity of EBIT. This indicates that they substitute shifting 
via debt with shifting via transfer pricing. Moreover, if both anti-avoidance regulations are 
strict, these companies are still able to shift profits via transfer pricing manipulation; however, 
they cannot do this to the same extent as companies with a high intangible intensity. If transfer 
pricing documentation regulations have been present for several years, the leeway for transfer 
pricing manipulation clearly declines, especially for affiliates of a group with a low intangible 
intensity. 
4.2.3.4.2 Robustness checks 
To reassess the findings, several robustness checks are conducted. Firstly, the transfer pricing 
and thin capitalization strictness indictors are replaced by other measures used in previous stud-
ies. The results are provided in Table 42 in the Appendix. Following Buettner et al.254, a non-
linear transformation of the D/E ratio is used as an alternative strictness indicator of thin capi-
talization rules (columns I and II of Table 42). If no thin capitalization rules exist, the indicator 
is 0. In countries that apply an earnings stripping ratio, this indicator is set to missing. A detailed 
explanation of the variable is given in Chapter 4.2.3.2.2. With respect to the transfer pricing 
strictness indicator, a binary variable also applied by Lohse and Riedel is considered,255 which 
equals 1 if formal transfer pricing documentation rules exist and 0 otherwise (columns III and 
IV of Table 42). Moreover, informal transfer pricing documentation rules are also incorporated 
into the study, using a variable that is set to 1 in all countries with an informal transfer pricing 
documentation requirement. This measure is combined with the main variable for transfer pric-
ing strictness used in the baseline results to account for the effect of time. Consequently, this 
variable increases by 1 for each year after the introduction of formal transfer pricing documen-
tation rules (columns V and VI of Table 42). 
Using the D/E ratio as the thin capitalization strictness indicator, the results of Equation (19) 
are comparable to the main results with respect to their significance and direction of the coef-
ficients. One main difference is that, although the interaction between the thin capitalization 
strictness indicator and the CIT rate in column II of Table 42 is still negative for companies 
with a low intangible intensity, it is no longer significant. The significant negative triple inter-
action suggests that companies mainly substitute towards the transfer pricing channel if both 
thin capitalization rules and strict transfer pricing documentation regulations are in place. While 
                                                          
254 See Buettner et al. (2012). 
255 See Lohse/Riedel (2013). 
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the interest deduction limitation strictness indicator underlying the baseline results considers 
both thin capitalization rules and earnings stripping rules, the variable based on the D/E ratio 
excludes countries with an earnings stripping rule. Hence, the more significant and substantial 
coefficient of the two-way interaction between the thin capitalization strictness indicator and 
the CIT rate in column V of Table 27 may be driven by countries with an earnings stripping 
rule. This suggests that these rules are particularly effective in reducing profit shifting via in-
terest payments.  
If the alternative transfer pricing variable introduced by Lohse and Riedel is used,256 most of 
the baseline results are again confirmed. The main difference is that, when using this measure, 
the tax rate sensitivity of companies with a high intangible intensity is negative but no longer 
significant in the absence of anti-avoidance regulations. These results, however, must be treated 
with caution, as this binary variable exhibits considerably less variation in the sample than the 
transfer pricing strictness indicator used in the main analysis. 
The transfer pricing variable that considers both informal transfer pricing documentation rules 
and the effect of time on the strictness of transfer pricing regulations (columns V and VI of 
Table 42) shows no substantial differences with respect to the significance of the coefficients. 
The magnitude of the coefficients, however, differs slightly, and the results suggest an even 
lower effectiveness of transfer pricing documentation rules in the absence of interest deduction 
limitation rules. 
In addition to alternative definitions of the anti-avoidance strictness indicators, alternative def-
initions of intangible intensity are tested. Table 43 in the Appendix shows the results of this. In 
the first variation (columns I and II), the sample is split by taking account of the level of intan-
gible assets to total assets of the group only. Under this definition, companies active in R&D 
intensive industries are, differently to the main regression results, not automatically assumed to 
be intangible intensive. In the second alternative (columns III and IV), intangible intensity is 
defined based on the level of intangible assets held by an affiliate, rather than the ratio of intan-
gible assets to total assets. In a third alternative (columns V and VI), the ratio of intangible 
assets to total fixed assets instead of total assets is used as a proxy for intangible intensity. In 
this specification, companies active in R&D intensive industries are again by default included 
in the sample of companies belonging to groups with a high intangible intensity. The alterations 
                                                          
256 See Lohse/Riedel (2013). 
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in the definition of intangible intensity yield very similar results and confirm the baseline results 
presented in Chapter 4.2.3.4.1. 
In a third robustness check, ultimate owners are re-added to the sample. The results are depicted 
in Table 44 in the Appendix. The findings for this sample also closely resemble the baseline 
findings. However, the magnitude of the tax sensitivity of EBIT in the absence of anti-avoid-
ance regulations, as well as the magnitude of the tax sensitivity when both anti-avoidance reg-
ulations are strict, are somewhat smaller than the baseline results. This confirms prior findings 
that headquarter firms are less prone to profit shifting behaviour. 
4.2.3.5 Results II: Quasi-experimental evidence from a thin capitalization reform in 
France 
4.2.3.5.1 Main analysis 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4.2.3.4 suggests that multinationals are to some 
extent able to substitute proﬁt shifting strategies. To further validate these findings, a reform 
setting in France is studied using a difference-in-difference approach, as described in Chapter 
4.2.3.3.2. 
Figure 12 illustrates that the average EBIT of treatment and control groups (as defined in Chap-
ter 4.2.3.3.2) followed a parallel trend in the three years prior to the reform. Meanwhile, in the 
post-reform years, it declined more strongly for treated firms than untreated ones. Thus, the 
parallel trend assumption required for a difference-in-difference setting can be confirmed for 
both the total sample and the subsample of IP firms.  
Figure 12: Common trend of EBIT in treatment and control group 
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Table 28 summarizes the results of the difference-in-difference estimation, as defined in Equa-
tion (20). Column I presents the regression results, considering both industry-year and firm 
fixed effects but not controlling for firm-specific time-variant variables. The coefficient on the 
difference-in-difference estimator is negative and significant at the 1% level, with a magnitude 
of -0.37. It remains negative and significant if fixed assets and employee compensation are 
added to the regression (see column II). This finding confirms that firms react to an introduction 
or tightening of thin capitalization rules by reducing their EBIT. This again suggests that some 
firms substitute debt shifting with transfer pricing manipulation if the debt shifting channel 
becomes more restricted. 
Table 28: Main results of difference-in-difference estimation 
Dependent variable: Log EBIT 
 All All IP Non-IP All 
After 1.525 -0.868** -0.273*** -1.216** -0.891** 
 (0.966) (0.410) (0.053) (0.523) (0.405) 
Treat x After -0.367*** -0.314** -0.573*** -0.097 -0.066 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.157) (0.164) (0.166) 
After x IP high     0.056 
     (0.046) 
Treat x After x IP high     -0.497** 
     (0.227) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 938 938 506 432 938 
# Observations 5,628 5,628 3,036 2,592 5,628 
R-squared (within) 0.072 0.124 0.165 0.104 0.125 
Notes:  
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log EBIT, which denotes a natural logarithm of a firm’s 
earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 and 2006 and takes on 
the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. Treat is a binary variable that is equal to one 
for all firms that are assigned to the treatment group and is equal to zero for all companies assigned to the control 
group. Controls include Log Fixed Assets and Log Costs of employees, which represent natural logarithms of a 
company’s fixed assets and the employee costs, respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample 
of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 4.2.3.4.1 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
In order to reflect the idea that treatment ﬁrms differ in their ability to manage intragroup prices 
upward or downward (i.e. in switching from debt shifting to trade mispricing), the sample is 
split into ﬁrms with a high and a low intangible intensity. For this purpose, the same proxy for 
intangible intensity is used as in the previous estimation approach, which is explained in detail 
in Chapter 4.2.3.4.1. This means that all companies belonging to a group with an above-median 
ratio of intangible assets to total assets, as well as all companies active in industries with a high 
level of R&D investment, are classified as intangible intensive. 
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While France did not have formal transfer pricing documentation rules in the sample period of 
2004-2009, it nevertheless had transfer pricing regulations in place that were rather strictly en-
forced. This suggests that, for companies not affected by thin capitalization rules before 2007, 
shifting high levels of profits via the debt channel might have been cheaper than excessively 
using transfer pricing manipulation. Consequently, the model suggests that companies with 
both a high and a low intangible intensity in the treatment group had incentives to make use of 
debt shifting prior to the reform. This is also implicitly confirmed by including only companies 
with high levels of interest paid in the treatment group. Thus, restricting the level of allowed 
debt shifting through the introduction of thin capitalization rules should have affected firms in 
the treatment group irrespective of their level of intangible intensity. However, the potential for 
moving towards the other channel is likely to be more pronounced for companies with a high 
intangible intensity, which suggests that these companies are able to substitute more debt shift-
ing with shifting via transfer pricing. Moreover, as the new thin capitalization rules introduced 
in France in 2007 only applied to intragroup payments, companies with a low intangible inten-
sity might have compensated for the lack of opportunities to substitute internal debt shifting 
with transfer pricing manipulation by making greater use of external debt. 
In fact, the results shown in columns III and IV of Table 28 indicate a highly significant negative 
coefficient of the difference-in-difference estimator for intangible-intensive companies, as well 
as an insignificant coefficient for companies with a low intangible intensity. The magnitude of 
the coefficient for intangible-intensive companies is -0.57, which is notably higher than the 
coefficient for the full sample. To further validate this, instead of splitting the sample, a triple 
difference-in-difference estimation that also includes an indicator variable for intangible inten-
sity is used. The triple difference estimator is highly significant at the 5% level and negative. 
The joint coefficient is statistically significant, with an F-Value of 6.41. These findings support 
the assertion of Hypothesis 4 that companies with a high intangible intensity have more leeway 
in substituting debt shifting with transfer pricing manipulation. 
4.2.3.5.2 Robustness checks 
The findings are further tested by using alternative definitions of the treatment group. The re-
sults are depicted in Table 29.  
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Table 29: Difference-in-difference estimation: Robustness tests using alternative definitions 
of treatment and control groups and a placebo test 
Dependent variable: Log EBIT 
 All All All All 
After -0.866** -0.868** 0.060  
 (0.409) (0.410) (0.132)  
Treat2 x After -0.104*    
 (0.057)    
Treat3 x After   -0.308**   
  (0.120)   
Treat4 x After   -0.315**  
   (0.135)  
After(Placebo)    -0.184 
    (0.574) 
Treat x After(Placebo)    -0.082 
    (0.133) 
Log Fixed Assets 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.029 0.080** 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.036) (0.034) 
Log Costs of Employees 0.457*** 0.464*** 0.404*** 0.596*** 
 (0.088) (0.097) (0.107) (0.100) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 1,040 938 204 938 
# Observations 6,240 5,628 1,224 3,752 
R-squared (within) 0.115 0.124 0.115 0.158 
Notes:  
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural logarithm of a firm’s 
earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 and 2006 and takes on 
the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. After(Placebo) is equal to zero for 2004 and 
2005 and takes on the value of one for 2006 and 2007. Treat is a binary variable that is equal to one for all firms 
that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies assigned to the control group. Controls 
include Log Fixed assets and Log Costs of employees, which represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed 
assets and employee costs, respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. 
In column I of Table 29, the treatment group comprises only companies with a tax incentive 
and a parent firm in an EU member state or one of the other countries exempted from the ap-
plication of thin capitalization rules before 2007. In this definition of the treatment group, the 
additional requirement of interest payments above €150,000 (used in the main analysis) is ig-
nored. In a second alternative (see column II of Table 29), the mean instead of the median 
interest payments in the three years prior to the reform are taken as a proxy to define whether 
companies fulfil the requirement of interest payments above the exempt amount. Moreover, 
instead of referring to the tax incentive as a precondition to be assigned to the treatment group, 
all companies that have a parent in an EU member state or exempted treaty state and that have 
interest greater than €150,000 are assigned to the treatment group. In addition, the difference-
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in-difference estimation is conducted for the subsample of all companies with a tax incentive 
(see column III of Table 29). The three alternative definitions of the treatment group and the 
sample yield highly significant negative coefficients for the difference-in-difference estimator 
on EBIT. Moreover, a placebo test is conducted. This placebo test assumes that the reform in 
France took place in 2006, one year prior to the actual reform. Based on this assumption, the 
difference-in-difference model is re-estimated for the years 2004-2007. This yields a statisti-
cally insignificant coefficient of the difference-in-difference estimator, which further supports 
the validity of the main findings. 
Table 30: Robustness tests using different definitions for intangible intensity 
Dependent variable: Log EBIT 
 IP= intangible assets/total as-
sets of group above median of 
all groups 
IP= intangible assets of group 
above median of all groups 
 IP Non-IP IP Non-IP 
After 0.838*** 0.108*** 0.831*** 0.110** 
 (0.253) (0.040) (0.247) (0.046) 
Treat x After -0.563*** -0.126 -0.529*** -0.039 
 (0.170) (0.181) (0.177) (0.145) 
Log Fixed Assets 0.051 0.077** 0.048 0.075* 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.039) (0.042) 
Log Costs of Employees 0.704*** 0.422*** 0.710*** 0.406*** 
 (0.094) (0.110) (0.090) (0.112) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 427 385 434 378 
# Observations 2,562 2,310 2,604 2,268 
R-squared (within) 0.192 0.118 0.197 0.122 
Notes:  
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log(EBIT), which denotes a natural logarithm of a firm’s 
earnings before interest and taxes. After is equal to zero for pre-reform years between 2004 and 2006 and takes on 
the value of one for the post-reform period between 2007 and 2009. After(Placebo) is equal to zero for 2004 and 
2005 and takes on the value of one for 2006 and 2007. Treat is a binary variable that is equal to one for all firms 
that are assigned to the treatment group and is set to zero for all companies assigned to the control group. Controls 
include Log Fixed assets and Log Costs of employees, which represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed 
assets and employee costs, respectively. FE stands for fixed effects. 
In addition, in line with the analysis presented in Chapter 4.2.3.4, alternative definitions of IP 
intensity are tested. In columns I and II of Table 30, IP is defined based on the ratio of intangible 
assets to total assets only, without considering companies active in R&D-intensive industries. 
In columns III and IV of Table 30, the ratio of intangible assets to total fixed assets is used as a 
proxy for companies that belong to intangible-intensive groups. In addition, all companies ac-
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tive in R&D-intensive industries are classified as intangible intensive. Both alternative defini-
tions yield highly significant negative coefficients of the difference-in-difference estimator, 
confirming that the results are robust. 
In summary, the quasi-experimental setting verifies that a substitution from intragroup debt 
shifting towards transfer pricing manipulation takes place. Especially intangible-intensive ﬁrms 
react to a strengthening of thin capitalization rules by understating EBIT, possibly through in-
creased trade mispricing. 
4.2.4 Summary 
Chapter 4.2.1 illustrates that the most prevalent anti-avoidance regulations that extend the tax-
ation of interest and royalties at source are different kinds of interest deduction limitation rules 
and transfer pricing regulations. Furthermore, the OECD and the European Commission rec-
ommend the implementation of such regulations. Existing empirical evidence suggests that 
transfer pricing regulations and interest deduction limitation rules are rather effective in reduc-
ing BEPS. 
This dissertation presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the interdependency between 
the two main proﬁt shifting channels: the strategic use of transfer pricing and internal debt. It 
particularly studies the interdependency of anti-avoidance measures targeting these channels. 
While most prior studies have studied the effectiveness of anti-avoidance measures without 
considering the existence of anti-avoidance measures targeting other channels, this study con-
siders that there may be substitution between the profit-shifting channels. 
The empirical analysis is based on two identification strategies. Firstly, a panel data analysis is 
performed using firm-level data on 103,714 European companies over the period of 2004-2012. 
Secondly, data on 1,040 French firms is employed to estimate the outcomes of the 2007 tax 
reform in France, which strengthened thin capitalization rules for one group of firms and left 
them unchanged for another.  
In line with previous literature, the study ﬁnds a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact of 
the CIT rate on a firm’s reported proﬁts. In addition, the results suggest that transfer pricing 
documentation rules in a high-tax country reduce the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT. Taking into 
account that ﬁrms might be able to choose between transfer pricing shifting and debt shifting 
and that anti-avoidance regulations might interact with each other, a triple interaction of the tax 
rate and both the strictness of transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules are considered. It 
shows that the positive effect of transfer pricing rules on the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT is 
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reduced if a country applies both strict interest deduction limitation regulations and strict trans-
fer pricing rules. Hence, if the debt shifting channel is restricted by strict interest deduction 
limitation rules, transfer pricing rules are less effective in reducing profit shifting via transfer 
pricing than when debt shifting is not restricted. This suggests that the positive effect of transfer 
pricing on the tax rate sensitivity of EBIT found by previous studies may partly be attributable 
to a move from transfer pricing manipulation towards debt shifting. Moreover, the study indi-
cates that IP firms shift more via transfer pricing manipulation in the absence of anti-avoidance 
regulations and have greater potential to continue shifting via this channel even if transfer pric-
ing documentation rules have been in place for several years. 
A difference-in-difference analysis of a French thin capitalization reform in 2007 confirms that 
some firms substitute debt shifting with transfer pricing shifting if the former channel becomes 
restricted. It shows that companies affected by the new but not the old French thin capitalization 
rules decreased their EBIT following the reform, while other firms did not. This provides evi-
dence that interest deduction limitation rules do not necessarily reduce total profit shifting but 
may to a certain extent only change the relative use of the two profit-shifting channels. In ad-
dition, the difference-in-difference estimation confirms that IP firms have greater leeway in 
shifting via transfer pricing manipulation. 
Regarding policy recommendations that can be drawn from this study, the results show that 
ignoring the interdependency of profit-shifting channels might provide biased conclusions on 
the effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations or thin capitalization rules. Policy-makers 
should be aware that transfer pricing documentation rules seem to be rather ineffective in re-
ducing profit shifting via transfer pricing manipulations. This is particularly the case in the first 
years after the introduction of such rules and with regard to transfer pricing manipulation related 
to IP. Firms are likely to still have some capacity for profit shifting despite the existence of both 
transfer pricing regulations and interest deduction limitation rules. 
4.3 Reform options for extending the taxation of interest and royalties at source 
Chapter 4.2 demonstrated that prevalent measures for extending taxation of interest and royal-
ties at source have certain drawbacks. In particular, evidence has been provided that, despite 
the existence of strict transfer pricing and interest deduction limitation rules, companies still 
have substantial leeway to engage in profit shifting, especially via the transfer pricing channel. 
In addition, interest deduction regulations may result in double taxation.  
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This chapter257 presents and discusses four alternative methods to increase taxation of interest 
and royalties in the residence country of the payer. These are all based on the internationally 
accepted principle of avoiding double taxation. The four options are as follows: bilateral interest 
and royalty deduction limitations, an inverted tax credit, WHTs on all interest and royalty pay-
ments, and WHTs as an anti-avoidance regulation. None of these regulations are currently con-
sidered by either the OECD or the European Commission.  
Figure 13: Comparison of the reform options 
 
The options differ in the extent to which they limit profit shifting. Which measure is preferable 
depends on what specific objective countries want to achieve by strengthening taxation of in-
terest and royalties at source: Is the purpose to generally change the allocation of taxing rights 
                                                          
257 This chapter is a slightly modified extract of Finke et al. (2014). 
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and extend taxing rights of source countries? Or do countries try to guarantee a certain mini-
mum tax level for profits of multinationals? Should this minimum level be determined by the 
tax level in the source country? The differences between the intended objectives result in the 
reform options having different effects on tax revenue. Moreover, the reforms are likely to have 
different effects on real investment and differ in the required level of cooperation between 
countries. 
In Chapter 4.3.1, the reform options are presented and their scope, their general tax revenue 
consequences, their impact on real investment, and the required level of cooperation are ana-
lysed. Figure 13 summarizes the findings. In Chapter 4.3.2, an overview of cross-border royalty 
and license fee flows is provided. Based on this information, rough estimates of the value of 
tax revenue losses and gains arising from two of the reform options in selected countries are 
calculated. Chapter 4.3.3 summarizes the main findings. 
4.3.1 Description and analysis of the reform options 
4.3.1.1 Bilaterally limiting interest and royalty deductibility 
Many OECD countries extend interest taxation at source through unilateral thin capitalization 
or earnings stripping rules. These rules forbid the deduction of interest payments from the tax 
base in cases where a company exceeds a given threshold.258 In principle, similar rules could 
be introduced for royalty payments. However, to avoid double taxation, the residence country 
should reclassify the non-deductible payments as dividends. These dividends would then have 
to be either exempt from tax in the residence country or qualify for a credit of the underlying 
source tax.259 This reform option requires multilateral cooperation, and countries would have 
to adapt both their national tax law and bilateral tax treaties accordingly. 
Bilaterally limiting the deductibility of interest and royalty income based on a fixed ratio (e.g. 
interest/EBIT and royalty/EBIT) is designed to secure the source country’s tax base in the case 
of high levels of debt financing and licensing. This measure only limits profit shifting above a 
defined acceptable level and basically constitutes an anti-avoidance measure. Part of the taxing 
rights would be reallocated from the residence to the source country and the source country 
would gain while the residence country would lose some tax revenue. 
                                                          
258 See Chapter 4.2.1. 
259 Expenses related to royalty or interest income should nevertheless be deductible. 
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An important side effect of this reform option is that source tax becomes definite for the non-
deductible part of the interest or royalty payment. Therefore, the nominal tax rate in the source 
country becomes more relevant for investment decisions. In high-tax countries, the tax burden 
on investments made by affected companies would increase. This constitutes a desired effect 
of anti-tax-avoidance measures but also raises the CoC on investments in that country and may 
thus have a negative effect on the level of firm investment. 
4.3.1.2 Replacing the deductibility of payments by an inverted tax credit 
Another possible method to ensure an effective taxation of cross-border interest and royalty 
payments has been proposed by Lodin.260 According to his suggestion, the deduction of interest 
and royalty payments should be denied, and an inverted tax credit should instead be granted. 
The amount of this inverted tax credit should depend on whether the lender or licenser is a 
related or a third party. If the interest or royalties were paid to an external lender or licenser 
(foreign or domestic), the inverted tax credit would be based on the source country’s corporate 
tax rate. If the lender or licenser was an associated or group company or if the loan was guar-
anteed for by a related party, the inverted tax credit would be based on the tax rate applied to 
the income at the level of the receiving company. However, the tax credit rate would be limited 
to the domestic income tax rate. In the case of losses, the inverted tax credit could be carried 
forward.  
Table 31: Tax burden effect of the proposed inverted tax credit 
Nominal CIT rate in residence country 10% 40% 
Profits before interest/royalty payment 100 100 
Interest/royalty payment 100 100 
Taxable income 100 100 
Tax on profits in source country (30%) 30 30 
Tax credit based on interest/license cost 10 30 
Final tax liability in source country 20 0 
Interest/royalty income in residence country 100 100 
Final tax liability in residence country 10 40 
Total taxes 30 40 
Table 31 illustrates the tax burden effects of this proposal. The example assumes profits of 100 
and interest or royalty payments of 100 that are paid to a group company resident in either a 
                                                          
260 For the proposal for interest payments, see Lodin (2011); for the proposal for royalty payments, see Lodin 
(2013). 
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low-tax country (corporate tax rate of 10%) or a high-tax country (corporate tax rate of 40%). 
The tax rate in the source country is 30%. 
The calculations in Table 31 show that, under the proposed inverted tax credit system, in-
tragroup interest and royalty payments are always at least subject to the source country’s CIT 
rate but double taxation of the income is avoided. If the recipient is a third party, a domestic 
group company, or a group company that is resident in a country with the same or a higher tax 
rate than that of the source country, the tax treatment of the interest or royalty in the source 
country will equal the tax treatment under the current system, where interest and royalty pay-
ments are tax deductible. The tax treatment differs from the current system if interest and roy-
alties are paid to a group company that is resident in a low-tax country. In this case, the overall 
tax burden of the multinational group increases compared to the current situation.261 
Under Lodin’s proposal, expenses related to the interest or royalty income are generally de-
ductible in the residence country of the recipient. However, taxation of the net interest or royalty 
income is only ensured in cases of payments to countries with the same or a higher tax rate. If 
the recipient company was resident in a low-tax country and had deductible expenses, the net 
principle would be violated. To solve this problem, expenses related to the income at the level 
of the recipient need to be deducted from the taxable income in both the source country and the 
residence country. Furthermore, these expenses need to simultaneously be considered when 
determining the level of the inverted tax credit (Alternative 1). A drawback of this option is the 
difficulty of accurately allocating expenses to certain income, meaning that the administrative 
effort is likely to be high. As an easier option, the total expenses could be considered in the 
residence country only, and potential excess taxes levied in the source country could be re-
funded (Alternative 2).  
Table 32 illustrates the tax burden effects of the inverted tax credit, accounting for expenses 
related to the interest or royalty income in the residence country. The example in Table 31 was 
adjusted by assuming additional expenses of 50 in the residence country. Columns 1 and 4 of 
Table 32 refer to the taxation under Lodin’s proposal; columns 2 and 3 depict the two alternative 
approaches mentioned above. 
It becomes clear that, if the interest or royalty payment is made to a low-tax country, the total 
tax burden under Lodin’s proposal will be higher than if either the source or the residence coun-
try’s income tax rate applied to the net profit of 50. Under Alternatives 1 and 2, such excess 
                                                          
261 See also Lodin (2011), p. 178. 
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taxation is avoided and only the net income is taxed with the source country’s income tax rate. 
For payments to countries with a higher tax rate, no adjustment of Lodin’s proposal is necessary 
to ensure the taxation of the net income. In those cases, the net income always remains subject 
to the residence country’s tax rate.  
Table 32: Tax burden effect of the proposed inverted tax credit, alternatives for dealing with 
expenses 
 Lodin Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Lodin 
Nominal CIT rate in residence country 10% 10% 10% 40% 
Profits before interest/ 
royalty payment 
100 100 100 100 
Interest/royalty payment 100 100 100 100 
Expenses related to interest/ 
royalty income 
- 50 - - 
Taxable income 100 50 100 100 
Tax on profits in source country (30%) 30 15 30 30 
Tax credit based on (net) interest/ 
license cost 
10 5 10 30 
Final tax liability in source country 20 10 20 0 
Interest/royalty income in  
residence country 
100 100 100 100 
Total expenses 50 50 50 50 
Taxable income 50 50 50 50 
Tax on profits in residence country 5 5 5 20 
Tax credit - - 10 - 
Final tax liability in residence country 5 5 -5 20 
Total taxes 25 15 15 20 
Unlike the other reform options considered, the inverted tax credit completely removes oppor-
tunities for tax-minimizing intragroup profit shifting via interest and royalties and ensures that 
purely domestic groups are not put at a disadvantage compared to multinational corporations. 
Generally, this reform option additionally ensures a corresponding treatment of intragroup in-
terest and royalty payments at the level of the payer and the recipient.262  
An important difference between Lodin’s proposal and the first reform option (and the follow-
ing option) lies in the taxing authority: the residence country would fully keep its taxing rights 
and would not lose tax revenue, given that the behaviour of firms does not change. However, 
                                                          
262 See Lodin (2011), p. 178. 
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to ensure that only the net income is taxed, residence countries might have to refund excess 
taxes paid in the source country (see Alternative 2 in Table 32). In such cases, the countries 
would consequently lose some tax revenue, implying that some tax revenue would be reallo-
cated from residence countries to source countries. The source country will only derive tax 
revenue from an inverted tax credit on interest and royalty income if the recipient resides in a 
country with a lower tax rate. In this situation, the source country’s tax on either the gross 
payment (Lodin’s proposal) or the net payment (Alternatives 1 and 2) is the minimum tax the 
multinational would have to pay. Conversely, the source country will not collect any tax reve-
nue from applying an inverted tax credit in the case of profit shifting to countries with the same 
or a higher tax rate. The tax revenue effects of an inverted tax credit are discussed further in 
Chapter 4.3.2.2.3. 
An inverted tax credit system is likely to be compatible with EU law and double taxation treaties 
(DTTs),263 and countries could introduce it unilaterally without subjecting multinationals to 
double taxation. Hence, this reform option is comparatively easy to implement. It should be 
noted, however, that introducing an inverted tax credit in one country might prove ineffective 
if other high-tax countries do not apply it. To illustrate this, the example in Table 31 is recon-
sidered, assuming this time that the high-tax country with a tax rate of 40% does not grant an 
inverted tax credit. In this scenario, the multinational corporation may set up a subsidiary in the 
latter country and route the interest or royalty payment through this subsidiary before passing 
it on to the subsidiary in the low-tax country. In this case, a 30% tax credit would be granted in 
the source country, and the interest or royalty income would effectively be taxed at 10%. 
It may be possible to prevent such avoidance schemes by tying the tax credit to the final bene-
ficiary of the interest and royalty payments. However, this requires the identification of the final 
beneficiary. Lodin has argued that this may prove more difficult for interest payments than for 
royalties. Taking this into account, the credit system may only be an effective reform option for 
royalties if applied unilaterally.264 
Upon the application of an inverted tax credit, the taxes in the source country become definite. 
Herein lies a potential drawback of the proposed system, as the result is an increase in the tax 
burden on investments in high-tax countries. Therefore, investment in these countries is likely 
to decrease. In particular, the inverted tax credit should have a stronger negative impact on real 
investment in high-tax countries than the reform option discussed in Chapter 4.3.1.1. This is 
                                                          
263 See Lodin (2011), pp. 178-179. 
264 See Lodin (2013). 
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due to the lack of a safe haven, which makes the entire interest or royalty payment (as opposed 
to only the non-deductible part) subject to definite source taxation. The effect on investment is 
expected to be particularly strong if only a few high-tax countries applied the inverted tax credit. 
Even if all countries applied the same regulation, the investment effect would persist as long as 
tax rates are not harmonized.  
4.3.1.3 Extending the use of WHTs 
An alternative option worthy of discussion is imposing WHTs at the international level. Inter-
estingly, neither the OECD265 nor the European Commission266 consider the introduction of 
WHTs on interest and royalties. 
There are two different options for introducing WHTs to fight profit shifting via intragroup 
interest and royalty payments: (a) generally reintroducing WHTs on all intragroup interest and 
royalty payments and (b) specifically targeting profit shifting to zero- or low-tax countries. The 
following two subchapters describe and discuss these options in detail. 
4.3.1.3.1 A general reintroduction of WHTs 
As a first possible alternative, WHTs could be levied on all interest and royalty payments, irre-
spective of the location of the recipient and the taxation at the level of the receiving company. 
To avoid double taxation, countries would have to ensure that foreign WHTs are credited 
against the tax liability in the residence country and that excess foreign taxes are refunded. 
Therefore, unlike current country practice, the tax credit would not be limited to the amount 
paid on royalty income net of expenses but should always be granted in full, even if the tax 
liability was zero. This would eliminate frequently criticized excess tax credits, which may arise 
if the WHT is levied on the gross payment while taxes in the residence country of the recipient 
are levied on the net payment. It seems clear that such a general reintroduction of WHTs on all 
intragroup interest and royalty payments would require amendments of not only domestic law 
but also of tax treaties. In the case of EU member states, the modification of the EU Interest 
and Royalties Directive267 would also be necessary. 
Reintroducing WHTs on all interest and royalty payments and crediting or refunding these taxes 
in the residence country would considerably restrict the taxing rights of residence countries and 
redistribute tax revenue to source countries. To what extent taxing rights are reallocated would 
                                                          
265 See OECD (2015a). 
266 See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July, 2016. 
267 Council Directive 2003/49/EC. 
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depend on the level of applied WHT. In this respect, the 10% rate proposed in Art. 11 of the 
OECD Model Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD Model) could serve as a reasona-
ble benchmark. Chapter 4.3.2.2.2 discusses the tax revenue redistribution implied by this reform 
for royalty payments for a selected group of countries. 
Compared to the two reform options presented in Chapters 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2, taxation at 
source would not be definite, and it would thus not be relevant for investment decisions. This 
remains an important advantage of refundable WHTs. Put differently, if the refunding system 
is working, this reform option will not introduce additional investment distortions.  
4.3.1.3.2 Levying WHTs as an anti-avoidance regulation 
Alternatively, countries could levy WHTs as an anti-avoidance regulation, which would only 
target interest and royalty payments to certain tax havens. To this end, countries should imple-
ment regulations in domestic law that provide for levying WHT. Such a WHT would then be 
reduced according to tax treaties or the EU Interest and Royalties Directive upon application 
from the recipient. Local tax authorities could, however, deny any reduction of the WHT on 
interest and royalty payments made to a third non-treaty country that taxes this income below 
an acceptable level. Several examples exist that provide some guidance for such an acceptable 
threshold. For instance, in the context of the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, the threshold 
for the application of CFC rules is 50% of the tax rate of the EU member state applying the 
rule.268 Applying this 50% ratio to the average CIT rate across all EU member states, would 
yield an acceptable level of taxation, comparable to the already mentioned 10% rate specified 
in Art. 11 of the OECD Model. In addition, France and Sweden already apply measures that 
deny interest deductibility for certain income taxed below 10%. Hence, a 10% rate may serve 
as an adequate benchmark for an appropriate level of WHT. The procedure of claiming tax 
credit requires a disclosure of the recipient entity and recipient country, which enables tax au-
thorities to efficiently control interest and royalty flows to low-tax countries and tax havens. 
Some countries, such as Croatia, the Czech Republic, Portugal, and Denmark, already operate 
similar anti-avoidance regulations.269  
This reform option does not primarily aim to extent source taxation but to ensure a minimum 
taxation of royalty and interest income in either the source or the residence country. Differently 
                                                          
268 See Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July, 2016. 
269 See Chapter 3.2.3.1. Other countries apply an even stricter approach, fully taxing interest and royalty payments 
to certain low-tax countries (e.g. Austria, Slovenia, and Sweden). 
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to a general levy of WHTs, a WHT targeted at payments to non-EU tax havens could be intro-
duced unilaterally, and no changes to current treaty law and the EU Interest and Royalties Di-
rective would be necessary. However, in a manner comparable to the inverted tax credit system, 
countries would have to be able to identify the final beneficiary of interest and royalty payments 
in order to apply a WHT on payments to tax havens effectively, as long as some treaty countries 
do not apply a similar rule. Otherwise, multinationals would be able to circumvent the anti-
avoidance regulation by shifting profits via intermediate group members in treaty or EU mem-
ber states that do not collect WHTs. As already mentioned in Chapter 4.3.1.2, identifying the 
final beneficiary of interest payments may be difficult, and levying WHTs on payments to tax 
havens may thus not be effective if only applied by a few countries. 
In addition, countries must be aware that the above-presented anti-avoidance rule would not 
target profit shifting to EU member states and treaty states that undercut the defined acceptable 
level of taxation of interest and royalty income due to, for example, an IP-box regime. To ensure 
effective taxation in these cases as well, countries would have to agree on a minimum level of 
residence taxation of interest and royalties within the EU and in treaty states. Alternatively, an 
implementation of respective anti-avoidance rules within the EU Interest and Royalties Di-
rective and tax treaties would be necessary, allowing countries to levy WHT if the income is 
not effectively taxed at the level of the recipient.270 
If tax haven countries do not cooperate, the collected WHT will become definite. However, due 
to the low rate and the limited application of this rule, potential negative effects on investment 
should remain rather small, especially if applied multilaterally. 
4.3.2 Cross-border royalty and license fee flows and the resulting tax revenue effects of 
selected reform options 
The OECD.Stat database provides balance-of-payments data on trade in services by partner 
country for 34 OECD member countries as well as Hong Kong and Russia.271 In a subset of 
this dataset, aggregate country-level data on cross-border royalty and license fee payments and 
receipts are available for these countries. Moreover, most countries publish royalty and license 
fee flow data disaggregated by partner country. Based on this data, Chapter 4.3.2.1 presents 
some stylized facts, and, Chapter 4.3.2.2 provides estimations of the tax revenue arising from 
                                                          
270 The anti-avoidance rule in Art. 5 of the EU Interest and Royalties Directive, which allows the levying of with-
holding taxes in the case of fraud and abuse, is insofar not sufficient. 
271 OECD (2014). 
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cross-border royalty and license fee flows under the current tax system. These are compared to 
the presumable tax revenue resulting from two of the reform options proposed in Chapter 4.3.1.  
4.3.2.1 Stylized facts on cross-border royalty and license fee flows 
The time period for which royalty and license fee flow data are available in OECD.Stat differs 
from country to country. For most countries, aggregate country level data are published for the 
years 1996-2012.272 In the following, the focus lies on this time span. Figure 14 depicts the 
royalty and license fee receipts as well as payments of all countries that have ranked among the 
top five recipient and top five payer countries, respectively, at least once during the years 1996-
2012. 
Figure 14: Development of royalty inflows and outflows 1996-2012: Top 5 recipients and pay-
ers 
 
In all years of the time period observed, the value of U.S. royalty income was always a multiple 
of the value of royalty income of any other country. Other large economies, such as the UK, 
Japan, Germany, and France, are further top recipients of royalties and license fees. Some 
smaller economies like the Netherlands and Switzerland also ranked among the top five royalty 
income recipients in the last years of the period. All major recipient countries exhibit an overall 
increase in royalty inflows over the years 1996-2012. In some countries, royalty income 
                                                          
272 For 2013, countries have only reported a provisional value at the time the study was conducted. 
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dropped in the years around the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. While this drop was fol-
lowed by a stark increase in royalty income in the US and in Japan, the downward tendency in 
the UK, France, and Germany continued until 2012.  
It is interesting to compare the OECD.Stat data on royalties and license fees income to data on 
the number of granted patents and utility models, registered trademarks, and industrial designs, 
by the applicant’s country of origin (published by the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion).273 There is a positive correlation between the number of IP rights owned by residents of 
a country and royalty inflows to that country. However, the difference between the number of 
IP rights owned by the US and other major IP owner countries is notably smaller than the dif-
ference in royalty income received, suggesting that intangible assets owned by U.S. residents 
are more valuable or more frequently licensed across borders. In the same way, some countries 
like Germany, the Republic of Korea, and Italy in all observed years ranked higher than, for 
example, the Netherlands in terms of immaterial assets held but received less royalties and 
license fee income in the years 2003-2012.  
With respect to royalty and license fee payments made to other countries, the US ranked the 
highest until 2008, when it was overtaken by Ireland. While royalty outflows of especially the 
US, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have ascended steeply over time, a gentler in-
crease in royalty payments occurred in France, Japan, and the UK. Royalty and license fee 
outflows of Germany also constantly increased until 2009 but, differently to the payments of 
the other top payer countries, decreased considerably afterwards. This trend may have been 
supported by the reduction of the German CIT rate in 2008, which made it less attractive to 
reduce the tax base in Germany by shifting profits via royalty payments to countries applying 
a lower tax rate.  
Except for France and Ireland, all countries that ranked amongst the top five recipients of roy-
alties and license fees in at least one year during 1996-2012 also ranked amongst the top five 
payers of royalties and license fees in one or more of those years. Unsurprisingly, countries like 
the US, Japan, the UK, Germany, and France rank among the economies with the largest border-
crossing royalty flows. The high overall royalties and license fee flows from and to the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and Ireland are more surprising; in this respect, it seems obvious to suggest 
that tax planning may play an important role.  
                                                          
273 See World Intellectual Property Organization (2014). 
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For example, starting from 2005, the general CIT rate in the Netherlands had gradually been 
reduced. In addition, the Dutch government introduced an IP-box regime in 2007, under which 
certain royalty income is subject to an effective tax rate of merely 5%. These measures may 
explain the particularly steep increase of royalty income since 2006. Switzerland also reduced 
its general corporate tax rate during the years observed and offered preferential tax regimes for 
holding and mixed companies in all years, thereby considerably reducing the effective tax rate 
of IP holding companies. Ireland is a typical low-tax country. Since 2003, it has applied a cor-
porate tax rate for active trade income of only 12.5%. Under certain conditions, IP holding 
companies also qualify for this low tax rate. In addition, until 2010, Ireland had offered a patent 
income exemption regime, under which certain patent income cropped to a certain amount per 
annum remained fully exempt from taxation.274 Thus, in the observed years, all three countries 
offered special tax systems for royalty income, which made it attractive to shift profits via roy-
alty payments from high-tax countries to their jurisdictions. 
One reason for the high value of royalties and license fee payments flowing from the Nether-
lands and Switzerland to other countries could be the absence of WHTs on royalties applied by 
these countries in any of the observed years. The lack of WHTs on royalties makes it attractive 
to channel royalty payments from EU member states (where the EU Interest and Royalties Di-
rective applies) to third countries (particularly tax havens) via the Netherlands or Switzerland. 
In the case of Switzerland, the OECD.Stat database only includes data on the total receipts and 
payments of royalties and license fees. The Netherlands and Ireland, however, provide royalty 
flow data disaggregated by partner country. This data supports anecdotal evidence that some 
US-based multinationals are channelling royalties free of WHT from Ireland via the Nether-
lands to Bermuda using the “Double Irish Dutch sandwich” tax-planning strategy described in 
Chapter 2.1.1.275 The OECD.Stat data for Ireland show that, on average, 23% of all royalty 
outflows during the years 2004-2010 were attributable to payments to the Netherlands. For the 
remaining years, no data are available. According to the data reported by the Netherlands, the 
country received 50% of all royalties and license fees from Ireland in 2011. In 2008, the share 
was 44%, and it ranged between 17% and 19% in 2004-2007. For the remaining years, data are 
not available. Royalty payments from the Netherlands to Bermuda are not reported for any of 
the years in the period 1996-2012. However, for the years 2006 and 2007, the data show that 
payments from the Netherlands to non-OECD countries made up 42% and 26% of the overall 
                                                          
274 See Kessler/Eicke (2008), p. 846. 
275 For this tax-planning strategy, see also Kleinbard (2011a); Sandell (2012) and Chapter 2.1.1. 
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royalty payments, respectively. Only a share of 7% and 8% of these payments is reported by 
partner country (including payments to China, Hong Kong, India, Russia, and South Africa). 
Thus, a considerable share of overall royalties and license fee payments could have been ren-
dered to Bermuda or other tax havens. 
In addition to these findings, the data for Ireland show that, from 2007 to 2011, on average, 
17% of all royalties were paid to Luxembourg. Since 2008, when Luxembourg introduced an 
attractive IP-box regime, payments from Ireland to Luxembourg have shown a tendency to 
increase. During the same period, the share of Ireland’s payments to the US constantly de-
creased, although they still accounted for 34% of overall payments, on average. For the US, the 
BEA publishes more detailed data on royalty flows by partner country, separately showing roy-
alty flows from and to affiliates and non-affiliates and distinguishing between different royalty 
types.276 The data reveal that, from 2006 to 2012, almost 100% of all payments received from 
Ireland were attributable to payments from affiliates to their U.S. parent companies, suggesting 
that licensing IP from U.S. parent companies to Irish affiliates offers substantial tax benefits. 
This, however, presupposes that the low-taxed profits arising from the exploitation of intangi-
bles at the level of the Irish company are considerably higher than the royalty payments to the 
US.277 
4.3.2.2 Tax revenue estimation 
4.3.2.2.1 Sample selection and underlying assumptions 
This chapter seeks to determine what the tax revenue consequences of the different reform op-
tions discussed in Chapter 4.3.1 are. In this, it provides a rough estimate of the tax revenue 
gains and losses for different countries using the OECD.Stat data on royalties and license fee 
flows between countries, that has been discussed in Chapter 4.3.2.1. For reasons of data avail-
ability, the focus lies on two alternatives of the reform options under consideration: the inverted 
tax credit and the general reintroduction of WHTs on cross-border royalty payments (see Chap-
ters 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.3.1). 
The tax revenue arising from cross-border royalties and license fee payments under the follow-
ing four scenarios will be compared: 
(1) The status quo. 
                                                          
276 See BEA (2014). 
277 See also Mutti/Grubert (2009). 
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(2) The reform option of “a general reintroduction of WHTs on royalties”, which implies that 
all OECD and EU member states agree to increase their WHT rate on all royalties and 
license fee payments to 10%. OECD and EU member states that already levy higher 
WHTs on royalty payments to certain countries keep their higher rates. 
(3) The reform option of “implementing an inverted tax credit system” as proposed by Lodin 
(see Chapter 4.3.1.2). This scenario assumes that existing WHTs remain in place. 
(4) The reform option “implementing an inverted tax credit system” as proposed by Lodin 
(see Chapter 4.3.1.2). This scenario assumes that WHTs on royalty payments are replaced 
in all OECD and EU member states.278 
To account for variations in the royalty and license fee data, the tax revenue that would have 
resulted from the two reform options, as well as the actual tax revenue under the status quo, are 
calculated for the years 2006-2012.279 To avoid distortions, only those countries for which at 
least 90% of both royalty and license fee inflows and outflows are published on a per country 
basis in all of these years are included in the calculations. This constraint reduces the sample to 
12 countries. As the sources of data collection underlying the OECD.Stat data differ from coun-
try to country (i.e. surveys and compulsory reporting), the value of the royalty and license fee 
payments reported in one country usually differs from the respective value of royalty and li-
cense fee receipts of the partner country. The tax revenue estimates for each country are based 
on data reported by this country.  
The tax revenue arising from cross-border royalty payments under the status quo is determined 
by 
𝑇𝑗 = ∑ [𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑅𝑗𝑖 ]
𝑖≠𝑗
+  ∑ [𝑡𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑖≠𝑗
] − ∑ [𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖𝑗)
𝑖≠𝑗
𝑅𝑖𝑗 ] (21) 
where sji denotes the WHT rate on payments from country j to country i, Rji  equals the total 
value of royalty payments from country j to country i, tj represents the statutory profit tax rate 
of country j, sij stands for the WHT rate on payments from country i to country j and Rij  denotes 
the total value of royalty payments from country i to country j. 
                                                          
278 Here, both the case that only withholding taxes on intragroup royalties are abolished and the case that all with-
holding taxes are replaced are considered. 
279 For the Republic of Korea, data disaggregated by partner country was not available for 2012. Thus, the calcu-
lations are restricted to the years 2006-2011. 
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Under the status quo, countries collect WHT revenue on royalty outflows to certain countries 
(first term of Equation (21)). In addition, authorities derive tax income by levying residence-
based taxes on royalties received from abroad (second term of Equation (21)). This tax revenue 
will be reduced if foreign WHTs are credited (third term of Equation (21)). Two countries in 
the sample (the Czech Republic and France) will only credit foreign WHTs on royalties if a tax 
treaty exists between the residence country of the royalty payer and the country of the recipient. 
In all other cases, the foreign taxes can only be deducted from the domestic tax base. To account 
for this in the calculations for the Czech Republic and France, the third term of Equation (21) 
is replaced by tjsijRij  for all partner countries i that are not DTT partners of the Czech Republic 
and France, respectively. One country (the Slovak Republic) does not grant any relief for for-
eign WHTs if no tax treaty with the residence country of the payer exists. This is also accounted 
for in the calculations. 
For the calculation of the WHT balance under the status quo, sji and sij are set to the lower of 
either applicable domestic or treaty WHT rate. The domestic and treaty WHT rates stem from 
the Ernst & Young Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides for the years 2006-2012.280 
As discussed in Chapter 4.3.1.3.1, the reform option of levying WHTs of 10% in all OECD and 
EU member states requires that countries fully credit or even refund all foreign WHTs. Thus, 
the tax revenue arising from levying and crediting WHTs under the reform option is given by 
𝑇𝑗 = ∑ [𝜃𝑗𝑖𝑅𝑗𝑖 ]
𝑖≠𝑗
+  ∑ [𝑡𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗 ]
𝑖≠𝑗
− ∑ [
𝑖≠𝑗
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗 ] (22) 
For the calculation of the WHT revenue and WHT credit under the reform option, 𝜃𝑗𝑖  and 𝜃𝑖𝑗 
are set to the higher value of 10% and the minimum of the applicable domestic and treaty WHT 
rate under the status quo for all royalty payments made by OECD and EU member states, irre-
spective of the partner country. For all Rij  where i is a non-OECD and non-EU member state, 
𝜃𝑖𝑗 is set to the lower of the applicable domestic or treaty WHT rate under the status quo. As 
the term tjRij  is the same under the status quo and under the reform option of levying WHTs 
at a minimum rate of 10% in all OECD and EU member states, the change in tax revenue is 
given by  
∆𝑇𝑗
𝑊𝐻 = 𝑆𝑗
𝑊𝐻 − 𝑆𝑗
𝑆𝑄
 (23) 
                                                          
280 Ernst & Young (2006-2012). 
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where  
𝑆𝑗
𝑆𝑄 = ∑ [𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑅𝑗𝑖 ]
𝑖≠𝑗
−  ∑ [𝑚𝑖𝑛( 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖𝑗)𝑅𝑖𝑗 ]
𝑖≠𝑗
 (24) 
denotes the balance of WHT revenue and credited foreign WHTs under the status quo and 
𝑆𝑗
𝑊𝐻 = ∑ [𝜃𝑗𝑖𝑅𝑗𝑖 ]
𝑖≠𝑗
−  ∑ [𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝑖≠𝑗
] (25) 
amounts to the balance under a uniform minimum WHT of 10% with full credits for foreign 
taxes.  
The additional tax revenue arising from implementing an inverted tax credit system for all roy-
alty payments is given by 
∆𝑇𝑗
𝐼𝑇𝐶1 = ∑ [(𝑡𝑗 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑡𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖))𝑅𝑗𝑖
𝐼𝐺
𝑖≠𝑗
] (26) 
Under this regime, intragroup royalty payments (𝑅𝑗𝑖
𝐼𝐺) are fully subject to CIT. There is, how-
ever, a credit which is equal to the tax payable in the residence country of the recipient as long 
as it does not exceed the domestic tax. Equation (26) assumes that existing WHTs remain in 
place. If the inverted tax credit replaced existing WHTs on intragroup royalty payments in all 
countries, the change in tax revenue compared to the status quo would be given by 
∆𝑇𝑗
𝐼𝑇𝐶2 =  ∑ [(𝑡𝑗 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑡𝑗 , 𝑡𝑖))𝑅𝑗𝑖
𝐼𝐺
𝑖≠𝑗
] −  ∑ [𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑅𝑗𝑖
𝐼𝐺]
𝑖≠𝑗
+ ∑ [𝑚𝑖𝑛( 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖𝑗)𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝐼𝐺 ]
𝑖≠𝑗
 (27) 
Since the analysis relies on the assumption that only OECD and EU member states agree to 
replace existing WHTs on intragroup royalties with an inverted tax credit, 𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝐼𝐺  is set to zero for 
all i which are neither OECD nor EU member states. 
If countries abolished WHTs on all royalties (not only intragroup), 𝑅𝑗𝑖
𝐼𝐺 and 𝑅𝑖𝑗
𝐼𝐺  would have to 
be replaced by 𝑅𝑗𝑖  and 𝑅𝑖𝑗  in the second and third term of Equation (27). 
The OECD.Stat data does not distinguish between corporate and individual royalty payers and 
recipients, and does not include information on the share of transactions between affiliates and 
(general) the taxation at the level of the recipient. The following assumptions are made to deal 
with this drawback of the used data: 
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(1) All royalties are paid for the use of patents. Thus, if a DTT or a country’s domestic tax 
law provide different rates for different kinds of intangibles, the WHT rate for patent 
royalties is used. This assumption is based on U.S. BEA data (see Chapter 4.3.2.1), which 
shows that the highest percentage of both U.S. royalty payments and receipts are attribut-
able to industrial processes.281 For the US, the calculations are based on the more detailed 
BEA data and include different WHT rates depending on the reported type of intangible. 
(2) All royalties and license fees are received by companies that are subject to corporate tax-
ation. The possible bias resulting from the exclusive use of CIT rates in the calculations 
of the WHT credit under the status quo should remain rather small. This is because, for 
the vast majority of royalty flows considered, foreign WHTs are lower than both the per-
sonal and the CIT rate. At the level of the recipient, royalties may be subject to either the 
statutory corporate tax rate282 or a reduced tax rate under an IP-box regime. Since the 
value of royalty payments benefiting from an IP-box regime remains unknown, the     
analysis estimates the tax revenue consequences for two different scenarios. The first sce-
nario completely disregards IP-box regimes. The second scenario bases itself on the as-
sumption that all royalties received by a country offering an IP-box regime qualify for 
low taxation under this regime.283 The real value should lie within this estimated range. 
(3) There are no deductible expenses related to the royalty income and the royalty income 
recipients did not incur any losses which could limit the amount of foreign WHTs credited 
under the status quo. In reality, due to excess tax credits, the WHT balance under the 
status quo is likely to be higher. 
According to U.S. BEA data, U.S. resident companies received a share of between 62% and 
66% of all foreign royalty income from foreign affiliates in the years 2006-2012. The share of 
royalty payments from U.S. resident companies to affiliates abroad ranged from 70% to 73% 
in the same period. Therefore, a range of possible tax balance values for all EU member states 
in the sample is calculated, assuming that a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 100% of all 
royalties and license fee flows between EU member states were made between affiliates and 
qualified for WHT rate reduction under the EU Interest and Royalties Directive. Since the in-
verted tax credit system proposed by Lodin is limited to royalty payments between affiliates, 
this dissertation also relies on a calculated range of possible values of additional tax revenue 
                                                          
281 See BEA (2014). 
282 The corporate tax rates were taken from KPMG (2014b). 
283 The IP-box regime tax rates were taken from Evers et al. (2014). 
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for this proposal, once again assuming a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 100% of all 
royalty and license fee flows are payments between affiliates. For the US, the analysis relies on 
the more detailed BEA data on royalty payments to affiliates. However, for all U.S. royalty 
payments to partner countries for which the BEA does not disclose the share of payments to 
affiliates, a range of prospective additional tax revenue (50%-100%) is calculated. 
In all calculations, the analysis abstracts from behavioural responses of taxpayers.  
4.3.2.2.2 Results I: Introduction of a minimum WHT of 10% in all OECD and EU 
member states 
Figure 15 illustrates the balance of royalties and license fee receipts minus payments in 2012 
for all countries reporting in OECD.Stat.  
Figure 15: Royalties and license fee balance (receipts – payments) of reporting OECD coun-
tries in 2012 
 
It shows that the US, Japan, and the Netherlands were the top net recipients in 2012, while 
Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland were the top net payers of royalties and license 
fees. With respect to possible tax revenue consequences of a broader levy of WHTs one may 
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infer from Figure 15 that the top net recipient countries are likely to lose tax revenue as a result 
of the reintroduction of WHT on royalty payments in all OECD and EU member states. Mean-
while, the top net payer countries should experience an increase in their tax income thanks to 
such a reform. 
Table 33: Net tax revenue from WHT under the status quo and a minimum WHT of 10% in all 
OECD and EU member states: 100% intragroup payments, IP-boxes considered 
 
Table 33 presents the tax revenue estimation results for the reintroduction of a WHT on royal-
ties at a minimum rate of 10% in all OECD and EU member states under the assumption that 
100% of the royalty flows are intragroup payments and that all royalties qualify for low taxation 
under an IP-box regime, where available. The values for the remaining scenarios described in 
Chapter 4.3.2.2.1 are presented in Tables 45 and 46 in the Appendix. 
Status quo
WHT 10% 
OECD + EU
Change Status quo
WHT 10% 
OECD + EU
Change Status quo
WHT 10% 
OECD + EU
Change
Millions 
of USD
WHT Rev. −
WHT Credit
WHT Rev. −
WHT Credit
∆ Balance
WHT Rev. −
WHT Credit
WHT Rev. −
WHT Credit
∆ Balance
WHT Rev. −
WHT Credit
WHT Rev. −
WHT Credit
∆ Balance
AT FR KR
2006 -5 80 84 -147 -233 -86 370 369 -2
2007 -8 79 87 -223 -323 -100 437 436 -1
2008 -9 78 87 -284 -480 -197 443 442 0
2009 -9 60 69 -130 -386 -256 530 529 -1
2010 -9 71 80 -139 -285 -146 755 754 -1
2011 -7 86 93 -190 -410 -219 406 404 -2
2012 -7 86 93 -137 -238 -100 - - -
CZ IL SK
2006 41 51 10 30 14 -15 -3 1 3
2007 47 65 18 13 2 -11 -5 -4 1
2008 55 72 17 27 16 -11 -3 1 4
2009 51 64 13 -13 -28 -15 1 7 6
2010 52 67 15 -15 -29 -14 3 8 5
2011 25 88 63 -24 -40 -17 4 15 11
2012 17 61 44 -27 -49 -21 3 13 10
DE IT SE
2006 -105 253 357 7 74 67 -125 -235 -110
2007 -115 262 377 4 63 59 -103 -275 -172
2008 -174 215 389 -50 355 406 -151 -268 -116
2009 -216 0 216 -117 270 387 -52 -265 -214
2010 -238 -133 106 -114 331 444 -98 -422 -324
2011 -273 -117 156 -118 286 404 -78 -402 -325
2012 -284 -125 159 -145 176 321 -63 -392 -329
DK JP US
2006 -39 -39 0 -739 -580 159 -2117 -5620 -3504
2007 -71 -59 12 -826 -792 34 -2375 -6394 -4019
2008 -112 -83 29 -987 -920 67 -2397 -6633 -4236
2009 -85 -100 -16 -731 -591 140 -2598 -6292 -3695
2010 -65 -32 33 -947 -953 -6 -3900 -7539 -3639
2011 -88 -39 49 -1096 -1165 -70 -4507 -8756 -4249
2012 -66 -33 32 -1202 -1377 -176 -4520 -8444 -3924
Abbreviations: 
Rev. = Revenue; AT = Austria; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; IL = Israel; IT = Italy; JP = Japan, KR = Republic of Korea; 
SK = Slovak Republic; SE = Sweden; US = United States
Note: 
All numbers are rounded to the nearest million.
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Under the reform option of a broad introduction of WHTs, all net royalty recipient (payer) 
countries exhibit a negative (positive) balance of WHT income minus WHT credit. However, 
under the status quo, net payers of royalties and license fees do not necessarily exhibit a positive 
WHT balance. From 2006 to 2008, Germany, for example, was a net payer country but still 
featured a negative balance of WHT income minus WHT credits granted during these years. 
The same holds true for Italy with respect to the years 2009-2012.  
Most importantly, the results show that a net recipient (payer) country of royalties and license 
fees would not necessarily lose (gain) tax revenue if OECD and EU member states agreed on 
levying WHTs on royalties at a minimum rate of 10%. For example, the tax revenue balance of 
Germany in 2012, which is one of the top net recipient countries, amounted to values between 
$-284 million (100% intragroup payments, see Table 33) and $-295 million (50% intragroup 
payments, see Tables 45 and 46 in the Appendix). Had all OECD and EU member states levied 
WHT of at least 10% in 2012, the tax loss from levying and crediting WHTs would have only 
amounted to $-125 million. As the tax revenue estimates for the other years yield similar results, 
a broader levy of WHTs in all OECD and EU member states is likely to increase Germany’s 
tax revenue.  
The reasoning behind this rather counterintuitive result is the following: under the status quo, 
countries levy WHTs on payments to some countries only and apply different rates. Thus, 
whether a country loses or wins from a broader levy of WHTs does not only depend on the 
country’s net balance in royalties and license fee flows; it also depends on how the reform 
changes the composition of WHTs. Ultimately, whether the resulting increase in WHT revenue 
exceeds the increase in WHT credit is decisive.  
The analysis renders similar results for Austria, the Czech Republic, and Italy for all years 
observed. These countries would have earned more tax revenue than during the status quo if 
OECD and EU member states had levied WHTs of at least 10% on royalty payments during the 
years 2006-2012. The same holds true for Denmark and the Slovak Republic, except for the 
years 2006/2009 and 2007/2008 (50% intragroup payments)284, respectively.  
By contrast, France, Israel, Sweden, and the US would lose tax revenue. Among these countries, 
the US would incur the highest loss by far. According to the calculations, the balance of WHT 
revenue and WHT credit under the reform option would have amounted to $-8.44 million com-
pared to $-4.52 million under the status quo in 2012. The calculations for the remaining years 
                                                          
284 See Table 34. 
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yield comparable results. Thus, the tax loss of the US that results from levying and crediting 
WHTs would likely almost double if countries agreed to reintroduce WHTs on royalties of at 
least 10%.  
For the Republic of Korea, WHT revenue under the status quo and under a broader levy of 
WHTs would remain unchanged, while the overall amount of WHT credited would marginally 
increase. Consequently, the WHT balance of the Republic of Korea would probably remain 
almost the same if countries agreed on a broader levy of WHTs. The reason for this lies in the 
DTTs concluded by the Republic of Korea: all the major partner countries already provide for 
a 10% WHT rate on royalties and license fee payments.  
For Japan, the analysis yields an increase compared to the status quo in net WHT revenue re-
sulting from the reform option for the years 2006-2009 and a decrease for the years 2010-2012. 
This result is partly driven by the decrease in the value of royalty payments to the US net of 
royalty receipts from the US that occurred in the years following 2009. Japan has concluded 
one of its few DTTs with the US, which reduces the WHT rate on royalties to zero. Thus, an 
increase of the WHT rate on royalty payments from Japan to the US, as well as on royalty 
payments from the US to Japan to 10%, would have resulted in far higher additional tax reve-
nues in the years 2006-2009 than in the years 2010-2012. This highlights that the tax revenue 
effect of reintroducing WHTs strongly depends on the WHT rates currently levied on royalty 
flows between major partner countries.  
The example of France further illustrates this. The WHT balance of France (status quo) in-
creased in the years after 2008, although the value of the balance of royalty inflows to the 
country minus royalty outflows from the country was comparable in the years 2008, 2009, and 
2011, as well as in the years 2007 and 2010. One reason for this is the WHT rates on royalties 
in the DTTs with the US and Japan, which were reduced to zero with effect from 2009 and 
2008, respectively. As the royalty inflows from both countries exceeded the royalty payments 
to both countries in all years observed, France gained more from the resulting lapse of foreign 
WHT credits on the royalty inflows than it lost from refraining to levy WHTs on the royalty 
outflows. Reintroducing WHTs on royalty flows between France, the US, and Japan would 
reverse this effect. 
4.3.2.2.3 Results II: Implementing an inverted tax credit system 
In the calculations for the inverted tax credit, two reform options are considered:  
1. The inverted tax credit is introduced in addition to existing WHTs. 
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2. The inverted tax credit replaces the levy of WHTs in all OECD and EU member states. 
The results accrued under the assumption that 100% of the royalty flows consist of intragroup 
payments and that all royalties qualify for low taxation under an IP-box regime (where availa-
ble) are presented in Table 34. For the alternative scenarios, the tax revenue effects are pre-
sented in Tables 47 and 48 in the Appendix. 
It seems clear that the inverted tax credit significantly increases the tax revenue of high-tax 
countries like France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the US, irrespective of whether WHTs are 
replaced. If WHTs were not replaced, no country would lose tax revenue. However, the lower 
a country’s tax rate is in comparison to other national tax rates, the lower the additional tax 
revenue earned from the inverted tax credit is. The example of Germany helps to illustrate this. 
Although royalty outflows from Germany have constantly been growing from 2006 to 2009, an 
inverted tax credit system would have resulted in lower additional tax revenue in 2008 and 2009 
than 2006 and 2007, given that IP-box regimes are not considered (see Tables 47 and 48 in the 
Appendix). This can be traced back to the 2008 tax rate cut in Germany. If IP-box regimes were 
considered (see Table 34), the German tax revenue resulting from an inverted tax credit system 
would have been highest in 2009, despite the tax rate cut in 2008. One reason for this is that 
payments to France and the Netherlands, which both offer a low-tax IP-box regime, were con-
siderably higher in 2009 than in any other year observed. Therefore, the domestic tax rate and 
the destination of the royalty outflows are key determinants of the tax revenue effect of imple-
menting an inverted tax credit. When comparing the tax revenue resulting from reintroducing 
WHTs (see Table 33) to implementing an inverted tax credit in Germany in the years 2006-
2012, it becomes evident that the former option is far less dependent on the destination of roy-
alty outflows. 
If an inverted tax credit system replaced the levy of WHTs, low-tax countries that are net payers 
of royalties and license fees and currently levy WHT on royalty payments to some countries 
(e.g. the Czech Republic, the Republic of Korea, and the Slovak Republic) would especially 
lose tax revenue. The Republic of Korea, for example, would have earned $568 million less 
than during the status quo if all OECD and EU member states had replaced levying WHTs on 
intragroup royalties with an inverted tax credit in 2012.285  
                                                          
285 Assuming that 100% royalty payments were made intragroup and considering IP-box regimes. Tables 47 and 
48 show that the losses would also have been considerable under the other scenarios. 
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Table 34: Tax revenue effect of the inverted tax credit: 100% intragroup payments, IP-boxes 
considered 
 
In summary, the tax revenue estimates show that the reallocation of taxing rights caused by a 
general levy of WHTs of 10% in all OECD and EU member states would lead to a significant 
redistribution of tax revenues. Interestingly, there is no perfect correlation between net royalty 
payment flows and revenue gains or losses. Introducing an inverted tax credit system to replace 
WHTs would also lead to a redistribution of tax revenue. It seems clear that, if an inverted tax 
credit was introduced without abolishing the WHTs levied under the status quo, no country 
would lose revenue and high-tax countries in particular would collect more tax revenue. How-
In addition to 
WHT
Instead of 
WHT
In addition to 
WHT
Instead of 
WHT
In addition to 
WHT
Instead of 
WHT
Millions of 
USD
∆ Status Quo ∆ Status Quo ∆ Status Quo ∆ Status Quo ∆ Status Quo ∆ Status Quo
AT FR KR
2006 9 13 5 130 34 -454
2007 20 26 24 222 61 -471
2008 26 34 43 284 62 -533
2009 23 30 87 130 49 -621
2010 31 38 180 237 46 -877
2011 44 48 275 344 37 -568
2012 47 50 239 275 - -
CZ IL SK
2006 12 -30 25 -11 1 3
2007 24 -23 35 21 2 6
2008 19 -36 40 12 6 10
2009 16 -35 11 21 3 2
2010 10 -42 11 23 3 0
2011 22 -3 12 32 2 -2
2012 18 -1 16 39 2 -1
DE IT SE
2006 573 623 128 115 17 46
2007 934 980 171 154 59 91
2008 561 639 803 713 93 118
2009 1259 1366 734 726 62 79
2010 746 856 806 774 71 113
2011 886 986 903 871 84 113
2012 931 1025 796 771 131 152
DK JP US
2006 31 59 676 686 1409 2253
2007 43 96 833 810 1900 2911
2008 65 146 1099 1030 2711 3776
2009 53 101 1063 912 2909 3907
2010 47 89 1239 1025 2723 4078
2011 91 144 1372 1148 3338 4831
2012 80 116 1326 1127 4005 5159
Notes: 
All numbers are rounded to the nearest million. “Instead of WHT” implies that all OECD and EU member states replace WHTs with an inverted tax credit.
Inverted Tax Credit
Abbreviations: 
AT = Austria; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; IL = Israel; IT = Italy; JP = Japan, KR = Republic of Korea; 
SK = Slovak Republic; SE = Sweden; US = United States
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ever, if expenses related to the income were taken into account and Lodin’s proposal was ad-
justed so that potential excess taxes paid in the source country are refunded by the residence 
country (see Chapter 4.3.1.2, Table 32), a reallocation of tax revenue would occur. Clearly, the 
drawback of an inverted tax credit lies in the increase of the tax burden on investments in high-
tax countries, which may lead to firms investing less or restructuring their business activities. 
The calculations abstract from these behavioural changes. 
4.3.3 Summary 
As an option for reform, thin capitalization and earnings stripping rules could be introduced by 
more countries, and similar rules could be applied to intragroup royalties. To avoid double tax-
ation of interest and royalty income, these regulations would need to be modified to reclassify 
non-deductible interest or royalty payments in the source country as deemed dividends in the 
residence country of the recipient. The deemed dividends would either have to be tax exempt 
or a tax credit would have to be granted for them. This reform option requires at least bilateral 
cooperation between countries and secures source countries’ tax revenue in cases of what is 
defined as “excessive” debt financing or “excessive” levels of royalties. Defining such thresh-
olds, however, remains both challenging and controversial.  
Alternatively, countries could choose broader reform options and change the general tax rules 
for all interest and royalty payments. One option considered in this dissertation entails the in-
troduction of a minimum WHT on interest and royalty payments in all OECD countries. This 
would require residence countries to credit or refund the WHTs. To achieve this, changes to 
DTT and the EU Interest and Royalties Directive would be necessary. Moreover, such a reform 
would most likely give rise to a significant redistribution of tax revenue. According to rough 
estimations, the US as the world’s largest net recipient of royalty income would have suffered 
revenue losses of approximately $4 billion in 2012 (or 5% of their net royalty inflows). Sur-
prisingly, other net royalty recipients including Germany would have likely benefited from such 
a reform. Clearly, the revenue effects would make it difficult to reach an agreement. It should 
also be kept in mind that incentives for shifting profits through royalties would not be com-
pletely neutralized by a 10% WHT, given that the headline corporate profit tax is often close to 
30%.  
A more limited approach would be to levy WHTs on payments to tax havens only. This type of 
anti-avoidance regulation solely requires changes to domestic tax law. However, in order to 
apply this measure effectively and to also tackle profit shifting to EU member states and treaty 
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countries that undercut the acceptable level of taxation, international coordination and consent 
would also be necessary for this reform option. 
Another reform option is the inverted tax credit as proposed by Lodin.286 The inverted tax credit 
is the only presented reform option that completely eliminates profit shifting incentives and 
ensures that purely domestic companies are not put at a disadvantage compared to multination-
als. In addition, an inverted tax credit system allows for unilateral strengthening of source tax-
ation without causing double taxation, thus ensuring it is easy to implement. However, if only 
applied by a few countries, the inverted tax credit system may prove ineffective because com-
panies route royalties or interest payments through high-tax countries that do not apply the tax 
credit. This probably remains impossible for interest payments, but it may prove challenging 
even for royalty payments. 
Moreover, applying an inverted tax credit would most likely increase the tax burden on eco-
nomic activity, resulting in declining investment. This is an important difference to WHTs. If 
fully credited in the residence countries, the overall tax burden on investment would remain the 
same. Of course, a country that does introduce the inverted tax credit could use the additional 
revenue to cut corporate taxes, so that the negative impact on investment could be avoided or 
reduced. The same holds true for additional tax revenue from WHTs. 
  
                                                          
286 See Lodin (2011) and Lodin (2013). 
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5 Conclusion 
(1) Anecdotal and empirical evidence shows that multinational corporations engage in BEPS. 
Both intragroup debt and intragroup transfer pricing are used to channel profits from high-
tax countries to low-tax countries. These profit-shifting strategies are fostered by three 
main elements of the international tax system: (a) the lack of concurrent taxation of world-
wide income at the level of the ultimate parent company; (b) the existence of tax havens, 
preferential tax systems, favourable tax rulings and hybrid mismatch arrangements, ena-
bling zero- or low taxation of passive income like interest and royalties; and (c) the lack 
of taxation of interest and royalty payments in the residence country of the payer. 
(2) Calculations of the CoC and EATR for cross-border investments between EU member 
states and the US show that the effective tax burden of investments can be substantially 
reduced using typical tax-planning strategies. For profit shifting via intragroup financing, 
locating the financing company in an EU member state and making use of a hybrid loan 
provides the lowest CoC and EATRs among the financing structures considered. If this 
tax-planning strategy was used, the mean CoC would decrease by 1.9 percentage points 
(from 5.7% to 3.8%) and the mean EATR would decrease by 6.6 percentage points (from 
20.9% to 14.3%) across all 28 countries included in the analysis. For profit shifting via 
intragroup licensing, locating the IP holding company in a tax-exempt country would 
reduce the mean CoC to 4.7% and the mean EATR to only 2%, assuming that the multi-
national generated its income solely from the use of intangibles. Even lower CoC and 
EATRs result if the IP holding company is resident in one of the EU member states of-
fering an IP-box regime that allows an asymmetric treatment of income and expenses, 
such as Portugal or Hungary. Anti-avoidance measures like WHTs, switch-over clauses 
for intercompany dividends, thin capitalization rules, and CFC regulations neutralize the 
tax savings from tax-planning strategies and may even increase the tax burden above that 
experienced without tax planning. 
(3) Extending taxation of interest and royalties in the residence country of the payer is a 
pragmatic way to reduce profit shifting incentives. In addition, it ensures that source coun-
tries with an economic connection to the interest and royalty income receive a share of 
the total tax revenue. Source taxation of interest and royalties is also in line with basic 
legal and economic principles as long as double taxation is avoided. 
(4) Currently, countries mainly rely on transfer pricing regulations and interest deduction 
limitation rules as measures to prevent tax base erosion by interest and royalty payments. 
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No WHTs are levied on intragroup payments within the EU and many countries also do 
not apply WHTs on such payments to third countries. Empirical studies suggest that both 
transfer pricing regulations and interest deduction limitation rules are effective in reduc-
ing profit shifting. However, these studies usually ignore the interdependency of different 
profit-shifting channels. In this dissertation, empirical evidence is provided that there is a 
substitutive relationship between debt shifting and shifting via transfer pricing. It is also 
indicated that the high effectiveness of transfer pricing regulations found by earlier stud-
ies may partially be attributable to a move towards debt shifting. The results suggest that, 
even if both transfer pricing and interest deduction limitation rules are strict, companies 
still enjoy a degree of leeway in profit shifting, especially in using transfer pricing ma-
nipulation related to IP. 
(5) Four alternative measures extending taxation of interest and royalties at source are pre-
sented: bilateral interest and royalty deduction limitations, an inverted tax credit, WHTs 
on all interest and royalty payments, and WHTs as an anti-avoidance regulation. While 
the measures have different objectives and consequences for both tax revenue and loca-
tion attractiveness for real investment, they all prevent harmful double taxation and dou-
ble non-taxation and may be applied to both interest and royalty payments. However, to 
prevent double taxation and ensure an effective application of the measures, a certain 
degree of international cooperation between countries is required for all reform options.  
(6) Generally, countries face a trade-off between combating base erosion through profit shift-
ing and attracting real investment. Full elimination of profit shifting incentives arising 
from interest and royalty payments can be achieved under an inverted tax credit system. 
However, this reform option is likely to have the strongest negative impact on real invest-
ment of all the measures considered. Potentially the simplest and most feasible reform 
option is to levy WHTs on interest and royalties that are creditable in the residence coun-
try of the recipient. This reform option would ensure a certain minimum tax level of in-
terest and royalty payments and reallocate taxing rights while not affecting the attractive-
ness of the source country as an investment location. Rough estimates suggest that, as the 
world’s largest net recipient of royalty income, the US would have suffered revenue 
losses of approximately $4 billion in 2012 if WHTs were levied on all royalties in all 
OECD member states at a rate of 10%. However, other net royalty recipients (e.g. Ger-
many) and net royalty payers would have benefited from an increase in tax revenue fol-
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lowing this reform option. Alternatively, instead of generally levying WHTs on all inter-
est and royalty payments, the decision could be made to only target interest and royalty 
payments subject to low taxation at the level of the recipient. Due to the limited impact 
of this reform option on the allocation of taxing rights, consensus on its implementation 
might be easier to reach. 
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Appendix 
Table 35: Country statistics 
  Full sample IP Non-IP 
Country Observations % Observations % Observations % 
Austria 9,017 1.67 6,129 1.88 2,888 1.34 
Belgium 24,799 4.58 12,040 3.70 12,759 5.91 
Bosnia  
Herzegovina 
1,177 0.22 634 0.19 543 0.25 
Bulgaria 3,625 0.67 1,882 0.58 1,743 0.81 
Croatia 5,525 1.02 3,044 0.94 2,481 1.15 
Czech Republic 22,997 4.25 12,333 3.79 10,664 4.94 
Denmark 10,766 1.99 4,956 1.52 5,810 2.69 
Estonia 4,502 0.83 1,841 0.57 2,661 1.23 
Finland 11,011 2.03 7,089 2.18 3,922 1.82 
France 99,863 18.45 70,775 21.74 29,088 13.48 
Germany 35,339 6.53 24,395 7.49 10,944 5.07 
Hungary 2,850 0.53 1,938 0.60 912 0.42 
Iceland 106 0.02 37 0.01 69 0.03 
Ireland 581 0.11 229 0.07 352 0.16 
Italy 54,878 10.14 45,782 14.07 9,096 4.21 
Latvia 102 0.02 57 0.02 45 0.02 
Luxembourg 2,160 0.40 1,112 0.34 1,048 0.49 
Malta 6 0.00 5 0.00 1 0.00 
Montenegro 15 0.00 9 0.00 6 0.00 
Netherlands 8,437 1.56 3,456 1.06 4,981 2.31 
Norway 21,620 3.99 15,117 4.64 6,503 3.01 
Poland 20,952 3.87 11,751 3.61 9,201 4.26 
Portugal 9,086 1.68 4,686 1.44 4,400 2.04 
Romania 20,764 3.84 10,595 3.26 10,169 4.71 
Serbia 6,248 1.15 2,909 0.89 3,339 1.55 
Slovak Republic 5,675 1.05 3,311 1.02 2,364 1.10 
Slovenia 3,310 0.61 2,298 0.71 1,012 0.47 
Spain 55,495 10.25 34,309 10.54 21,186 9.82 
Sweden 24,177 4.47 9,515 2.92 14,662 6.79 
Switzerland 15 0.00 7 0.00 6 0.00 
Ukraine 7,084 1.31 2,552 0.78 4,532 2.10 
UK 69,141 12.77 30,701 9.43 38,440 17.81 
Total 541,323 100 325,494 100 215,827 100 
Notes:  
This table shows a distribution of observations across countries in the full sample, the sample of IP-intensive 
firms, and the sample of non-IP firms. IP intensity is defined in Section 4.2.3.4.1. 
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Table 36: Transfer pricing documentation requirements 
Country Formal Informal 
Austria No All sample years 
Belgium No All sample years 
Bosnia Herzegovina No Since 2008 
Bulgaria No Since 2006 
Croatia Since 2005  
Czech Republic No All sample years 
Denmark Since 2006 All sample years 
Estonia Since 2007  
Finland Since 2007 All sample years 
France Since 2010 All sample years 
Germany Since 2003 All sample years 
Hungary Since 2010 All sample years 
Iceland No  
Ireland Since 2011  
Italy Since 2010 All sample years 
Latvia No Since 2007 
Luxembourg No Since 2005 
Malta No  
Montenegro No All sample years 
Netherlands Since 2002  
Norway Since 2008 All sample years 
Poland Since 2001  
Portugal Since 2002  
Romania Since 2007 All sample years 
Serbia No All sample years 
Slovak Republic Since 2009 All sample years 
Slovenia Since 2005  
Spain Since 2009 All sample years 
Sweden Since 2007 All sample years 
Switzerland No All sample years 
Ukraine No  
UK Since 2008 All sample years 
Notes:  
Formal refers to transfer pricing documentation requirements that are explicitly stated in national law. Informal 
refers to transfer pricing documentation requirements that are not explicitly mentioned in national law but are 
required in practice. 
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Table 37: D/E ratios under thin capitalization rules 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Belgium  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Croatia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Czech Republic 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
Denmark  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
France 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Germany 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 - - - - - 
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Italy 5 4 4 4 - - - - - 
Latvia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Lithuania 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
Netherlands 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Poland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Portugal 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Romania 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Serbia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Slovenia 0 8 8 8 6 6 6 5 4 
Spain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - 
 
Table 38: Special interest deduction limitation rules and thin capitalization rules with excep-
tions 
Country Rules 
Belgium 7:1 D/E ratio if interest is tax-exempt or taxed at a reduced rate at the level of the 
lender 
France 2004-2006: applicable only in case of payments to Non-EU parent companies that 
are not resident in one of the exempted treaty countries 
Luxembourg 85:15 D/E ratio if debt is used for the funding of participations or real estate located 
in Luxembourg 
Portugal  2006-2012: applicable only in cases of payments to non-EU parent companies. Be-
fore: escape possible if D/E ratio is considered arm’s length 
Spain 2004-2011: applicable only in cases of payments to non-EU parent companies 
Sweden No deduction of interest paid on intragroup debt relating to the intragroup acquisi-
tion of shares if there are no justifying business or commercial reasons and the in-
come is not subject to tax of at least 10% 
Ukraine Interest deductible up to the own interest income and 50% of other income if paid 
to a foreign company 
UK Included in transfer pricing regulations, generally a 1:1 ratio is used as a guideline 
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Table 39: Three-stage interest deduction limitation strictness indicator 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bosnia Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Croatia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Romania 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Serbia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes:  
The three-stage variable measures the strictness of interest deduction limitation rules. It is denoted as follows:  
0 - no specific interest deduction limitation rule; 1 – a special rule or a thin capitalization rule with broad excep-
tions or D/E ratio above 3; 2 – a thin capitalization rule without broad exception and D/E ratio of 3 or lower or 
an earnings stripping rule. 
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Table 40: Descriptive statistics: Panel data analysis 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP 
 Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max Obs. Mean Min Max 
EBIT 541,323 4,605.62 0.00 9,535,506 325,494 5,127.08 0.00 6,219,053 215,827 3,819.23 0.00 9,535,506 
Fixed assets 541,323 25,631.88 0.00 5.06E+07 325,494 28,875.49 0.00 5.06E+07 215,827 20,740.31 0.00 3.52E+07 
Costs of employees 541,323 7,689.78 0.00 7,336,624 325,494 8,792.55 0.00 7,336,624 215,827 6,026.75 0.00 6,041,358 
Interest paid 410,742 1,334.33 0.00 1.94E+08 261,046 1,600.01 0.00 1.94E+08 149,696 871.02 0.00 6,567,206 
Sales 515,216 66,994.01 0.00 1.15E+08 312,625 70,072.53 0.00 5.00E+07 202,589 62,244.02 0.00 1.15E+08 
Net PPE/assets 541,139 0.18 0.00 79.64 325,399 0.17 0.00 79.63 215,740 0.18 0.00 1.96 
EBITDA/assets 527,346 0.18 -0.81 329.39 319,423 0.17 -0.81 329.39 207,923 0.18 -0.31 157.50 
Intangibles 535,215 2,665.22 0.00 1.80E+07 323,057 3,722.45 0.00 1.80E+07 212,158 1,055.35 0.00 3,762,855 
Intangibles/assets  541,321 0.01 0.00 0.99 325,494 0.02 0.00 0.99 215,827 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CIT 541,323 0.29 0.09 0.40 325,494 0.30 0.09 0.40 215,827 0.28 0.09 0.40 
TP Doc Years 541,323 1.53 0.00 11.00 325,494 1.46 0.00 11.00 215,827 1.63 0.00 11.00 
TP Doc Binary 541,323 0.49 0.00 1.00 325,494 0.49 0.00 1.00 215,827 0.51 0.00 1.00 
TP Doc Years +  
Informal TP Doc 
541,176 2.51 0.00 12.00 325,417 2.45 0.00 12.00 215,757 2.6 0.00 12.00 
TC three-stage 541,323 1.24 0.00 2.00 325,494 1.28 0.00 2.00 215,827 1.18 0.00 2.00 
TC 1/(1+D/E-ratio) 481,995 0.18 0.00 0.50 280,267 0.21 0.00 0.50 201,728 0.16 0.00 0.50 
Corruption 541,323 1.18 -1.03 2.56 325,494 1.15 -1.03 2.56 215,827 1.23 -1.03 2.56 
Unemployment 541,323 8.57 2.30 31.80 325,494 8.63 2.30 31.80 215,827 8.45 2.30 31.80 
Inflation 541,323 2.74 -1.71 25.20 325,494 2.61 -1.71 25.20 215,827 2.94 -1.71 25.20 
GDP 541,323 1.09E+12 1.81E+09 2.55E+12 325,494 1.15E+12 2.18E+09 2.55E+12 215,827 9.88E+11 1.81E+09 2.55E+12 
GDP/capita 541,323 25,751.01 1421.18 70,569.24 325,494 26,021.74 1,421.18 70,569.24 215,827 25,342.54 1,421.18 70,569.24 
GDP growth 541,323 1.47 -14.80 12.10 325,494 1.37 -14.80 12.10 215,827 1.63 -14.80 12.10 
Growth opportunities 492,009 0.06 -0.99 140.86 295,803 0.06 -0.99 140.86 196,204 0.06 -0.99 23.57 
Notes:  
Fixed assets represents total fixed assets. Interest paid denotes a firm’s interest payments. Sales stands for a company’s total turnover. Net PPE/assets is a ratio of a company’s net 
property, plant, and equipment to total assets. EBITDA/assets is a ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Intangibles shows total 
intangible assets of a company. Intangibles/assets represents a ratio of the MNE’s intangibles to total assets (median in the group). TP-variables measure the strictness of transfer 
pricing regulations. TC-variables measure the strictness of interest deduction limitation rules. Corruption represents a corruption index. Unemployment stands for a country’s rate of 
unemployment. Inflation denotes a country’s rate of inflation. GDP denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. GDP/capita stands for a natural logarithm of 
a country’s GDP per capita. GDP growth is a country’s rate of GDP growth. Growth opportunities denotes the median annual sales growth per industry and country. IP represents a 
sample of IP-intensive firms as defined in section 4.2.3.4.1 and Non-IP represents a sample of all other companies. Obs. stands for number of observations.
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Table 41: Descriptive statistics: Difference-in-difference estimation 
Full Sample       
 Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment Group       
EBIT 120 8,377.94 3,373.41 11,857.69 156.30 53,744.78 
Costs of employees 120 15,506.77 9,793.83 20,690.72 851.26 110,785 
Fixed assets 120 55,012 11,621.67 136,975.80 78.09 704,268.70 
       
Control Group       
EBIT 5,508 11,893.03 718.48 106,761.80 0.19 3,232,000 
Costs of employees 5,508 16,833.22 2,011.11 73,509.92 0.33 1,769,000 
Fixed assets 5,508 39,757.99 1,007.44 265,506.80 0.00 4,920,454 
       
All Firms       
EBIT 5,628 11,818.08 745.51 105,632.60 0.19 3,232,000 
Costs of employees 5,628 16,804.94 2,075.49 72,784.34 0.33 1,769,000 
Fixed assets 5,628 40,083.24 1,039.74 263,423.90 0.00 4,920,454 
       
IP-intensive firms       
 Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment Group       
EBIT 60 10,025.57 4,050.25 13,793.34 209.69 53,744.78 
Costs of employees 60 21,617.45 11,612.07 26,851.96 851.26 110,785 
Fixed assets 60 81,250.91 16,460.96 186,250.40 321.64 704,268.70 
       
Control Group       
EBIT 2,976 15,668.66 1,274.36 135,135.90 0.50 3,232,000 
Costs of employees 2,976 21,241.59 3,739.15 59,276.42 2.78 641,069 
Fixed assets 2,976 56,932.31 2,097.93 332,521.40 0.00 4,920,454 
       
All Firms       
EBIT 3,036 15,557.14 1,337.52 133,809.60 0.50 3,232,000 
Costs of employees 3,036 21,249.02 3,869.67 58,806.89 2.78 641,069 
Fixed assets 3,036 57,412.92 2,166.21 330,258.10 0.00 4,920,454 
   Note:   
   IP-intensive firms are defined in Section 4.2.3.5.1. Obs. stands for number of observations. Std. Dev. stands for 
standard deviation. 
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Table 42: Robustness tests using alternative definitions of anti-avoidance strictness 
Dependent variable: Log EBIT 
TP Measure: TP Doc Years TP Doc Binary TP Doc Years + TP 
Doc required in practice 
TC Measure: 
1/ (1 )  
   TC D/E Ratio 
TC three-stage TC three-stage 
 IP Non-IP IP Non-IP IP Non-IP 
CIT -1.207*** 0.345 -0.103 0.970*** -1.018*** 0.203 
 (0.291) (0.319) (0.250) (0.301) (0.285) (0.348) 
TP 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT x TP 0.999*** 0.915*** 0.677** 0.366 0.557*** 0.453*** 
 (0.122) (0.139) (0.267) (0.314) (0.101) (0.119) 
TC 0.036 0.066 0.016* 0.068*** 0.027*** 0.077*** 
 (0.096) (0.109) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) 
CIT x TC 1.761 -1.572 0.025 -0.518*** 0.177 -0.566*** 
 (1.184) (1.351) (0.146) (0.176) (0.161) (0.194) 
TP x TC -0.188*** -0.275*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT x TP x TC -2.729*** -2.325*** -0.761*** -0.680*** -0.264*** -0.180*** 
 (0.400) (0.472) (0.169) (0.201) (0.056) (0.068) 
Log Fixed Assets 0.085*** 0.076*** 0.089*** 0.074*** 0.089*** 0.074*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log Costs of  0.414*** 0.385*** 0.400*** 0.386*** 0.399*** 0.385*** 
Employees (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment rate -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Corruption -0.016 0.053* -0.000 0.006 -0.010 0.012 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) 
GDP growth rate 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log GDP -1.048*** -1.760*** 0.718*** 0.345 0.118 -0.315 
 (0.306) (0.367) (0.263) (0.311) (0.273) (0.322) 
Log GDP/capita 1.097*** 1.890*** -0.578** -0.259 0.110 0.528* 
 (0.288) (0.338) (0.238) (0.278) (0.260) (0.297) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 57,719 42,163 60,732 42,981 60,729 42,980 
# Observations 280,267 201,728 325,494 215,827 325,417 215,757 
R-squared (within) 0.094 0.085 0.092 0.082 0.092 0.082 
Notes:  
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Units of observation 
are firms. The dependent variable is Log EBIT, which denotes a natural logarithm of a firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. TP 
measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Log Fixed assets 
and Log costs of employees are firm-level controls and represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and employee costs, 
respectively. Unemployment rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Corruption represents a corruption index. GDP growth 
rate is a country’s rate of GDP growth. Log GDP denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Log GDP/capita 
stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents a sample of IP-intensive firms 
as defined in section 4.2.3.4.1 and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies.  
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Table 43: Robustness tests using alternative definitions of intangible intensity 
Dependent variable: Log EBIT 
 IP2 Non-IP2 IP3 Non-IP3 IP4 Non-IP4 
CIT -0.450* 0.353 -0.525* 0.046 -0.581** 0.647** 
 (0.270) (0.285) (0.274) (0.298) (0.261) (0.298) 
TP 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
CIT x TP 0.613*** 0.431*** 0.513*** 0.528*** 0.617*** 0.379*** 
 (0.108) (0.116) (0.112) (0.120) (0.107) (0.118) 
TC 0.007 0.044*** 0.011 0.044*** 0.008 0.043*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
CIT x TC -0.143 -0.531*** -0.044 -0.348** -0.073 -0.655*** 
 (0.152) (0.159) (0.154) (0.166) (0.148) (0.165) 
TP x TC -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT x TP x TC -0.275*** -0.187*** -0.248*** -0.222*** -0.298*** -0.131* 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.062) (0.068) (0.059) (0.068) 
Log Fixed assets 0.090*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Log Costs of  0.399*** 0.387*** 0.405*** 0.375*** 0.401*** 0.382*** 
employees (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Unemployment rate -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.006 -0.014 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) 
GDP growth rate 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log GDP 0.096 -0.288 0.292 -0.301 0.130 -0.275 
 (0.287) (0.300) (0.298) (0.316) (0.279) (0.311) 
Log GDP/capita 0.149 0.509* 0.016 0.507* 0.130 0.543* 
 (0.274) (0.278) (0.290) (0.288) (0.266) (0.287) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 52,985 50,728 66,842 68,459 60,389 43,324 
# Observations 284,806 256,515 278,859 261,107 323,655 217,666 
R-squared (within) 0.093 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.093 0.081 
Notes:  
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log EBIT, which denotes a natural logarithm of a firm’s 
earnings before interest and taxes. TP measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the 
strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Log Fixed assets and Log Costs of employees are firm-level controls 
and represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and employee costs, respectively. Unemployment 
rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Corruption represents a corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is 
a country’s rate of GDP growth. Log GDP denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Log 
GDP/capita stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents 
a sample of IP-intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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Table 44: Main regression results based on the sample that includes ultimate owners 
Dependent variable: Log EBIT 
 Full Sample IP Non-IP 
CIT -0.008 -0.426* 0.378 
 (0.175) (0.236) (0.269) 
TP 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
CIT x TP 0.528*** 0.535*** 0.515*** 
 (0.073) (0.099) (0.109) 
TC 0.027*** 0.009 0.044*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
CIT x TC -0.337*** -0.107 -0.534*** 
 (0.100) (0.135) (0.152) 
TP x TC -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
CIT x TP x TC -0.235*** -0.261*** -0.202*** 
 (0.041) (0.055) (0.063) 
Log Fixed assets 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Log Costs of employees 0.394*** 0.405*** 0.378*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Unemployment rate -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
GDP growth rate 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP/capita 0.185 -0.115 0.482* 
 (0.183) (0.251) (0.270) 
Corruption 0.003 -0.003 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) 
Log GDP 0.086 0.376 -0.139 
 (0.193) (0.261) (0.292) 
Year-Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
# Companies 114,918 66,877 48,039 
# Observations 605,489 362,482 243,000 
R-squared (within) 0.089 0.095 0.082 
Notes: 
 ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Units of observation are firms. The dependent variable is Log EBIT, which denotes a natural logarithm of a firm’s 
earnings before interest and taxes. TP measures the strictness of transfer pricing regulations. TC measures the 
strictness of interest deduction restrictions. Log Fixed assets and Log Costs of employees are firm-level controls 
and represent natural logarithms of a company’s fixed assets and employee costs, respectively. Unemployment 
rate stands for a country’s rate of unemployment. Corruption represents a corruption index. GDP Growth Rate is 
a country’s rate of GDP growth. Log GDP denotes a natural logarithm of a country’s gross domestic product. Log 
GDP/capita stands for a natural logarithm of a country’s GDP per capita. FE stands for fixed effects. IP represents 
a sample of IP-intensive firms and Non-IP includes a sample of all other companies. 
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Table 45: Tax revenue from WHT under the status quo and a minimum WHT of 10% in all 
OECD and EU member states: all scenarios (part 1) 
   
Millions of 
USD
WHT Rev. 
50% IRD
WHT Rev. 
100% IRD
WHT Credit  
50% IRD
WHT Credit 
100% IRD
Balance 
50% IRD
Balance 
100% IRD
WHT Rev. WHT Credit Balance
∆ Balance 
50% IRD
∆ Balance 
100% IRD
AT
2006 41 1 9 6 32 -5 129 49 80 47 84
2007 46 1 13 9 33 -8 145 66 79 46 87
2008 49 3 19 12 31 -9 160 82 78 47 87
2009 36 1 16 10 19 -9 126 66 60 40 69
2010 31 1 13 9 18 -9 130 59 71 53 80
2011 30 1 13 8 17 -7 148 62 86 69 93
2012 33 2 15 9 18 -7 153 67 86 68 93
CZ
2006 42 42 1 0 40 41 55 3 51 11 10
2007 48 48 2 1 47 47 68 3 65 18 18
2008 56 56 3 2 54 55 77 5 72 18 17
2009 57 57 7 6 50 51 73 9 64 14 13
2010 59 59 8 7 51 52 77 10 67 16 15
2011 54 32 8 7 46 25 99 11 88 42 63
2012 44 28 14 11 30 17 81 20 61 31 44
DE
2006 46 36 148 141 -102 -105 932 680 253 355 357
2007 69 60 181 174 -112 -115 1076 814 262 374 377
2008 68 57 242 230 -175 -174 1291 1076 215 390 389
2009 74 45 270 261 -197 -216 1770 1770 0 197 216
2010 70 55 304 293 -234 -238 1325 1458 -133 101 106
2011 93 72 368 345 -275 -273 1315 1432 -117 158 156
2012 79 58 374 341 -295 -284 1214 1338 -125 170 159
DK
2006 17 16 56 55 -39 -39 132 171 -39 0 0
2007 3 3 75 73 -72 -71 135 194 -59 13 12
2008 6 5 120 117 -113 -112 173 256 -83 30 29
2009 29 3 102 87 -73 -85 174 274 -100 -27 -16
2010 22 6 82 71 -61 -65 172 205 -32 28 33
2011 20 3 106 92 -87 -88 188 227 -39 48 49
2012 23 5 87 71 -64 -66 187 220 -33 31 32
FR
2006 73 57 207/ 206 205/ 204 -134/ -133 -148/ -147 328 562 -233 -100/ -101 -85/ -86
2007 121 97 324/ 323 321/ 320 -202 -224/ -223 465 788 -323 -121 -99/ -100
2008 115 92 380/ 379 377/ 375 -266/ -265 -285/ -284 516 996 -480 -215/ -216 -196/ -197
2009 90 37 185/ 184 168/ 167 -95/ -94 -131/ -130 898 1284 -386 -291/ -293 -255/ -256
2010 73 27 181/ 178 168/ 167 -107/ -105 -141/ -139 985 1270 -285 -177/ -180 -144/ -146
2011 95 33 245/ 242 225/ 224 -150/ -148 -192/ -190 1097 1506 -410 -259/ -262 -218/ -219
2012 75 24 186/ 184 162/ 161 -111/ -109 -138/ -137 910 1148 -238 -126/ -128 -99/ -100
IL
2006 81 81 52 52 30 30 91 77 14 -15 -15
2007 69 69 55 55 13 13 75 72 2 -11 -11
2008 84 84 57 57 27 27 92 76 16 -11 -11
2009 43 43 56 56 -13 -13 47 75 -28 -15 -15
2010 44 44 59 59 -15 -15 48 77 -29 -14 -14
2011 48 48 71 71 -24 -24 53 93 -40 -17 -17
2012 60 60 88 88 -27 -27 67 115 -49 -21 -21
Status quo WHT 10% OECD + EU Change
Abbreviations: 
IRD = EU Interest and Royalties Directive; AT = Austria; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; FR = France; IL = Israel
Notes: 
All numbers are rounded to the nearest million. The first two columns illustrate the amount of tax revenue received from levying WHT on royalty outflows of a country. Columns 3 and
4 depict the value of foreign WHTs credited in the respective country. For France, the tax credit is calculated for two scenarios: (a) the assumption holds that the IP-box regime does
not apply (first value in columns 3 and 4) and (b) it is assumed that all royalties are taxed under the IP-box regime (second value in columns 3 and 4). Columns 5 and 6 show the
balance of WHT income minus WHT credit. For the EU member states, a range for WHT revenue, credit and balance is calculated, assuming that at least 50% (columns 1, 3, and 5)
and at most 100% (columns 2, 4, and 6) of all royalty payments were made between at least 25% of affiliates qualifying for WHT reduction under the IRD. Columns 7-9 illustrate the
WHT revenue, WHT credit and balance that would have resulted if all EU and OECD member states had levied WHT on royalties at a minimum rate of 10%. Columns 10 and 11
highlight the change in WHT balance resulting from the reform option of a broader levy of WHT on royalties. For France, the second number in columns 10 and 11 depicts the change
in tax revenue if IP-box regimes are considered. 
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Table 46: Tax revenue from WHT under the status quo and a minimum WHT of 10% in all 
OECD and EU member states: all scenarios (part 2) 
 
Millions of 
USD
WHT Rev. 
50% IRD
WHT Rev. 
100% IRD
WHT Credit  
50% IRD
WHT Credit 
100% IRD
Balance 
50% IRD
Balance 
100% IRD
WHT Rev. WHT Credit Balance
∆ Balance 
50% IRD
∆ Balance 
100% IRD
IT
2006 90 47 51 40 38 7 182 109 74 36 67
2007 76 38 46 34 30 4 165 102 63 32 59
2008 341 197 275 247 65 -50 772 417 355 290 406
2009 293 163 303 280 -10 -117 669 399 270 280 387
2010 273 143 278 256 -5 -114 711 380 331 336 444
2011 259 117 264 235 -5 -118 697 412 286 291 404
2012 223 98 272 243 -49 -145 603 427 176 225 321
JP
2006 445 445 1184 1184 -739 -739 1528 2108 -580 159 159
2007 412 412 1238 1238 -826 -826 1626 2418 -792 34 34
2008 443 443 1430 1430 -987 -987 1757 2677 -920 67 67
2009 432 432 1163 1163 -731 -731 1643 2234 -591 140 140
2010 518 518 1465 1465 -947 -947 1830 2783 -953 -6 -6
2011 525 525 1620 1620 -1096 -1096 1864 3030 -1165 -70 -70
2012 527 527 1729 1729 -1202 -1202 1939 3317 -1377 -176 -176
KR
2006 596 596 226 226 370 370 596 228 369 -2 -2
2007 655 655 218 218 437 437 655 219 436 -1 -1
2008 719 719 277 277 443 443 719 277 442 0 0
2009 917 917 387 387 530 530 917 387 529 -1 -1
2010 1114 1114 359 359 755 755 1114 360 754 -1 -1
2011 916 916 510 510 406 406 916 512 404 -2 -2
SK
2006 5 1 5 4 0 -3 11 10 1 0 3
2007 6 2 8 7 -2 -5 12 16 -4 -2 1
2008 8 3 7 6 1 -3 18 18 1 -1 4
2009 9 5 5 4 4 1 16 9 7 2 6
2010 7 4 1 1 6 3 15 7 8 2 5
2011 8 4 0 0 8 4 15 0 15 7 11
2012 7 3 0 0 6 3 13 0 13 6 10
SE
2006 12 11 138 136 -126 -125 164 399 -235 -108 -110
2007 21 19 124 122 -103 -103 182 457 -275 -171 -172
2008 23 22 175 173 -152 -151 198 465 -268 -116 -116
2009 23 21 75 73 -51 -52 180 446 -265 -214 -214
2010 10 6 105 103 -94 -98 146 568 -422 -328 -324
2011 10 8 91 85 -82 -78 188 590 -402 -321 -325
2012 26 23 96 86 -70 -63 233 625 -392 -322 -329
US
2006 443 443 2560 2560 -2117 -2117 2479 8100 -5620 -3504 -3504
2007 547 547 2921 2921 -2375 -2375 2733 9127 -6394 -4019 -4019
2008 564 564 2960 2960 -2397 -2397 2972 9605 -6633 -4236 -4236
2009 482 482 3080 3080 -2598 -2598 3134 9426 -6292 -3695 -3695
2010 229 229 4130 4130 -3900 -3900 3014 10553 -7539 -3639 -3639
2011 311 311 4819 4819 -4507 -4507 3240 11996 -8756 -4249 -4249
2012 797 797 5317 5317 -4520 -4520 4063 12507 -8444 -3924 -3924
Notes: 
All numbers are rounded to the nearest million. The first two columns illustrate the amount of tax revenue received from levying WHT on royalty outflows of a country. Columns 3
and 4 depict the value of foreign WHTs credited in the respective country. Columns 5 and 6 show the balance of WHT income minus WHT credit. For the EU member states, a range
for WHT revenue, credit and balance is calculated, assuming that at least 50% (columns 1, 3, and 5) and at most 100% (columns 2, 4, and 6) of all royalty payments were made
between at least 25% of affiliates qualifying for WHT reduction under the IRD. Columns 7-9 illustrate the WHT revenue, WHT credit and balance that would have resulted if all EU
and OECD member states had levied WHT on royalties at a minimum rate of 10%. Columns 10 and 11 highlight the change in WHT balance resulting from the reform option of a
broader levy of WHT on royalties.
Status quo WHT 10% OECD + EU Change
Abbreviations: 
IRD = EU Interest and Royalties Directive; IT = Italy; JP = Japan, KR = Republic of Korea; SK = Slovak Republic; SE = Sweden; US = United States
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Table 47: Tax revenue effect of the inverted tax credit: all scenarios (part 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Millions of 
USD
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
no IP Box
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
no IP Box
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
IP Box
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
IP Box
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
no IP Box
IG WHT
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
no IP Box
all WHT
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
no IP Box
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
IP Box
IG WHT
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
IP Box
all WHT
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
IP Box
AT  
2006 3 7 4 9 5 -30 10 6 -29 13
2007 4 7 10 20 7 -31 13 13 -25 26
2008 5 11 13 26 9 -27 18 17 -19 34
2009 5 9 12 23 8 -16 17 15 -9 30
2010 7 15 16 31 11 -13 21 19 -5 38
2011 8 16 22 44 10 -12 20 24 2 48
2012 11 21 23 47 12 -10 25 25 2 50
CZ
2006 2 5 6 12 -18 -38 -37 -15 -35 -30
2007 3 7 12 24 -20 -43 -41 -12 -35 -23
2008 2 5 9 19 -25 -52 -50 -18 -45 -36
2009 2 5 8 16 -23 -47 -46 -18 -42 -35
2010 2 3 5 10 -25 -49 -49 -21 -46 -42
2011 2 4 11 22 -10 -44 -21 -1 -35 -3
2012 1 3 9 18 -8 -29 -16 0 -22 -1
DE
2006 244 488 286 573 270 292 539 312 334 623
2007 306 612 467 934 329 350 659 490 511 980
2008 119 238 280 561 158 198 316 319 360 639
2009 231 461 630 1259 284 318 568 683 717 1366
2010 185 370 373 746 240 291 480 428 479 856
2011 190 379 443 886 239 291 479 493 544 986
2012 212 424 465 931 259 318 519 513 571 1025
DK
2006 13 26 16 31 27 40 54 30 43 59
2007 8 16 21 43 35 62 69 48 75 96
2008 12 24 33 65 52 94 104 73 115 146
2009 10 20 27 53 34 46 68 51 63 101
2010 10 21 23 47 32 48 63 45 61 89
2011 19 37 46 91 45 70 90 72 97 144
2012 16 32 40 80 34 50 68 58 75 116
FR
2006 73 146 2 5 136 184 271 65 113 130
2007 111 222 12 24 210 287 420 111 188 222
2008 145 289 22 43 265 366 530 142 243 284
2009 210 420 44 87 232 217 463 65 50 130
2010 249 497 90 180 277 272 554 118 112 237
2011 298 596 138 275 332 326 665 172 164 344
2012 269 539 119 239 287 278 575 137 127 275
IL
2006 11 21 13 25 -8 -26 -15 -6 -24 -11
2007 14 28 18 35 7 0 13 10 3 21
2008 15 30 20 40 1 -13 2 6 -8 12
2009 1 1 6 11 5 10 11 10 15 21
2010 1 1 5 11 7 13 13 11 18 23
2011 1 1 6 12 11 21 21 16 26 32
2012 1 2 8 16 12 24 25 19 31 39
Abbreviations: 
ITC – Inverted Tax Credit; IG – intragroup; AT – Austria; CZ – Czech Republic; DE – Germany; DK – Denmark; FR – France; IL – Israel
Notes:
All numbers are rounded to the nearest million. Columns 1-4 depict the range of additional tax revenue income that in the respective years would have resulted from the implementation of an
inverted tax credit system in addition to existing WHTs. The lower boundary is calculated assuming that at least 50% of all royalty payments were made between affiliates and thus were
subject to the inverted tax credit (columns 1 and 3). The upper boundary is calculated assuming that all payments were made between affiliates (columns 2 and 4). In columns 1 and 2, the case
where no royalty income benefits from an IP-box regime is considered. Columns 3 and 4 assume that all royalty income benefits from an IP-box regime, where available. Columns 5-10
present the results for the case where the inverted tax credit replaces WHTs in all OECD and EU member states. In columns 5, 6, 8, and 9, it is assumed that 50% of all royalty payments were
made between affiliates. In columns 7 and 10, 100% affiliate payments are assumed. In columns 5-7, IP-box regimes are not considered. In columns 8-10, the assumption is that all royalty
income benefits from an IP-box regime, where available. In columns 5 and 8, only WHTs on intragroup royalties are replaced. In columns 6 and 9, all WHTs are replaced. 
ITC in addition to WHT ITC instead of WHT
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Table 48: Tax revenue effect of the inverted tax credit: all scenarios (part 2) 
 
 
 
  
Millions of 
USD
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
no IP Box
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
no IP Box
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
IP Box
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
IP Box
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
no IP Box
IG WHT
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
no IP Box
all WHT
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
no IP Box
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
IP Box
IG WHT
∆ Status Quo
50% IG
IP Box
all WHT
∆ Status Quo
100% IG
IP Box
IT
2006 47 95 64 128 41 3 82 57 20 115
2007 53 106 85 171 45 10 90 77 43 154
2008 197 394 401 803 152 -8 305 357 196 713
2009 185 370 367 734 181 69 362 363 252 726
2010 196 393 403 806 180 56 360 387 263 774
2011 196 393 451 903 181 52 361 436 307 871
2012 172 344 398 796 159 50 319 385 277 771
JP
2006 303 605 338 676 307 312 615 343 348 686
2007 342 684 417 833 330 319 660 405 393 810
2008 454 907 549 1099 419 384 838 515 480 1030
2009 450 900 532 1063 374 298 748 456 380 912
2010 532 1063 620 1239 425 318 849 513 406 1025
2011 560 1120 686 1372 448 335 895 574 462 1148
2012 522 1045 663 1326 423 324 846 564 464 1127
KR
2006 5 10 17 34 -239 -484 -479 -227 -472 -454
2007 9 18 31 61 -257 -523 -515 -236 -502 -471
2008 7 14 31 62 -290 -588 -581 -267 -564 -533
2009 4 7 24 49 -331 -666 -662 -310 -645 -621
2010 4 9 23 46 -457 -919 -914 -439 -900 -877
2011 4 8 19 37 -299 -601 -597 -284 -587 -568
SK
2006 0 1 0 1 2 0 3 2 0 3
2007 0 1 1 2 2 1 5 3 2 6
2008 0 0 3 6 2 -1 4 5 1 10
2009 0 0 1 3 0 -4 0 1 -3 2
2010 0 0 1 3 -1 -6 -2 0 -5 0
2011 0 0 1 2 -2 -8 -3 -1 -7 -2
2012 0 0 1 2 -1 -6 -2 0 -5 -1
SE
2006 7 14 9 17 21 38 43 23 39 46
2007 12 24 29 59 28 44 56 46 62 91
2008 26 51 47 93 38 51 76 59 72 118
2009 12 24 31 62 20 28 40 39 48 79
2010 17 33 35 71 38 55 75 56 74 113
2011 20 40 42 84 34 53 69 56 75 113
2012 35 70 66 131 45 62 90 76 93 152
US
2006 1027 1118 1318 1409 1444 1871 1450/1962 1735 2162 1741/2253
2007 1377 1452 1824 1900 1854 2387 1874/2463 2302 2835 2322/2911
2008 2214 2214 2711 2711 2620 3280 2620/3280 3117 3776 3117/3776
2009 2493 2493 2909 2909 2838 3491 2838/3491 3254 3907 3254/3907
2010 2182 2187 2718 2723 2763 3536 2762/3541 3299 4072 3298/4078
2011 2425 2452 3311 3338 3079 3919 3058/3945 3965 4805 3944/4831
2012 3065 3072 3998 4005 3281 4219 3279/4226 4213 5152 4212/5159
Abbreviations: 
ITC – Inverted Tax Credit; IG – intragroup; IT = Italy; JP = Japan; KR = Republic of Korea; SK = Slovak Republic; SE = Sweden; US = United States
Notes:
All numbers are rounded to the nearest million. Columns 1-4 depict the range of additional tax revenue income that in the respective years would have resulted from the implementation of an
inverted tax credit system in addition to existing WHTs. The lower boundary is calculated assuming that at least 50% of all royalty payments were made between affiliates and thus were
subject to the inverted tax credit (columns 1 and 3). The upper boundary is calculated assuming that all payments were made between affiliates (columns 2 and 4). In columns 1 and 2, the case
where no royalty income benefits from an IP-box regime is considered. Columns 3 and 4 assume that all royalty income benefits from an IP-box regime, where available. Columns 5-10
present the results for the case where the inverted tax credit replaces WHTs in all OECD and EU member states. In columns 5, 6, 8, and 9, it is assumed that 50% of all royalty payments were
made between affiliates. In columns 7 and 10, 100% affiliate payments are assumed. In columns 5-7, IP-box regimes are not considered. In columns 8-10, the assumption is that all royalty
income benefits from an IP-box regime, where available. In columns 5 and 8, only WHTs on intragroup royalties are replaced. In columns 6 and 9, all WHTs are replaced. For the US, in
columns 7 and 10, the first value refers to the change in revenue if only WHTs on intragroup royalties are replaced and the second value refers to the change in revenue if WHTs on all
royalties are replaced. The reason why those values differ only for the US is that the more detailed BEA data is used for the US, which shows the share of affiliate payments for most royalty
flows.
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